Opinion
No. 12–P–1500.
2013-08-19
K.B. v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES.
By the Court (CYPHER, VUONO & MEADE, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff appeals from a Superior Court judgment affirming the decision of the Department of Children and Families (department) upholding a supported allegation that the plaintiff had physically abused her son. The department's final decision followed an administrative fair hearing by the department. On appeal, the plaintiff asserts that (1) the department's decision was not supported by substantial evidence; and (2) the department's delay in holding the fair hearing and issuing its decision prejudiced the plaintiff. We affirm.
1. Substantial evidence. The plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating the error of the department's decision in supporting the allegation that she abused her son. See Massachusetts Assn. of Minority Law Enforcement Officers v. Abban, 434 Mass. 256, 263 (2001). See also G.L.c. 30A, § 14(7) (setting forth standard of review); Lindsay v. Department of Social Servs., 439 Mass. 789, 797–798 (2003) (standard of review is whether there is “reasonable cause to believe that an incident ... of abuse or neglect ... did occur”). We have examined the entire administrative record, see Mayor of Revere v.Civil Serv. Commn., 31 Mass.App.Ct. 315, 322 (1991) ( “we must inquire whether there is substantial evidence in the record before the commission to support the commission's decision”), and taken into account the elements of the record that would fairly detract from the weight of the supporting evidence. Cobble v.Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 390 (1999). As a general rule, we “must accept the factual determinations made by the [department] if [we] find[ ] they are supported by substantial evidence.” School Comm. of Boston v. Board of Educ., 363 Mass. 125, 128 (1973). See Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Social Servs., supra (we defer to [the department] on questions of fact and reasonable inferences drawn from the record”). The plaintiff makes numerous challenges to multiple factual and credibility findings by the hearing officer and inferences drawn from those findings; such challenges belie the maxim that the hearing officer was in the best place to weigh all the appropriate evidence, and we may not displace the officer's choice between conflicting views of the evidence. See Zoning Bd. of Appeals v. Housing Appeals Comm., 385 Mass. 651, 657 (1982). We are satisfied that the administrative record establishes sufficient substantial evidence to support the hearing officer's decision that there was reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff abused her son. Lindsay v. Department of Social Servs., supra at 798.
2. Departmental delay. The plaintiff also argues the department improperly delayed in both conducting a fair hearing concerning the department's decision to support the allegation of abuse and issuing a decision within the time standards set forth in the pertinent regulations. See 110 Code Mass. Regs. §§ 10.10 and 10.29 (1998). The plaintiff has failed to show how she was prejudiced by the department's delay. See Wilson v. Department of Social Servs., 65 Mass.App.Ct. 739, 748 (2006) (no prejudice despite two and one-half year delay by department in issuing decision); B.K. v. Department of Children & Families, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 777, 783 (2011) (even though the department failed to comport with time standards, “no showing of prejudice ... has been made”). Simply not conforming with the applicable time standards for performance of the department's administrative duties does not constitute per se prejudice because the standards are intended to be both advisory and flexible in nature. See Amherst–Pelham Regional Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 376 Mass. 480, 496 (1978) (“the time of performance of a duty by a public officer,” so long as it “does not go to the essence of the thing to be done ... is only a regulation for the orderly and convenient conduct of public business and not a condition precedent to the validity of the act done”). Absent any showing of prejudice resulting from the delay, this court will not reverse the department's decision.
Judgment affirmed.