This Court finds the Thomasville decision to be both an anomaly (which has been followed by no subsequent decision) and a valuable precedent only insofar as it may suggest that a police officer may avail himself of the defense when he acts so far outside of his delegated functions that his acts may fairly be considered discretionary or similar to the acts performed by managerial employees acting within the scope of their discretionary functions. More recently, in Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 317 S.E.2d 900 (1984), the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed a case in which two sheriff's deputies were alleged to have negligently conducted a high-speed chase that resulted in the death of plaintiff's decedents. The Keener court did refer to the case of Nelson v. Spaulding County, supra, note 24 (discussing the ministerial/discretionary-act dichotomy), and found that, in the case before it, "[a]ppellants' allegations . . . [had] raised a factual question as to whether the deputy sheriffs were engaged in the performance of a ministerial act in which they acted negligently in endangering the lives and property of others."
In the same sense, a sheriff is the employer of his deputies. See Barnes, 282 Ga. App. at 895 (3); Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 675 (1) ( 317 SE2d 900) (1984). See OCGA ยง 15-16-23.
Hill v. Clayton County Bd. of Commrs., 283 Ga. App. 15, 17 (1) (a) ( 640 SE2d 638) (2006). See also Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 675 (1) ( 317 SE2d 900) (1984). In Hill, a county challenged the sheriff's decision to use forfeited drug money (allocated to the sheriff by federal statute) to repaint the vehicles and offices of the sheriff's department.
However, the Board's control over county property is limited in the context of motor vehicles and equipment owned by a county but assigned to a sheriff for his exclusive use. See Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 675 (1) ( 317 SE2d 900) (1984) (the act requiring county to provide supplies and equipment to the sheriffs department did not give the county commissioners control over the use of the equipment); Clayton v. Taylor, 223 Ga. 346, 348-349 ( 155 SE2d 387) (1967). In Taylor, a local act required the Board of County Commissioners of Jenkins County to pay for two police vehicles for the county sheriffs office.
Accord Smith v. Chatham County, 264 Ga. App. 566, 570 ( 591 SE2d 388) (2003). Phillips cites Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 675 (2) ( 317 SE2d 900) (1984), as support for the trial court's holding. In that case, this Court found that where it was alleged that a police officer was speeding in hot pursuit in violation of OCGA ยง 40-6-6 (b) (3), such allegations "raised a factual question as to whether the deputy sheriffs were engaged in the performance of a ministerial act in which they acted negligently in endangering the lives and property of others."
[Cit.]" Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 675(2) ( 317 S.E.2d 900) (1984). Here, neither the policy nor the act in issue is comparable to those in the cases cited by Standard.
Therefore, Officer Holcomb's acts or omissions in supervising inmates were subject to tort liability. OCGA ยงยง 42-5-53 (b); 42-5-60 (e); Ga. Admin. Code ยงยง 125-2-3-.04; 125-3-1-.02; 125-3-1-.05; 125-3-2-.02; 125-3-2-.07; 125-3-2-.08; 125-4-3-.01 through 125-4-3-.04; 125-4-4-.01 through 125-4-4-.12; Gilbert v. Richardson, supra at 749-753; Hiers v. City of Barwick, 262 Ga. 129, 134 ( 414 S.E.2d 647) (1992); Logue v. Wright, 260 Ga. 206 ( 392 S.E.2d 235) (1990); Nelson v. Spalding County, 249 Ga. 334 ( 290 S.E.2d 915) (1982); Williams v. Dept. of Corrections, 224 Ga. App. 571 ( 481 S.E.2d 272) (1997); see also Joyce v. Van Arsdale, 196 Ga. App. 95 ( 395 S.E.2d 275) (1990); Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 676 (2) ( 317 S.E.2d 900) (1984). (d) To the extent that official immunity was waived under OCGA ยง 33-24-51 (b), "[a] county may be liable for a county employee's negligence in performing an official function to the extent the county has waived sovereign immunity."
See generally Burbridge v. Hensley, 194 Ga. App. 523 ( 391 S.E.2d 5) (1990). We do not agree with appellant that under the law that existed prior to the enactment of OCGA ยง 36-1-21, see Pettus v. Smith, 174 Ga. App. 587, 588 (2) ( 330 S.E.2d 735) (1985); Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674, 675 (1) ( 317 S.E.2d 900) (1984); Drost v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 703, 710-711 (3) ( 22 S.E.2d 475) (1942), any attempt by Henry County and Sheriff Chaffin to make Sheriff's Department employees subject to the Henry County civil service system was valid. Accordingly, appellant was an employee of the Henry County Sheriff, not a Henry County employee, and thus cannot rely upon the disciplinary procedures set forth in Henry County's employee policy manual.
Construing the evidence in favor of the appellants, and otherwise affording them the benefit of every doubt, the only rational inference which can be drawn from these facts is that Officer DiFiore's actions did not constitute a proximate cause of the collision. Compare Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674 (2) ( 317 S.E.2d 900) (1984); Davis v. Ramey, 174 Ga. App. 417 ( 330 S.E.2d 130) (1985). Consequently, there is no basis for assessing any liability against him. It follows that there is no basis for assessing liability against the police chief, the city manager, or the mayor and aldermen of the city, based on any city policy which may or may not have been in force with respect to high-speed chases in general.
Appellant enumerates as error the trial court's finding that Deputy Harris was not an employee of the board of commissioners. In Keener v. Kimble, 170 Ga. App. 674 ( 317 S.E.2d 900) (1984), this court held that deputy sheriffs are employees of the sheriff, who is vested with legal authority to direct and regulate their conduct as to the discharge of their official duties. See also McCutcheon v. MacNeill, 197 Ga. 72 ( 28 S.E.2d 469) (1943); Drost v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 703 ( 22 S.E.2d 475) (1942); Bd. of Commissioners, Richmond County v. Whittle, 180 Ga. 166 ( 178 S.E.2d 534) (1934).