While it is true that a judge should hesitate to undo his own work, and hesitate still more to undo the work of another judge because of the "code" of restraint based upon comity and courtesy, nevertheless when presented with a prior interlocutory ruling that is based on a clearly mistaken interpretation of the law it is indeed appropriate for the succeeding judge to vacate or modify the prior order. Keathley v. Larson, 348 So.2d 382, 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (footnote omitted). Impeachment by Evidence of Officer's Prior Acts
The decision was based on the court's erroneous belief that a previous judge's ruling disallowing this testimony on the issue was the law of the case. Keathley v. Larson, 348 So.2d 382, 384 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 ("[W]here one judge has made an interlocutory order in the case, and for some reason is properly removed from the case and another judge properly assigned . . ., the successor judge can vacate that prior interlocutory order while the case is still pending and has not yet gone to final judgment."). We affirm the exclusion of this part of the cure testimony for another reason.
I agree with all of the majority opinion, but write because the trial court will still have the opportunity, prior to final judgment, to consider what may be appropriately called to its attention so that the final judgment is a fully informed one. See Motorola Communications Elecs., Inc. v. Nat'l Patient Aids, Inc., 427 So.2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So.2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1978); Tingle v. Dade County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 245 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1971). Appellants' counsel, in my view, had an obligation to the trial court to call the following authorities to its attention: Kwatcher v. Massachusetts Serv. Emp. Pension Fund, 879 F.2d 957 (1st Cir. 1989); Giardono v. Jones, 867 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1989); Dodd v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 688 F. Supp. 564 (E.D.Cal. 1988); McHugh v. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 638 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D.Pa. 1986); and Peckham v. Board of Trustees of Int'l Bhd. of Painters Allied Trades Union, 653 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1981).
Yet, a successor judge has the obligation to correct any error in a prior interlocutory ruling on matters of law. Tingle v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 245 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1971); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So.2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1978); see also Canney v. Canney, 453 So.2d 179 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Here, the judge erred in failing to correctly apply these principles.
Where a prior judge has entered an interlocutory order but is no longer assigned to the case, a successor judge has jurisdiction to vacate that order while the case is still pending. Tingle v. Dade County Board of County Commissioners, 245 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1971); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So.2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1978). An order entering a default is interlocutory in character.
The only professionally prudent explanation we perceive is that the attorney felt it was his obligation to inform the trial court that, although summary judgment had been awarded upon facts as they were represented by the pleadings, at the time of trial the facts, because of intervening events, were substantially different than how the pleadings had represented them. See Tingle v. Dade County Board of County Comm'rs, 245 So.2d 76 (Fla. 1971); Keathley v. Larson, 348 So.2d 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 358 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1978). At the time the original trial judge entered summary judgment in favor of Motorola and against two guarantors, the complaint was a simple action on the two executed guaranties.