Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-3870.
June 25, 2004
MEMORANDUM
Presently before the court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiff's Response in opposition. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion will be denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, John J. Keegan, was born on June 1, 1945, and is currently 59 years old. (Keegan Dep. II at 14.) Plaintiff had been employed in various positions at Defendant General Electric Company ("GE") since 1963. (Keegan Dep. at 17.) In February, 2000, Plaintiff was promoted to North American pole sales manager at GE Multilin, a division of Defendant. (Keegan Dep. II at 38-42.) Plaintiff was responsible for overseeing Regional Sales Managers ("RSMs") in North America, and reported to the global sales manager, Mike Coleman ("Coleman"). (Keegan Dep. II at 38-42; Coleman Aff. at ¶ 4.) In February, 2002, Plaintiff was informed by Coleman that his position was being eliminated. (Bowman Dep. at 26.) Defendant sent written notice of termination on March 26, 2002. (Pl.'s Exhibit 8.)
The decision to eliminate Plaintiff's position was made as part of an annual review session conducted by Defendant. (Coleman Dep. at 68.) Defendant's proffered reasons for the elimination of Plaintiff's position were "realignment and consolidation of work brought on by changing business conditions" and a desire to "reduce employment levels." (Pl.'s Exhibit 8). At the same time that Defendant decided to eliminate Plaintiff's position, Defendant created two new RSM positions, RSM for Strategic Accounts, and RSM for the South Central United States. (Coleman Dep. at 67.) John Garrity ("Garrity"), who was age 35 at the time, was hired as the RSM for Strategic Accounts in February, 2002, at a higher level of compensation than Plaintiff had been. (Garrity Dep. at 3.; Coleman Dep. at 79.)
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint against Defendant alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated because of his age, and that his duties were reassigned to substantially younger employees. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment to which Plaintiff responded.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be awarded "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Once the moving party has carried the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the non-moving party cannot rely on conclusory allegations in its pleadings or in memoranda and briefs to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Pastore v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 511 (3d Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party, instead, must establish the existence of every element essential to his case, based on the affidavits or by the depositions and admissions on file. Id. (citing Harter v. GAF Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 852 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The evidence presented must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1983).
To prove a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he was a member of a protected class, i.e., above 40 years of age; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was discharged or suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) he was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination. Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2004). If the employee's position was eliminated in the context of a reduction-in-force ("RIF"), the employee can satisfy the last prong by showing that other similarly situated employees not in the protected class were retained. Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 249 (3d Cir. 2002).
Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, a defendant must produce a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for its action. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). If a defendant produces a non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the reasons offered by the defendant were merely a pretext for discrimination. See id. at 253. To successfully discredit the defendant's proffered reasons, a plaintiff must show "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the [defendant's] proffered legitimate reasons such that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them `unworthy of credence.'"Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he was replaced by a similarly situated, sufficiently younger employee. Defendant also claims that Plaintiff's employment was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons which Plaintiff has failed to adequately rebut. It is undisputed that Plaintiff's position was eliminated as part of an alleged RIF, and that Plaintiff was not replaced in his position by anyone, the position itself was eliminated. Therefore, to establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff must show that other similarly situated, sufficiently younger employee's were treated more favorably. Plaintiff claims that the position of RSM for strategic accounts was similarly situated to his former position, and that John Garrity was treated more favorably when he was hired to fill that position. To demonstrate that the RSM for strategic accounts position was "similarly situated" to his former position, Plaintiff must show that ". . . the duties were comparable or that they were otherwise similarly situated." Anderson, 297 F.3d 242, 250.
There is a genuine issue of fact as to whether the position of RSM for strategic accounts is similarly situated to Plaintiff's former position. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff's former position included supervisory duties, and the RSM for strategic accounts position does not, the two positions are not similarly situated. Plaintiff has presented evidence, however, that suggests that the RSM for strategic accounts position was not similar to other RSMs, rather that the position was comparable to Plaintiff's former position. Plaintiff's evidence includes an organizational chart, prepared by Defendant, which indicates that the RSM for strategic accounts position was on the same level in the management structure as Plaintiff's former position. (Pl.'s Exhibit 9.) The RSM for strategic accounts position is a part of GE Multilin's "leadership team," as was Plaintiff, and both positions reported directly to the global sales manager. (Coleman Dep. at 85.) The evidence on the record also indicates that Mr. Garrity, who was hired as the RSM for strategic accounts, was compensated at a higher level then Plaintiff was. (Garrity Dep. at 3.)
Defendant claims that they terminated Plaintiff as part of a RIF, which is a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason to terminate an employee. Plaintiff has, however, presented evidence of weaknesses and inconsistencies in Defendant's proffered reasons. See Keller, 130 F.3d 1101, 1109. Although Defendant claimed to be terminating Plaintiff as part of a reduction in work force, the number of management level employees increased. (Pl.'s Exhibit 9.) Defendant's hiring of two new RSMs, including one whose position shares similarities with Plaintiff's and who was compensated at a higher level is sufficient evidence under summary judgment, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, to conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the reasons offered by Defendant for terminating Plaintiff's employment were not its true reasons but, rather, a pretext for age discrimination. Thus, Plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination, and met his burden of rebutting Defendant's proffered reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.
An appropriate order follows.