K. C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Insurance

21 Citing cases

  1. Granco Steel, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd.

    68 Cal.2d 191 (Cal. 1968)   Cited 35 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Concluding that to apply the estoppel doctrine, the insured must be "ignorant of the true state of facts" and must detrimentally rely on the insurer's conduct

    (Cf. K.C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka Security etc. Ins. Co. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 134-135 [ 185 P.2d 832]; Walters v. West American Ins. Co. (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 581 [ 41 P.2d 355, 43 P.2d 306].)

  2. Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com.

    34 Cal.2d 500 (Cal. 1949)   Cited 3 times   1 Legal Analyses

    In that light, it is clear that Cornish's consent to cancellation and Haugen's authority to cancel were granted on condition that a contract of insurance would be in existence at the moment the old coverage ceased. ( K.C. WorkingC. Co. v. Eureka-Security F. M. Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120 [ 185 P.2d 832]; Poor v. Hudson Ins. Co., 2 F. 432; Holden v. Putnam F. Ins. Co., 46 N.Y. 1 [7 Am.Rep. 287]; Aetna Ins.Co. v. Rosenberg, 62 Ark. 507 [36 S.W. 908].) There was no new contract at the time of Spidle's death because there was no agreement about the extent of coverage.

  3. Guipre v. Kurt Hitke & Co.

    109 Cal.App.2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)   Cited 15 times
    In Guipre v. Kurt Hitke & Co., Inc., 109 Cal.App.2d 7, 14, 240 P.2d 312 (1952) and Hazard's Administrator v. New England Marine Insurance Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 557, 583, 8 L.Ed. 1043 (1834), the courts did not hold that the insurers were โ€œbound by the meaning of the terms used in their insureds' industries,โ€ but rather that the insurers were bound by the technical meaning of terms used in their own insurance industry or market.

    Appellant concedes that oral contracts of insurance are enforceable. ( Smith v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 71 Cal.App. 661 [ 236 P. 176]; K.C. Working C. Co. v. Eureka-Security F. M. Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120 [ 185 P.2d 832].) The cases hold that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the effective date of insurance is the date when acceptance is made.

  4. Gandelman v. Mercantile Ins. Co. of America

    90 F. Supp. 472 (S.D. Cal. 1950)   Cited 3 times

    Even if he had been successful in doing so, before any substitution could be affected, the plaintiff would have to consent thereto. K.C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 185 P.2d 832-838; section 1550, Civ. Code of Cal. The two policies and the rider for the National policy were intended as a substitute for the existing National policy and until such intention was carried out by mutual consent of all parties, no liability was created under the proposed substituted policies or the substituted rider. Crawford v. Trans-Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 125 Cal. 609, 58 P. 177; City of N.Y. Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 5 Cir., 284 F. 420; American Can Co. v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 12 Cal.App. 133, 106 P. 720; Law v. Northern Assur. Co., 165 Cal. 394, 132 P. 590; Sec. 381, insurance Code of Cal. Plaintiff ignores the rider to the National policy but seeks the benefits of the defendants' policies.

  5. Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Superior Court

    14 Cal.4th 1231 (Cal. 1997)   Cited 17 times
    In Amex Life Assurance Co. v. Super. Ct., 14 Cal.4th 1231, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 898, 930 P.2d 1264 (1997), the plaintiff brought an action against Amex Life Assurance Company (โ€œAmexโ€), the life insurance company that denied his claim.

    " ( Id. at p. 157.) As stated in K.C. Working C. Co. v. Eureka-Sec. Ins. Co. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 131 [ 185 P.2d 832], "To constitute a valid contract of insurance the minds of the parties must have met on the identity of the person with whom they are dealing." Amex argues it insured, if anyone, the person who appeared for the medical examination, not Morales, and that to the extent the policy purported to insure Morales, it was void from the beginning or, to use the term in the cases, ab initio.

  6. Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Society

    39 Cal.App.3d 623 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)   Cited 37 times
    In Ascherman v. San Francisco Medical Society (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 623, 648 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 681], Division One of this district held that "a private hospital may not deprive a physician of staff privileges without granting him minimal due process of law protection."

    [Citations.]" ( K.C. Working C. Co. v. Eureka-Sec. Ins. Co. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 131 [ 185 P.2d 832].) If there is no duty to furnish the insurance, the fact, if it be such, that Mrs. Neick and Hadfield conspired to prevent plaintiff from securing insurance with the defendant insurer did not render it liable. (9) "Where a complaint charges a conspiracy and the commission of a wrongful act, the only significance of the conspiracy charge is that each member may be held responsible as a joint tortfeasor, regardless of whether or not he directly participated in the act. [Citations.] A conspiracy, in and of itself, however atrocious, does not give rise to a cause of action unless a civil wrong has been committed resulting in damage.

  7. Gillis v. Sun Ins. Office, Limited

    238 Cal.App.2d 408 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 38 times
    Affirming finding that a defunct corporation named as the insured held an insurable interest where โ€œ[the insurer] intended to insure the property in question; there was no fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the insured; there was no increase of hazard on the part of the insurance company on account of the error in the name of the insured or because of the merger; the management remained the same; and the insurer accepted and retained the premium paymentsโ€

    [3] Respondent has pointed out: "To constitute a valid contract of insurance the minds of the parties must have met on the identity of the person with whom they are dealing." ( K.C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka-Security F.M. Ins. Co. (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 131 [ 185 P.2d 832].) [4] It is also axiomatic that the court cannot reform and remake a contract for alleged mistake where there was never any such common intent.

  8. Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Founders' Ins. Co.

    209 Cal.App.2d 157 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 40 times
    In Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Founders' Ins. Co., 209 Cal.App.2d 157, 25 Cal.Rptr. 753, 3 A.L.R.3d 1058 (1962) the insured had told the agent for Glens Falls that she would cancel her Glens Falls policy if the company did not honor a claim she had presented.

    While such surrender or return of the unearned premium is not essential to the cancellation of a policy, it is nevertheless a piece of evidence tending to show that the respondent did not deem the policy to be cancelled, particularly in the light of the burden placed upon the respondent to prove cancellation. ( K.C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka-SecurityFire Marine Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 130 [ 185 P.2d 832]; see Stevenson v. Sun Ins. Office, supra, 17 Cal.App. 280, 288.) Another circumstance which militates against such cancellation is the payment of the insurance on the personal property and the acceptance of that payment by Mrs. Brucato.

  9. Ulwelling v. Crown Coach Corp.

    206 Cal.App.2d 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)   Cited 40 times
    In Ulwelling, also, the inspection was conducted initially to determine whether the bus company should be insured at all.

    Nor is there anything in the policy, or the evidence, from which it may be inferred that there was any meeting of the minds upon any essential feature or element of such a contract urged by appellants. The evidence is wholly lacking in details essential to prove a contract. ( Ellis v. Klaff, 96 Cal.App.2d 471 [ 216 P.2d 15]; K.C. Working Chemical Co. v. Eureka-Sec. F M. Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120 [ 185 P.2d 832].) No proof established definite or certain terms in the precise performance which would be required to perform undercarriage mechanical or other inspections, anything to show the scope or character of the inspection, the frequency of inspections, the manner in which they were to be made, et cetera.

  10. Smith v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Co.

    86 Cal.App.2d 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948)   Cited 19 times
    In Smith the court concluded, as follows, in respect of the right of the nominated beneficiary to sue: "Plaintiffs seem to concede in their brief that with two or three exceptions [citations], it has been universally held that a cause of action, under circumstances such as here related, may lie in favor of the representative of the estate, but not in favor of the named beneficiary merely by reason of being the beneficiary named in the application.

    In 15 American Law Reports, page 1026 and 75 American Law Reports, page 952, and cases cited thereunder, it appears that the weight of authority is to the effect that mere delay in passing on an application for insurance does not create a contract of insurance. ( Lucas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 14 Cal.App.2d 676 [ 58 P.2d 934]; K.C. Working C. Co. v. Eureka-Security etc. Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120, 132 [ 185 P.2d 832]; 1 Cal.Jur. ยงยง 12, 13, pp. 319, et seq.) In Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 Ill. 381 [129 N.E. 171, 15 A.L.R. 1021], the court disposed of the case in holding that no right of action survived the death of the applicant, since it was admitted by the parties to the proceeding that no cause of action accrued to the applicant until his death, and neither he nor his estate sustained any injury until that time; that since the death was not caused by the negligence of the defendant and the action was for damages to his estate for failing to pass on his application, and since no cause of action accrued to the applicant in his lifetime, no cause of action survived to his administrator.