Mississippi's appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue of authentication of Facebook messages. However, this Court has addressed a similar authentication issue regarding emails in Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). ¶ 32.

Based on this testimony, the State adequately-authenticated State’s Exhibits 4 and 5. See Bobo, 102 Ark. App. at 334-36 (copies of e-mails properly admitted where witness confirmed content, matched his independent recollection of messages); Simon, 279 Ga. App. at 847-48 (e-mails properly authenticated where witness testified printouts accurately reflected exchange between the parties and messages contained in-dicia of reliability); Kearley v. State, 843 So. 2d 66 , 70 (Miss. App. 2002) (e-mails properly authenticated where witness vouched for accuracy of printouts); Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98 , 105 (Tex. App. 2005) (e-mails authenticated where complaining witness testified *227 she was familiar with the defendant s e-mail and received the messages from him); Tibbetts v. RadioShack Corp., No. 03-C-2249, 2004 WL 2203418 , at *13 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (unpublished opinion) (copies of e-mails authenticated by sales manager’s testimony that they were true and accurate copies); see also Annot., 34 A.L.R. 6th 253 (Authentication of Electronically Stored Evidence) § 2, pp. 269-70 (citing Mueller and Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 9:9 [3d ed.] [witness who viewed original e-mail need only testify printout is an accurate reproduction]).

Smith then appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the Facebook messages because they were not authenticated and were hearsay, and that certain testimony by Waites violated the Confrontation Clause. The Court of Appeals found that the Facebook messages were properly authenticated. It found that Waldrop's testimony properly authenticated the Facebook messages, relying on Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). Smith filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court, which we granted.

sages); Shea v. State, 167 S.W.3d 98, 104–05 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, pet. ref'd) (emails); Massimo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 210, 215–17 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (emails). FN28. SeeJackson v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 466, 320 S.W.3d 13 (2009) (Yahoo instant message conversations); Bobo v. State, 102 Ark.App. 329, 285 S.W.3d 270 (2008) (emails); Hammontree v. State, 283 Ga.App. 736, 642 S.E.2d 412 (2007) (internet instant message conversation); Simon v. State, 279 Ga.App. 844, 632 S.E.2d 723 (2006) (emails); Ford v. State, 274 Ga.App. 695, 617 S.E.2d 262 (2005) (internet chat room); State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77, 190 P.3d 896 (App.2008) (on-line conversation); People v. Chromik, 408 Ill.App.3d 1028, 349 Ill.Dec. 543, 946 N.E.2d 1039 (2011) (text message); People v. Downin, 357 Ill.App.3d 193, 293 Ill.Dec. 371, 828 N.E.2d 341 (2005) (email); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 459 Mass. 442, 945 N.E.2d 372 (2011) (emails); Commonwealth v. Amaral, 78 Mass.App.Ct. 671, 941 N.E.2d 1143 (2011) (emails); Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66 (Miss.App.2002) (emails); People v. Clevenstine, 68 A.D.3d 1448, 891 N.Y.S.2d 511 (2009) (MySpace instant messages); State v. Thompson, 777 N.W.2d 617 (N.D.2010) (text messages); In the Interest of F.P., a Minor, 878 A.2d 91 (Pa.Super.Ct.2005) (instant messages); State v. Taylor, 178 N.C.App. 395, 632 S.E.2d 218 (2006) (text messages); Bloom v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 814, 554 S.E.2d 84 (2001) (instant messages); United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140 (2nd Cir.2007) (emails and internet chat room); United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.2009) (Yahoo instant message conversations); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627 (9th Cir.2000) (internet chat room); United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir.1998) (internet chat room); United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir.2000) (email). FN29. Jackson, supra, Ark. App. at 469, S.W.3d at 16 (defendant admitted to police that he had engaged in instant message conversations and acknowledged transcripts as accurate); Bobo, supra (defendant

We first note that Wilson stated affirmatively that he had no objection at trial to instruction S-3; therefore, this particular issue is not properly before this Court. Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66, 69 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002). ¶ 13. Instruction S-4 instructed the jury as follows:

An appellant court may only review those matters properly preserved for appeal during trial." Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66, 69 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002). Furthermore, after reviewing the record, this court finds that the trial judge did not exhibit bias toward the State. His instructions and rulings were correct statements of the law.

Calling a witness with first hand knowledge of a document is one such means of introducing the document. M.R.E. 901(b)(1). While it is not necessary that the sponsoring witness be the author of the document, it is necessary that the witness have first hand knowledge that the document is that which it is purported to be. Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66 (¶ 19) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002). In this case, Johnson denied taking part in making it, and no witness with first hand knowledge was called.

However, those there are, although not binding on this court, would not suggest a contrary result. See Massimo v. State ofTexas, 144 S.W.3d 210 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004) (e-mails admissible where the victim recognized the appellant's e-mail address; the e-mails discussed things only the victim, the appellant, and a few other people knew about; they were written in the way in which the appellant would communicate; and a third party had witnessed the appellant sending a similar threatening e-mail to the victim previously); Kearley v. State ofMississippi, 843 So.2d 66 (Miss.App. 2002), certiorari denied, 842 So.2d 578 (Miss. 2003) (e-mails adequately authenticated where victim vouched for their accuracy, and a police officer testified that the appellant admitted sending the e-mails); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures,Inc., 213 F.Supp.2d 1146 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (exhibits printed off the internet, including pictures and webpages, had sufficient circumstantial indicia of authenticity (such as dates and web addresses) to support a reasonable juror in the belief the documents are what the proponent says they are); United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir.(Ala.)

This Court has previously ruled that the use of the word "victim" in jury instructions does not constitute a comment on the evidence. Kearley v. State, 843 So.2d 66, 69 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App. 2002). Accordingly, there was no error in granting instructions S-1, S-2 or S-3.