Any false impressions which the jury might have received from this instruction certainly would have been corrected by the jury reading the instructions as a whole. ". . . `As we stated in Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, "Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced." This same doctrine was announced in Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207, and Palmer v. Miller, 310 Ill. App. 582.'

We think we are bound by the modern rule as set forth in Jepsen v. Sprout Davis, 330 Ill. App. 448, 456, as follows: "No doubt it was an oversight of the trial court, and the second instruction should not have been given, but a case should not be reversed because the court gave an erroneous instruction, if it is a harmless one. As we stated in Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, `Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced.' This same doctrine was announced in Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207, and Palmer v. Miller, 310 Ill. App. 582." We have considered the three instructions tendered by the defendant.

The reviewing court held that the evidence supported the verdict for the defendant and that the allowance of the plaintiff's motion for a new trial was an abuse of discretion. In Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, this court had before it a matter concerning the discretion of the trial court which granted a new trial to the defendant when the plaintiff had obtained a verdict against him for personal injuries. From the case it appears that the trial court awarded the new trial on the ground of erroneous instructions given by the court at the request of the plaintiff. The Appellate Court does recognize the distinction between such motions when involving questions of fact and of law, and cited the Velie case, supra, in support thereof.

The trial judge was satisfied with the finding of the jury on all other issues. A similar situation arose in Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250. There the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, and the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial which was granted.

injury is caused by the concurring negligence of a defendant and a third person, the defendant is liable to the same extent as though the injury had been caused by his own negligence. Miller v. Union Pacific R. Co., 290 U.S. 227, 54 S.Ct. 172, 78 L.Ed. 285; Sullivan v. William Ohlhaver Co., 291 Ill. 359, 126 N.E. 191; Gleason v. Cunningham, 316 Ill. App. 286, 44 N.E.2d 940. But instructions are to be regarded as a series, Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Shaw, 220 Ill. 532, 536, 77 N.E. 139, and must be considered as a whole and not in their individual parts, Rosenfeld v. Curtis Pub. Co., 2 Cir., 163 F.2d 660, and if the instructions as a whole, when viewed in the light of the evidence, show no tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect to the principle of law applicable to the issues, then minor irregularities, when considered as an abstract proposition of law, should not be permitted to prevail, where it appears that the complaining party's rights have not thereby been prejudiced, Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, 255, 50 N.E.2d 761. We are mindful of and recognize the force in the abstract of the legal propositions asserted by plaintiffs, but it must be remembered that in Illinois it has been held that absolute accuracy with respect to instructions is a thing seldom to be attained, and the courts, for want of it, should not set aside verdicts unless the inaccuracy is of such a character that it misled the jury.

In adjudging first the propriety of the controverted instruction, it is established that it is the province of the trial court to inform the jury of the rules of law applicable to the facts adduced in evidence. ( Woods v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 306 Ill. 217.) The trend of judicial opinion reveals a reluctance to reverse cases on the ground of technical errors in instructions; hence, courts have reiterated that the instructions will be considered as a whole, and where the jury has not been misled, and the complaining party's rights have not been prejudiced by minor irregularities, such errors will not be deemed grounds for reversal. ( Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250; Stephens v. Weigel, 336 Ill. App. 36; Anderson v. Brown, 340 Ill. App. 613.) Where, however, the instruction is peremptory in character and directs a verdict for either party, it must necessarily contain all the facts and be complete within itself; it cannot be cured by any other instruction in the series.

An order was entered which reversed the order of the trial court granting a new trial and remanded the cause "with directions to enter judgment on the verdict." 320 Ill. App. 250. Plaintiff filed a petition in this court asking for leave to appeal from the order of the Appellate Court. Defendant filed his answer.

Another clear expression of this doctrine is found in Sphatt v. Tulley, 38 Ill. App.2d 229, 186 N.E.2d 670, at 236, where the court emphasized that: As stated in Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, and reiterated in the recent case of Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311: "Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced." We also observed in Jepsen v. Sprout Davis, 330 Ill. App. 448, that the trend of judicial opinion reveals a reluctance to reverse cases on the ground of technical errors in instructions; hence, courts have reiterated that the instructions will be considered as a whole, and where the jury has not been misled, and the complaining party's rights have not been prejudiced by minor irregularities, such errors will not be deemed grounds for reversal.

Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced. Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, 50 N.E.2d 761; Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205. [4] As to defendant's instruction No. 21, the only objections made to this instruction by counsel for plaintiff, at the conference on instructions, was that it was not in I.P.I. and was not a proper instruction. This form of objection is not within the rule announced by the reviewing courts, that objections should specifically point out wherein the instruction is an incorrect statement of the law or not applicable. Furthermore when the trial judge indicated he would give the instruction counsel for plaintiff requested the opportunity to tender an admission instruction, which he did.

Modern tendency favors a liberal application of the harmless error doctrine to instructions when it appears the rights of the complaining party have in no way been prejudiced. Bunton v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 15 Ill. App.2d 311, 146 N.E.2d 205; Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 320 Ill. App. 250, 50 N.E.2d 761; Reivitz v. Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 327 Ill. 207, 158 N.E. 380. [12] Appellants complain of defendants' instruction 18 because it was modeled after instructions in the Allegretti case (supra).