Opinion
Civil Action 1:23-cv-381
07-10-2024
CHRIS KEATON v. MAJOR O'NEAL, ET AL.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CHRISTINE L. STETSON, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Chris Keaton, an inmate formerly confined at the Stiles Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings the above-styled lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The above-styled action was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations for the disposition of the case.
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Pending before the court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (doc. #35) in which the Defendants move to dismiss the above-styled action because, inter alia, Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this action. The time to file a response has expired, and Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Analysis
Exhaustion
Section 1997e of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j, requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before initiating a prison conditions case. The statute provides in pertinent part the following: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division currently employs a two step grievance procedure which takes approximately 90 days to exhaust. The grievance procedure available for inmates confined in TDCJ-CID is outlined in the Offender Orientation Handbook. See http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/pubtications/cid/pubtications-cid-offender-orientations-handbook.htm.
The first step of the grievance procedure, Step 1 (I-127 form), involves the prisoner submitting a grievance to the unit grievance coordinator. The Step 1 grievance must be submitted within 15 days from the date of the alleged incident. The unit grievance investigator will investigate the grievance, collect documents and other evidence, interview witnesses, draft an investigation report of findings and prepare a recommendation for the review of the decision maker. The authorized decision maker for a Step 1 grievance is the warden or assistant warden. Step 1 of the grievance process may take up to 40 days from the date the unit grievance office receives the Step 1 form.
The second step of the grievance procedure, Step 2 (I-128 form), involves the prisoner submitting an appeal to the division grievance investigator at TDCJ-CID headquarters. The division grievance investigator will investigate the grievance, collect documents and other evidence, interview witnesses, draft an investigation report of findings and prepare a recommendation for the review of the decision maker. The decision maker for a Step 2 grievance is the regional director or assistant director. The Step 2 process may take up to 35 days to provide a written response.
Administrative remedies must be exhausted regardless of the type of relief sought in the lawsuit and regardless of whether the particular type of relief sought is available through the applicable grievance process. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 740-41 (2001). The exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes. Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002).
Here, the Defendants move to dismiss because Plaintiff admitted he had not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing this action. Specifically, Plaintiff stated in his Amended Complaint “let me file the 1983 complaint without exhausting my remedies.” (Doc. #18 at 17.)
The Supreme Court has explained that prisoners must exhaust available administrative remedies in accordance with all procedural rules, including deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2382, 2387, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). The Fifth Circuit has made clear that administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to filing a lawsuit rather than while the action is pending. See Gonzalez v. Seal, 702 F.3d 785, 788 (5th Cir. 2012) (“there can be no doubt that pre-filing exhaustion of prison grievance processes is mandatory”). Plaintiff makes clear in his complaint that he did not exhaust the available administrative remedies prior to filing this action. Accordingly, this complaint should be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The dismissal should be without prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to file a new complaint should he chose to do so after exhausting the available administrative remedies.
Recommendation
The Defendants' Motion to Dismiss should be granted. The above-styled action should be dismissed without prejudice.
As the Defendants' motion is recommended for dismissal based on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the court exercises its discretion to not address the Defendants' alternative theories in the exercise of judicial economy.
Objections
Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C).
Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings of facts, conclusions of law and recommendations contained within this report within fourteen days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from the entitlement of de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court except on grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72.