From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Keegan v. General Electric Company

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Jun 21, 2004
Civil Action No. 03-3870 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 21, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 03-3870.

June 21, 2004


MEMORANDUM


Presently pending is Plaintiff's Petition to Amend Complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), and Defendant's response in opposition. For reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's motion will be granted.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on August 30, 2002, which alleged age discrimination involving his termination from his position with Defendant, General Electric. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Plaintiff commenced this action on June 27, 2003. Plaintiff's original Complaint alleged that he had been replaced in his position as North American Sales Manager by John Garrity, a substantially younger person, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).

The discovery period was originally ordered to be completed by January 9, 2004, but was extended, upon stipulation of the parties, to March 1, 2004, and then again to April 30, 2004. On the final day of discovery Plaintiff filed this Petition to Amend the Complaint to include an allegation that Defendant failed to transfer him to one of two positions created at or around the time of his termination.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) allows a party to amend its pleadings once as a matter of course at any time prior to the serving of a responsive pleading. Otherwise, a court may give a party leave to amend its complaint "when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The Rule further states that such leave should be "freely given." Id. A District Court may only deny leave to amend if it is apparent from the record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the opposing party. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

The passage of time is not enough to deny a motion to amend, the delay must have either placed an unwarranted burden on the Court, in which case it is deemed to be "undue," or it must have placed an unfair burden on the opposing party, in which case it is deemed to be "prejudicial." Adams v. Gould Inc., 739 F.2d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). I find that the delay in filing the Petition has not placed an unwarranted burden on the Court, nor has it placed an unfair burden on the Defendant. Both the original complaint and Plaintiff's proposed amendments make claims of age discrimination, and draw from many of the same set of facts and circumstances. It is unlikely that Defendant would have to engage in any further discovery in order to defend against a claim of failure to transfer, and in the absence of any evidence on the record demonstrating what the burden to the Defendant would be, I find that none exists sufficient to establish prejudice.

Defendant also claims that allowing the amendment would be futile. They argue that a motion to amend is futile if it would not survive a Rule 56 summary judgment motion. The Third Circuit has clearly defined "futility" for these purposes as meaning that the amended Complaint would fail to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted. In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, 114 F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). A District Court must apply the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) a claim should be dismissed if it fails to state a cause of action, when it appears to a certainty that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved. See Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The District Court must "construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065, 109 S.Ct. 1338, 103 L.Ed.2d 808 (1989) (citations omitted).

Defendant advances three reasons why the plaintiff's requested amendment would be futile. (1) Plaintiff has not exhausted his statutorily mandated administrative remedies with regards to his new claim, (2) Defendant had no obligation to transfer Plaintiff, and (3) Plaintiff never asked to be considered for either of the newly created positions. (Def.'s Brief [in Opp. To Pl. Pet. To Amend Compl.] at 8).

In order to file a civil action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act a Plaintiff must first file a charge alleging unlawful discrimination with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The scope of the judicial complaint, however, is not limited to the four corners of the administrative charge. Hicks v. ABT Assoc., Inc., 572 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1978). After a charge is filed with the EEOC alleging discriminatory conduct, the scope of a resulting private civil action is defined by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination. Id. at 966. Under a 12(b)(6) standard, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the EEOC investigation could reasonably have been expected to include a failure to transfer claim.

Defendants also claims that the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint would be futile because it had no obligation to transfer Plaintiff, and because Plaintiff never asked to be considered for the positions. In order to establish that the Defendant engaged in discriminatory conduct by failing to transfer Plaintiff, Plaintiff must demonstrate that similarly situated employees were transferred when Plaintiff was not. Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff claims that John Garrity was transferred into a position that shared many similarities to Plaintiff's former position, and although Defendant denies this claim, it is unnecessary for the Court to decide the issue in the context of a motion to dismiss. Similarly, whether Plaintiff was aware, and to what degree he was aware of the new job openings is a question that is not appropriately answered at this time.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and in consideration of the facts in their totality, I find no grounds to deny Plaintiff's Petition to Amend Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion will be granted. An appropriate order follows.

ORDER

AND NOW, this ____ day of June, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Petition to Amend Complaint, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Petition to Amend Complaint is GRANTED.


Summaries of

Keegan v. General Electric Company

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
Jun 21, 2004
Civil Action No. 03-3870 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 21, 2004)
Case details for

Keegan v. General Electric Company

Case Details

Full title:JOHN J. KEEGAN, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, Defendant

Court:United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Date published: Jun 21, 2004

Citations

Civil Action No. 03-3870 (E.D. Pa. Jun. 21, 2004)