Opinion
10 CV 9170 (VB)
01-13-2012
K.B., individually and as parent and next friend to D.B., a child with a disability, Plaintiffs, v. PEARL RIVER UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
VINCENT L. BRICCETTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiff K.B. (“parent”) brings this action on behalf of her minor child D.B. (“DB”) pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., against defendant Pearl River Union Free School District (“the district”). Parent seeks review of an administrative decision by a State Review Officer (“SRO”) at the New York State Education Department (“NYSED”) upholding the administrative decision of an Impartial Hearing Officer (“IHO”) denying parent reimbursement for an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”).
Parent moves for summary judgment. (Doc. # 10). For the reasons set forth below, parent's motion is DENIED.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1331.
BACKGROUND
I. Statutory Background
The IDEA was enacted to promote the education of disabled children. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). States receiving public funds are required to provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) to children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). Public school districts must provide “special education and related services tailored to meet the unique needs of a particular child, [which are] ‘reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.'” Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). These services are determined by the student's Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”), which school districts must develop in collaboration with the child's parents periodically. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A).
In New York, if the parents disagree with any part of the IEP process they may request an impartial due process hearing, which is administered by an IHO appointed by the local board of education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f); N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(1)(a). The IHO's decision may be appealed to a SRO. See N.Y. Educ. Law § 4404(2); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g). The SRO's decision may be challenged in state or federal court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
II. Factual Background
The parties have submitted briefs, a stipulation of facts, and supporting exhibits, which reflect the following factual background.
DB was born in 1996 and suffers from autism. In 2007, the district conducted various evaluations of DB as part of his triennial evaluation. One of these was a psychological evaluation, which was conducted on March 7, 2007 (“the district evaluation”). The evaluations were reflected in DB's IEP for the 2007-2008 school year.
On April 12, 2007, parent objected by letter to three of the evaluations, including the district evaluation, and requested IEEs for each at public expense. With respect to the district evaluation, parent stated, “I am requesting an IEE for a neuropsychological evaluation because I object to the results of the school district[']s psychological evaluation.” (DX 2, p. 16). Carolyn Moffa, the district's director of special services, wrote in response, “you are not entitled to an independent neuropsychological evaluation if you disagree with the results of a psychological evaluation.” (DX 2, p. 18).
For the purposes of this opinion, “DX” refers to the exhibits submitted by the district at the 2010 hearing, “PX” refers to the exhibits submitted by the parents at the 2010 hearing, and “Tr.” refers to the transcript of the 2010 hearing.
On April 25, 2007, the district requested an impartial due process hearing to defend the appropriateness of its evaluations. On June 4, 2007, three days before the hearing was scheduled to commence, parent withdrew her request for an independent neuropsychological evaluation. Parent testified that she withdrew her request because she did not have “extensive enough knowledge to fight the psychological evaluation.” (Tr. p. 644). An IHO commenced hearings and resolved parent's objections to the other two evaluations in a separate proceeding not at issue here (“the 2007 hearing”). The IHO's determination became final when an SRO dismissed parent's appeal.
On April 9, 2008, a subcommittee of the district's committee on special education (“CSE”) convened for an annual review of DB to develop his IEP for the 2008-2009 school year. Parent reiterated her request for a neuropsychological evaluation at that meeting. A partial transcript of the meeting reflects that parent stated she disagreed with the district evaluation at the time it was conducted and continued to disagree with it. (PX L, p. 35). The April 9, 2009, IEP indicates that “parent requested a neuropsychological evaluation because she claims she sees regression in [DB's] speech functioning and variability on testing.” (DX 2, p. 63). The district again denied her request.
In May 2008, parent hired a private psychologist, Andrew Kuhn, to evaluate DB. On June 3, 2008, parent requested that the district allow Dr. Kuhn to observe DB in the classroom, stating that Dr. Kuhn “is a neuro-psychologist evaluating [DB]. This is to assist with [DB's] placement for next year.” (DX 2, p. 70). The district refused her request. Dr. Kuhn evaluated DB outside of the classroom and issued a report (“the Kuhn evaluation”) summarizing DB's functioning and educational testing results, and made recommendations for his education.
On July 28, 2008, DB's father sent a letter requesting a CSE meeting at which the Kuhn evaluation would be considered. On August 21, 2008, the CSE reconvened to review the Kuhn evaluation and DB's educational program for the 2008-2009 school year. Dr. Kuhn and the parents were present at the meeting. The parties dispute whether the resulting IEP contained the same recommendations as those made in the April 9, 2008, IEP. However, IHO James P. Walsh found that the new IEP was not dissimilar from the prior IEP except for the insertion of standardized test results.
On January 8, 2009, parent requested reimbursement for the cost of the Kuhn evaluation in the sum of $3,500. The district denied the request. Parent then filed a complaint with the New York State Office of Vocational and Educational Services for Individuals with Disabilities (“VESID”). VESID directed the district either to (1) reimburse parent for the Kuhn evaluation at a rate consistent with federal and state regulation; or (2) request an impartial due process hearing to challenge parent's request for reimbursement.
In August 2009, the district paid parent $1,800 in accordance with defendant's policy of capping the reimbursement for neuropsychological evaluations at that sum. (Tr. pp. 677-678). On October 27, 2009, the district increased its reimbursement cap to $3,000. Accordingly, on October 28, 2009, the district paid plaintiffs an additional $1,200, for a total of $3,000. (Tr. p. 679). In December 2009, VESID directed the district either to forward proof that parent agreed with the $3,000 reimbursement or to commence an impartial hearing.
On January 27, 2010, the district initiated an impartial due process hearing (“the 2010 hearing”), alleging that the Kuhn evaluation was not an IEE, that the district evaluations were appropriate, and that the district's $3,000 reimbursement cap was appropriate.
The hearing commenced on April 23, 2010, and concluded on May 27, 2010, after four days of testimony. On July 4, 2010, IHO Walsh found, relying on 8 N.Y.C.R.R. 200.5(g): (1) parent is only entitled to an IEE at public expense if she disagrees with a specific evaluation obtained by the district; (2) parent did not request a neuropsychological evaluation of DB at public expense, but instead requested that the district itself conduct the evaluation; (3) the Kuhn evaluation was obtained not because the parent disagreed with the district evaluation, but because parent saw regression in DB's functioning and wanted an IEE in order to assist in determining DB's placement for the 2008-2009 school year; and (4) parent's request for a neuropsychological evaluation was the precise issue raised prior to the previous hearing and therefore parent was barred from attempting to relitigate the issue she previously withdrew. The IHO further found that Dr. Kuhn was not qualified to provide a neuropsychological evaluation and the district evaluation was appropriate.
Following the IHO's decision, parent appealed the ruling to SRO Frank Munoz. On September 23, 2010, the SRO issued a decision finding that parent's claim for reimbursement was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Parent initiated this action on December 8, 2010.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Standards
Motions for summary judgment usually resolve IDEA cases in federal court. See Viola v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 414 F.Supp.2d 366, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Unlike in an ordinary summary judgment motion, the existence of a disputed issue of material fact will not necessarily defeat the motion. Id. Rather, summary judgment in the IDEA context functions as an appeal from an administrative decision. T.P. v. Mamaroneck Union Free Sch. Dist., 554 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009).
In a review action pursuant to the IDEA, the Court (1) reviews the records of the administrative proceedings; (2) hears additional evidence at the request of a party; and (3) grants such relief as it deems appropriate based on the preponderance of the evidence. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(c); see Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 380 (2d Cir. 2003).
The standard of review for IDEA cases has been characterized as “modified de novo.” M.R. v. South Orangetown Cent. School Dist., 2011 WL 6307563, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2011). Although the Court must engage in an independent review of the record and make a determination based on a preponderance of the evidence, its review of state administrative decisions is limited. See Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06; Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 129. The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have cautioned that the IDEA requires “substantial deference to state administrative bodies on matters of educational policy.” Cerra v. Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 2005). The Court must be mindful “that the judiciary generally lack[s] the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to resolve persistent and difficult questions of educational policy,” Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d at 129, and should not “substitute [its] own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206. Thus, the Court should not disturb an SRO decision that “is reasoned and supported by the record.” Gagliardo v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2007).
The Court finds the SRO's decision to be reasoned and supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record.
II. Res Judicata
The SRO upheld the IHO's determination that the parent's claim for reimbursement for the Kuhn evaluation is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata-also known as claim preclusion-precludes parties from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in a prior proceeding. See Monahan v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d 275, 284-85 (2d Cir. 2000)). The doctrine applies to claims that could have been raised in a prior litigation, but were not. See Heimbach v. Chu, 744 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1984). By “precluding] parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,” res judicata protects against “the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-154 (1979).
Res judicata applies when: (1) the prior proceeding involved an adjudication on the merits; (2) the prior proceeding involved the same parties or those in privity with the parties; and (3) the claims alleged in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in the prior proceeding. Monahan v. N.Y. City Dep't of Corr., 214 F.3d at 285. The SRO found that the elements of res judicata had been met in this case because: (1) the 2007 hearing resulted in an adjudication on the merits as to the appropriateness of the district's 2007 occupational therapy and speech-language evaluations; (2) both the 2007 and 2010 hearings involved the same parties; and (3) the issue of parent's disagreement with the district evaluation would have been adjudicated at the 2007 hearing if parent had not withdrawn her reimbursement request.
It is well-settled that res judicata applies to administrative proceedings when the agency is acting in a judicial capacity. See United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). Courts in this circuit regularly apply the doctrine to IDEA cases, and the Court sees no reason why it should not apply here. See Schreiber v. E. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 700 F.Supp.2d 529, 554-55 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Grenon v. Taconic Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 2006 WL 3751450, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2006). But see Orange County Health Care Agency v. Dodge, 793 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (inappropriate to apply res judicata to a case brought pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415).
To sustain her reimbursement claim, parent must show that the Kuhn evaluation was an IEE to which she was entitled at public expense. The IHO held-and New York state law makes clear-that a prerequisite for an IEE is a disagreement with a specific evaluation conducted by the district. See 8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 200.5(g). Thus, parent's claim depends on whether the Kuhn evaluation was obtained because she disagreed with the district evaluation within the meaning of that statute. If she did not properly object to the district evaluation, the Kuhn evaluation does not qualify as an IEE and parent cannot claim reimbursement therefor.
The district maintains that parent never properly disputed the district evaluation and was never entitled to an independent neuropsychological evaluation at public expense. The district first emphasized the distinction between a psychological and neuropsychological evaluation when it denied parent's request for an independent evaluation in March 2007, explaining that parent was “not entitled to an independent neuropsychological evaluation if you disagree with the results of a psychological evaluation.” Parent's proper recourse at that point was to commence an impartial hearing to dispute the validity of the evaluations to which she objected. Parent initiated the impartial hearing process, but subsequently withdrew her reimbursement claim, and an IHO adjudicated the remaining issues on the merits. That decision became final when an SRO dismissed parent's appeal. Because the issue of parent's disagreement with the district evaluation became ripe in 2007 and she could have brought her claim at the 2007 hearing, that claim is now barred.
Parent argues that res judicata cannot apply to her reimbursement claim because the Kuhn evaluation was not conducted until after the 2007 hearing; therefore, her claim could not have been litigated on the merits and cannot be precluded. Parent argues the SRO erroneously applied a version of collateral estoppel-also known as issue preclusion-to her claim. Under that doctrine, when an issue of ultimate fact has been resolved by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated in a future lawsuit. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008). Collateral estoppel applies when: “(1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” Boguslavsky v. Kaplan, 159 F.3d 715, 719-20 (2d Cir. 1998).
Parent confuses the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Parent's disagreement with the district evaluation is not a separate issue, but rather a threshold inquiry that must be resolved before her reimbursement claim can be heard. The dispositive question is not the appropriateness of the Kuhn evaluation, but whether parent properly disputed the district evaluation. If parent did not properly dispute the district evaluation, she cannot claim reimbursement for a subsequent private evaluation because it would not qualify as an IEE. Contrary to parent's assertions, she could have litigated the crucial issue-her disagreement with the district evaluation-at the 2007 hearing, but she withdrew her claim. This is a case of claim preclusion and is properly considered under the doctrine of res judicata. The Court is thus barred from hearing parent's claim and declines to address parent's remaining contentions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, parent's motion for summary judgment (Doc. #10) is DENIED. The motion for summary judgment having been denied, the Court affirms the decision of the SRO and dismisses the complaint.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion and to close this case.
SO ORDERED.