Conversely, "a jury charge is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard, or if it does not adequately inform the jury of the law." Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 51-52 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 552) (considering unpreserved objection in a copyright context)."To constitute plain error, 'a court's action must contravene an established rule of law,' and 'go to the very essence of the case.'"

We have recognized an exception to this principle where the purported error was "purely one of law." Keeling v. Hars , 809 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2015). But, even then, we will not entertain post-verdict appeals on an issue raised in a denied summary-judgment motion when two alternative paths to review were available to the challenging party: "(1) the party may petition for the right to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) ; or (2) if the case proceeds to trial, the party may file a motion (and renewed motions) pursuant to Rule 50 for judgment as a matter of law and appeal the district court's denial of that motion."

On plain error review, this court "will only grant relief if there was ‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’ " Keeling v. Hars , 809 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Weintraub , 273 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir. 2001) ). In other words, "[t]o constitute plain error, a court's action must contravene an established rule of law and go to the very essence of the case."

(quoting Hathaway, v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 554 (2d Cir. 1996)). Conversely, “a jury charge is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard, or if it does not adequately inform the jury of the law.” Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 51-52 Cir. 2015) (quoting Hathaway, 99 F.3d at 552 (considering unpreserved objection in a copyright context)). “To constitute plain error, ‘a court's action must contravene an established rule of law,' and ‘go to the very essence of the case.'”

"In order to show plain error affecting 'substantial rights,' a litigant must typically show that the error was prejudicial: [i]t must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings." Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 54 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has "cautioned that instructions must be evaluated not in isolation but in the context of the entire charge."

Clockwork relies on other cases involving derivatives that, like the guitar in Pickett , obviously are pervaded by the original work. See Keeling v. Hars , 809 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2015) (live-action parody of the movie Point Break ); U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC , 692 F.3d 1009, 1013 (9th Cir. 2012) (updated version of a software program). Clockwork also argues that the district court erred by allowing the jury to find that Hiller had authorization to incorporate content from the Manuals.

Thus, the Port Authority's challenge to that summary judgment decision was not waived, and the legal issues underlying the denial of summary judgment are subject to de novo review. Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 2015).

Big Apple contends that because Suarez did not raise the specific jury-charge objection before the district court that she now raises on appeal, she did not properly preserve her challenge and we should apply plain error review. See Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2015). Because Suarez's objection cannot survive either standard, we need not resolve this issue.

Because Ortega sought no such clarifying instructions or questions in the District Court, we review only for "plain error," and will grant relief only if such error affected "substantial rights" and "the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To constitute plain error, a court's action must contravene an established rule of law, and go to the very essence of the case."

In addition, "[w]e construe the submissions of a pro se litigant liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." Keeling v. Hars, 809 F.3d 43, 47 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2519 (2016). Blake argues that he had a privilege under New York law and his group life insurance policy to "convert" that policy's coverage of Ms. Blake as a dependent into an independent, stand-alone policy (with the death benefit still payable to her ex-husband, no less).