Opinion
13-4043
10-16-2014
RICHARD KEARNEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.
FOR APPELLANT: RICHARD KEARNEY, pro se, Stormville, New York. FOR APPELLEES: LAURA ETLINGER, for Assistant Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York.
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT . CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT , A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 16th day of October, two thousand fourteen. PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
FOR APPELLANT:
RICHARD KEARNEY, pro se, Stormville, New York.
FOR APPELLEES:
LAURA ETLINGER, for Assistant Solicitor General, for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, Albany, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (Suddaby, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED.
Appellant Richard Kearney, pro se, appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing his reasonable accommodation action. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo with the view that "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). We resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Assoc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of act to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Upon such review, we conclude that Kearney's appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Dancks' report and recommendation, which the district court adopted over Kearney's timely objection. To the extent Kearney asserts that he was deprived of access to the showers, he fails to raise a triable issue of fact because his need for crutches is "for long periods of standing and walking"; he refused additional consultations and treatment from prison doctors; and a prison is not required to "provide a disabled individual with every accommodation he requests or the accommodation of his choice" in order to provide "reasonable accommodations." McElwee v. County of Orange, 700 F.3d 635, 641 (2d Cir. 2012).
For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Kearney's other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O'HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK