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Keen v. State

626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)
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Keen v. State

46 Citing cases

  1. State v. Sodders

    255 Kan. 79 (Kan. 1994)   Cited 25 times
    In Sodders, 255 Kan. at 84, despite the absence of any federal or state constitutional violation, the court affirmed the suppression of evidence where Overland Park police officers exceeded their territorial jurisdiction by executing a search warrant within the municipal boundaries of Lenexa.

    668 P.2d at 1152. In Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Crim. 1981), an Austin, Texas, police officer obtained a search warrant for a residence outside the city limits. Officers from the county sheriff's office were present at the time the search warrant was executed.

  2. Miffleton v. State

    777 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that Tex. Const. art. 1, sec. 10 only applies to testimonial compulsion

    It is a well-established rule that, under such circumstances, appellate courts are to apply the presumption that the trial judge disregarded any inadmissible evidence presented at trial. Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Ex parte LeBlanc, 615 S.W.2d 724 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). Hattersley v. State, 487 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932, 93 S.Ct. 1900, 36 L.Ed.2d 391 (1973); Larocca v. State, 479 S.W.2d 669 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972); Atkins v. State, 423 S.W.2d 579 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968); Milligan v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. 584, 343 S.W.2d 455 (1961); Arnold v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 344, 277 S.W.2d 106 (1955).

  3. State v. Bassano

    827 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App. 1992)   Cited 13 times
    In State v. Bassano, 827 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd), the court held that the defendant had standing to contest the search of his wife's vehicle.

    " The Court of Criminal Appeals has already addressed this issue in Long v. State and Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981). In Long, a search warrant commanded the sheriff to enter and search the suspected place described in the affidavit.

  4. Stafford v. State

    758 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. App. 1988)   Cited 10 times

    Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981) (and cases cited therein). Unfortunately, in so responding, the State misconceives appellant's argument.

  5. Wilson v. State

    977 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)   Cited 65 times
    Holding that appellant challenging authority of qualified judge to preside pursuant to an expired assignment must make timely objection

    Rather, a defendant "must bring a direct action through a quo warranto proceeding." Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309, 311-312 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Archer v. State, 607 S.W.2d 539, 543-544 (Tex.Crim.App 1980). It is clear to us now, however, that the rule of Keen and Archer must be abandoned as unworkable.

  6. Miller v. State

    866 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)   Cited 17 times
    In Miller v. State, 866 S.W.2d 243 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993), we explained that a party may preserve error concerning the challenge to the authority of a special judge by objecting at trial.

    The State also argues that a quo warranto proceeding is the only means to contest the appointment of a special judge. See Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309, 311-12 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Archer v. State, 607 S.W.2d 539, 543-44 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 908, 101 S.Ct. 3037, 69 L.Ed.2d 410 (1981). We disagree.

  7. Tolbert v. State

    743 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)   Cited 29 times
    In Tolbert v. State, 743 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988), a plurality of this Court held that in a trial before the court there is a presumption that the trial court as trier of fact disregarded any inadmissible evidence admitted at trial.

    It is a well-settled rule of general acceptance that in a trial before the court, the presumption is entertained that the court as trier of fact disregarded any inadmissible evidence admitted at trial. See Morgan v. State, 692 S.W.2d 877 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985); Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Komurke v. State, 562 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Hernandez v. State, 556 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Larocca v. State, 479 S.W.2d 669 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972) and cases cited therein; Milligan v. State, 170 Tex.Crim. R., 343 S.W.2d 455 (1961); Arnold v. State, 161 Tex.Crim.

  8. Polk v. State

    729 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)   Cited 71 times
    Holding that for an objection to be timely, it must be lodged "at the earliest opportunity," or "as soon as the ground for objection becomes apparent"

    Hence, for example, came the rule that in a proceeding before the court it will be presumed, even in the face of a valid objection that is overruled, that the court ignored objectionable or incompetent evidence in its deliberations, so long as other evidence, properly admitted or not challenged, is sufficient to support its judgment. E.g., Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981); Arnold v. State, 161 Tex.Crim. 384, 277 S.W.2d 106 (1955). In Arnold, 277 S.W.2d at 107, the rule is stated:

  9. Moraguez v. State

    701 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)   Cited 135 times
    Holding that defendant preserves objection to introduction of evidence in pretrial motion to suppress but waives that error when he affirmatively states "no objection" to introduction of same evidence at trial

    The situation in the instant case is more closely akin to those cases which teach that an erroneous ruling on a motion to suppress will not vitiate a conviction where the evidence sought to be suppressed is not introduced and the conviction is supported by other evidence independently of that contested by the motion to suppress. Stiggers v. State, 506 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974) (on a plea of not guilty); Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309, 314, 315 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982). In the instant case the appellant entered stipulations, both oral and written, which were to constitute the entire evidence before the court on his plea of not guilty. The stipulations were not artfully drafted to say the least.

  10. Morgan v. State

    692 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)   Cited 135 times
    Holding extraneous acts of touching complainant's sister were properly admitted as relevant to infer specific intent to gratify sexual desire

    When the prosecutor urged her to elaborate, she testified she couldn't remember whether he "rubbed on" her. Ultimately she testified, still on direct: "He didn't rub me. Just picked me up and touched me between my legs." Assuming all the extraneous acts of misconduct were inadmissible for purposes of prosecuting the instant offense, and entertaining the presumption that in a trial before the court the trial court does not consider inadmissible evidence in arriving at its judgment, see, e.g., Keen v. State, 626 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981), we would be compelled to agree with the court of appeals that the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to convict. The circumstances surrounding the alleged act were not of themselves of such a character that the specific intent to arouse and gratify his sexual desire could be attributed to appellant beyond a reasonable doubt therefrom.