Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-CV-8610.
May 17, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Richard Kautz brings claims for damages and injunctive relief against Defendant Met-Pro Corporation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (the "ADEA") (Count I) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951 et seq. (the "PHRA") (Count II). Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion"). For the reasons stated below, the Motion will be granted.
I. Factual Background
Met-Pro Corporation ("Met-Pro") is a publicly-held company engaged in the manufacture and sale of industrial pumps. Deposition of James Board ("Board Dep.") at 87. It is comprised of several divisions, including the Dean Pump Division and the Fybroc Division. Motion at ¶ 1. Plaintiff was employed by Met-Pro in December of 1987, when he was 49 years old. Deposition of Richard Kautz ("Kautz Dep.") at 18. He held the position of Regional Sales Manager ("RSM") for the Dean Pump Division and worked out of his home near Houston until January 2002. Id.; DeHont Declaration ("DeHont Decl.") at ¶ 5.
Prior to October 2001, Fybroc and Dean Pump each maintained four sales regions within the United States and each had one RSM responsible for each region, resulting in a total of eight RSMs. Motion at ¶ 14. Effective October 1, 2001, Met-Pro consolidated its RSM positions and assigned one RSM responsibility for both Fybroc and Dean Pump products in each of six regions. Motion at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff was assigned the Southwest Region. As part of the consolidation, the account responsibilities of the RSMs were revised. Motion at ¶ 17.
In August 2001, Plaintiff was transferred to Telford, Pennsylvania to work out of Met-Pro's Fybroc plant. The company agreed to pay his relocation expenses. Kautz Dep. at 21, 40. The decision to transfer Plaintiff was made by James Board, Vice President and General Manager of the Fybroc and Dean Pump Divisions, Raymond DeHont, the company's President and CEO, and William Kacin, Chairman of the Board. Motion at ¶¶ 22-24. Plaintiff agreed to relocate but did not begin work in Telford until January 5, 2002. Kautz Dep. at 77-78.
Kacin was 69 years old at the time of the transfer. Plaintiff contends that Kacin had nothing to do with the decision to transfer him, and that Met-Pro is only claiming that Kacin participated because he is substantially older than Board and DeHont, both of whom were 48 at the time. Pl. Statement of Facts at ¶ 24. DeHont avers that Kacin approved the decision and Plaintiff has produced no evidence in support of his claim to the contrary. DeHont Decl. at ¶ 9.
DeHont avers that in February of 2002, the company determined that further consolidation of the sales force was necessary and decided to reduce the number of RSMs from six to five. DeHont Decl. at ¶ 11. In selecting which RSM position would be eliminated, Defendant claims that Board and DeHont evaluated two sets of sales statistics to compare the performance of the RSMs and the regions. Board Dep. at 68-70; DeHont Dep. at 58-60. DeHont and Board determined from their analysis of the sales statistics that Plaintiff and John Chenault, the 55-year-old RSM for the Midwest, were the two lowest-performing RSMs and should be examined more closely. Motion at ¶ 38. To decide between Plaintiff and Chenault, the company reviewed their work history, which revealed that there had been several complaints about Plaintiff's performance. DeHont Dep. at 46-49; Board Decl. at ¶ 2. There were no similar problems with Chenault. DeHont Decl. at ¶ 12; Board Decl. at ¶ 5.
Defendant denies that Plaintiff was fired because of his age and avers that Board, DeHont, and Kacin agreed that, based on the company's sales statistics and its evaluation of how he handled his region, Plaintiff was the RSM who should be laid off. Board Dep. at 4, 184; DeHont Dep. at 6. Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff would not have been laid off but for the necessary reduction in force. DeHont Dep. at 51. Plaintiff counters that Met-Pro transferred him to Pennsylvania expecting him to quit and then fired him, all because of his age. Pl. Statement of Facts at ¶ 22.
Plaintiff was notified of his layoff on February 20, 2002. Kautz Dep. at 102. His position was in fact eliminated and has not been filled. Board Dep. at 95. In 2003, Met-Pro fired two other RSMs (ages 30 and 43) and replaced them with David Hakim, age 33, and Christopher Cousart, age 47. DeHont Dep. at 86-87; Defendant's Reply at 17. Board states that the company did not consider Plaintiff for these openings because Met-Pro preferred to hire someone local to avoid relocation expenses. Board Dep. at 50.
When he was fired, Plaintiff signed an agreement for a severance package and received 13 weeks of severance pay. The agreement provided that Met-Pro had no obligation to recall or re-employ him in the future. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 at D00223. He is currently employed as a consultant for Kirkwood Company, a distributor of Dean Products and a customer of Met-Pro. Kautz Dep. at 149-51.
II. Legal Standard
In deciding a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, the test is "whether there is a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Medical Protective Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994)). "[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is `genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). However, "there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact' . . . [where the non-moving party's] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of [its] case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
Plaintiff brings claims under the ADEA and the PHRA. The Third Circuit has held that the legal framework governing claims under the ADEA also applies to PHRA cases. Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 644 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).
A plaintiff may prove age discrimination through direct or indirect evidence. Anderson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002). Plaintiff admits that he has no direct evidence of discrimination on the basis of age. Kautz Dep. at 106-108. Accordingly, the Court must analyze Plaintiff's claim under a "slightly modified version" of the three-step burdenshifting framework announced by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, Plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. In a reduction-in-force case, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he is forty years of age or over; (2) he is qualified for the position in question; (3) an adverse employment decision was taken against him; and (4) other similarly situated, but substantially younger employees were retained. Anderson, 297 F.3d at 249-50;Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Medical Center, 190 F.3d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1999).
In addition, at oral argument, Plaintiff's counsel candidly acknowledged that he does not have a "smoking gun" in this case.
If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, "[t]he burden of production (but not the burden of persuasion) shifts to the defendant, who must then offer evidence that is sufficient, if believed, to support a finding that it had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge."Showalter, 190 F.3d at 235. If the defendant satisfies this burden, then the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff to produce evidence "from which a factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action." Id. (internal citations omitted).
In this case, Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case and Defendant has articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge. Thus, the sole issue before the Court is whether Defendant's proffered reasons for the discharge are pretextual. The Third Circuit has specifically articulated the standard an ADEA plaintiff must meet in order to survive summary judgment on this issue. "To discredit the employer's proffered reasons . . . the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent."Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994). "Rather, the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." Id. (internal citations omitted).
III. Analysis
A. Testimony Regarding Plaintiff's Transfer to Pennsylvania
Plaintiff argues that "the discrepancy between the testimony of James Board and Raymond DeHont concerning the impetus for requiring Dick Kautz to move from Texas to Pennsylvania demonstrates `weaknesses, inconsistencies and contradictions' in Met-Pro's story." Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion ("Pl. Opp.") at 22. In response to the question of who made the decision to transfer Plaintiff to Pennsylvania, Board testified that "[t]he decision was made at our corporate level between Bill Kacin and Ray DeHont in conversations with me." Board Dep. at 29. Board further testified that there was an existing corporate policy requiring all newly-hired RSMs to work from a factory location, rather than from their homes. Board Dep. at 29-30. At his deposition, in response to questioning about whether he participated in the decision to transfer Plaintiff, DeHont said that Board wanted to transfer him and that DeHont approved that suggestion. DeHont Dep. at 31. In his declaration, DeHont states that Kacin approved the decision to transfer Plaintiff. DeHont Decl. at ¶ 9.
Prior to the transfer, Plaintiff was the only RSM who worked out of his home.
Plaintiff's attempt to identify inconsistencies fails because the above statements are not contradictory. Board testified that DeHont and Kacin made the decision to transfer Plaintiff in conversations with Board. DeHont testified that the transfer was Board's idea, which DeHont and Kacin approved. Board was never asked whether he initiated the idea, and neither Board nor DeHont was asked for the specifics of their conversations. The mere fact that Board mentioned a corporate directive and DeHont did not is insufficient to establish a contradiction, particularly since these answers were elicited in response to different questions. DeHont was asked whether he participated in the decision to transfer Plaintiff, not who made the decision or, more importantly, why the decision was made. Plaintiff has not shown any material discrepancy regarding the motive for transferring him, and therefore has provided no evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Defendant's explanations for the transfer were pretextual.
B. Met-Pro's Sales Statistics
Plaintiff next argues that "[a] reasonable jury could conclude that Met-Pro concocted a nonsensical method of analyzing sales records for the sole purpose of trying to justify the conclusion that Dick Kautz was the low performer who should be fired." Pl. Opp. at 25. Defendant claims that the decision to focus on Plaintiff and Chenault was made after analyzing two sets of sales statistics. First, Board and DeHont reviewed a document comparing the performance of each of the six regions for Fiscal Years 1997 through 2002 against the 5-year average bookings. It also compares the Fiscal Year 2002 bookings against the Fiscal Year 2002 budget. Motion, Exhibit I. The review of the territories concluded that the Southwest Region, with Plaintiff as the RSM, was the lowest performing of the six territories both in terms of Fiscal Year 2002 bookings compared to the Fiscal Year 2002 budget and Fiscal Year 2002 bookings compared to the 5-year average bookings. Exh. I.
Defendant acknowledges that, because the regions were re-drawn in October 2001 and because the RSMs' distributors changed after the reorganization, the evaluation of the regions does not necessarily reflect individual performance by an RSM. Motion at ¶ 30. Therefore, according to Defendant, the company also evaluated the performance of each RSM individually. Met-Pro looked at the actual bookings of each RSM (by distributor) for the first eight months of Fiscal Year 2002 (Feb. 1, 2001 through Sept. 30, 2001) and compared it to the same time period for Fiscal Year 2001. The cut-off of September 30, 2001 was used because of the consolidation of the Dean and Fybroc sales forces effective October 1, 2001. Board Dep. at 149-50; Motion, Exhibit H. Looking at the percentage that each RSM's Fiscal Year 2002 sales were of his Fiscal Year 2001 sales, Plaintiff and Chenault were the two lowest performers. Motion, Exhibit H.
Plaintiff questions Defendant's reliance on the bookings percentages by emphasizing the fact that the percentages are handwritten at the bottom of the page. At oral argument, Defendant explained that the handwritten figures represent an additional four months of data, making the numbers more current. Additionally, Defendant points out that the annualization of the figures reflected in the handwritten portion of the document actually increased Plaintiff's percentage of sales. Board Dep. at 148-52.
Plaintiff claims that this explanation is implausible in light of the multitude of sales data available. He states that reliance on the regional sales data unfairly misrepresented his performance, since the data reflected bookings by region and some of the bookings were performed by other RSMs prior to consolidation. Kautz Dep. at 116. He further argues that if Board and DeHont had looked at the total bookings for the same two fiscal years, rather than the percentage that the Fiscal Year 2002 bookings were of the 2001 bookings, they would have seen that Plaintiff's bookings were the second highest of the RSMs. Pl. Opp. at 28. In addition, Plaintiff's own booking records, which he maintained over the years using Met-Pro's figures, show that he was among the highest performers year after year during his employment with Met-Pro. Id.
Plaintiff's argument that Met-Pro should have relied on gross bookings or his personal booking records rather than a percentage fails as a matter of law. Essentially, his argument is that Met-Pro had at its disposal other modes of evaluation that it should have used. However, Plaintiff cannot meet his burden of demonstrating pretext by arguing that Met-Pro should have used evaluative methods that would have been more favorable to him. It is well-settled that "an employee's disagreement with an employer's evaluation of one's qualifications, or disagreement with the employer's evaluation of its own needs or proper business decisions, is not enough to prove pretext." Brader v. Landis Manufacturing Systems, Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-6750, 1992 WL 309636 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1992). There is no evidence that Met-Pro ever relied on gross bookings in making personnel decisions. In fact, Board testified that overall bookings were meaningless unless compared to the budget for a particular region. Board Dep. at 45-46. Plaintiff may well be correct that Met-Pro's reliance on the percentage of sales in 2002 vs. 2001 was shortsighted and did not take into account his sales history. However, in Brader, the District Court held that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate pretext where the defendant selected its oldest and best-performing salesperson for layoff because his recent sales projections were lower than those of other employees. Brader, 1992 WL 309636, at *4. Similarly, Plaintiff's belief that the regional sales data were not reflective of his work does not demonstrate pretext. Plaintiff admits that the exact same performance criteria were applied to all of the RSMs, and that to the extent that the regional review does not accurately reflect an individual salesman's performance, that is equally true for all RSMs. Kautz Dep. at 116. Plaintiff may take issue with Met-Pro's reliance on such a measure, but he has not put forth any reason to disbelieve Met-Pro's contention that it did, in fact, rely upon it.
Plaintiff states, "if a defendant uses particular criteria or a method of analysis because it will produce the desired outcome of targeting a specific employee for termination, it may be challenged as a pretext for discrimination." Pl. Opp. at 26,citing Showalter, 190 F.3d at 231. Plaintiff's reliance onShowalter, however, is misplaced. In Showalter, the plaintiff produced evidence that defendant's human resources manager had prepared alternative methods of calculating seniority to determine who would be discharged, and had discussed them with the ultimate decisionmaker. Id. at 237. The decisionmaker directly contradicted this testimony, claiming that the human resources manager had discussed only one method of calculating seniority, and that that method resulted in the termination of the plaintiff. The court found that this obvious discrepancy could demonstrate pretext, since a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the decisionmaker knew in advance the result of each of the ways to calculate seniority. Id. at 237-38. In the instant case, Plaintiff has produced no evidence that Met-Pro ever considered evaluative criteria other than those presented to the Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated any weaknesses, implausibilities or inconsistencies in Defendant's explanations for its reliance on the selected sales measures.
C. Defendant's Evaluation of Plaintiff's Performance
Defendant claims that, after narrowing the candidates for layoff, it relied upon past performance in making its ultimate decision. DeHont Dep. at 58-59. Defendant states that Chenault did not receive a single complaint from distributors or from management, and Plaintiff has produced no evidence to the contrary. Board Decl. at ¶ 5. Met-Pro has produced several documents demonstrating that Plaintiff, on the other hand, had been the subject of customer complaints as well as internal criticisms. Specifically, Met-Pro points to: (1) a memo prepared in June of 2001 by Edward Murphy, Plaintiff's supervisor, criticizing his performance on a bid for a Honeywell/GE pump order; (2) a memo written by Murphy in December of 2001 in which he notes a "serious failure in judgment" on Plaintiff's part; (3) testimony of Gary Cauble, the President of one of Met-Pro's largest distributors, that he had complained to Board about Plaintiff in 2000; (4) a memo prepared by Board on January 16, 2002, criticizing Plaintiff's actions with respect to the loss of a $40,000 bid; and (5) memoranda from Board and Murphy dated January 18, 2002 criticizing Plaintiff's lack of preparation for sales meetings.
Plaintiff first attempts to discredit Met-Pro's evidence by levelling a totally unsubstantiated accusation that the company fabricated these documents. Pl. Opp. at 29. Plaintiff's own sworn testimony fails to support this claim. Plaintiff states that during the time he worked at Met-Pro, he periodically reviewed his personnel file and it contained no negative information about his performance. Kautz Decl. at ¶ 3. He then states that when Met-Pro produced his personnel file in the course of this litigation, "there were a number of additional recently dated documents that purported to be contemporaneous memoranda to the file documenting performance issues." Id. The mere suggestion that these documents may not have been timely filed is inadequate to meet Plaintiff's burden of producing evidence on which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Plaintiff never states that he reviewed the file after these events supposedly took place and that the documents were not there. In the absence of this testimony, there is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the documents were manufactured after the fact.
This contention is questionable. Plaintiff's file — which he submitted to the Court as an Exhibit — contains a memo from 1991 criticizing Plaintiff's lack of attention to detail on a major bid. Pl. Exh. 1 at D00181. Also in 1991, Plaintiff's performance evaluation indicated that he "occasionally overlooks details" and "needs to work on follow-up." Pl. Exh. 1 at D00179.
Plaintiff next argues that Defendant's written evaluations are inaccurate and misleading, and that each document is contradicted by other evidence in the record. These arguments fail as a matter of law. First, with respect to Murphy's memo regarding the Honeywell bid, Plaintiff argues that he was not at fault for the pricing, and that another memo from Murphy to Board "obviously reflects Mr. Murphy's discomfort with the disingenuousness of the first critical file memo." Pl. Opp. at 30. This Court has examined both memoranda in detail and concluded that Plaintiff's argument has no merit. The memo to Plaintiff's file states that he "had put too much faith in the information he was getting from the distributor and should have been more directly involved with all concerned parties." Pl. Exh. 1 at D00210. Likewise, the memo to Board explains that Met-Pro had lost the bid because it lacked direct contact and allowed the distributor to make the quote. Pl. Exh. 1 at D00212. It further states that Murphy discussed the relevant issues with the individuals involved. Id. In no way does the second document reflect any "obvious discomfort" with the contents of the first memorandum.
Second, Plaintiff takes issue with the testimony of Gary Cauble, the President of one of Met-Pro's largest distributors, who stated that he told Board in 2000 that he had some concerns about Plaintiff, particularly about his failure to give special pricing information. Cauble Dep. at 46-47. He also pointed to several specific bids in which he was not satisfied with Plaintiff's performance. Id. at 47. In response, Plaintiff offers the testimony of David Kirkwood, another Met-Pro distributor, who praised his performance. He suggests that this testimony, because it contrasts with Gary Cauble's testimony, presents a contradiction sufficient to withstand summary judgment. This argument is unavailing. Cauble's criticisms were directed at Plaintiff's handling of specific bids in which Kirkwood was not involved. That Kirkwood generally was happy with Plaintiff does not demonstrate that Cauble's criticism was implausible or fabricated, nor does it show that Board and DeHont did not actually rely on Cauble's statements in making their employment decision. See Martin v. Health Care Retirement Corp., 67 Fed. Appx. 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that the relevant inquiry is whether the employer was motivated by certain reports, not the underlying truth of the reports).
Plaintiff does not address Murphy's criticism of his performance in December of 2001. He also fails to rebut Board's January 16, 2002 memorandum criticizing his actions in conjunction with the loss of a $40,000 bid. With respect to the January 18, 2002 memoranda, he admits that both Murphy and Board had criticized his lack of preparation for sales meetings. Kautz Dep. at 88, 94. In short, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any contradiction or inconsistency in Defendant's evidence sufficient to support a reasonable factfinder's conclusion that Defendant's explanations are pretextual.
Plaintiff asserts that he has no memory of losing a $40,000 bid or of discussing such an occurrence with Board, but does not deny that it happened. Kautz Dep. at 91.
D. Met-Pro's Decision Not to Re-hire Plaintiff
Finally, Plaintiff argues that Met-Pro's failure to offer him either of the RSM positions that later became available "belies its claim that it did not target him for termination because of his age." Pl. Opp. at 34. Board testified that he did not contact Plaintiff about the openings because they were seeking someone local for the positions in order to avoid relocation expenses, and that, at least with respect to the June opening, Board knew that Plaintiff was already employed at Kirkwood. Board Dep. at 49-51. DeHont testified that Plaintiff "just didn't come to mind" for those positions. DeHont Dep. at 88. Plaintiff has offered no evidence contradicting this testimony of Board and DeHont; he claims that the fact that he was not re-hired in itself creates an inference of age discrimination. However, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must provide evidence of inconsistencies and weaknesses in Defendant's testimony sufficient to support a reasonable factfinder's conclusion of pretext. In his severance agreement, Plaintiff acknowledged that he had "no recall rights, and that Met-Pro has no obligation to recall or reemploy [him] in the future." Pl. Exh. 1 at D00223. The fact that Met-Pro chose not to re-hire him a full year after he had been discharged, and after he had already secured employment with a customer of Met-Pro, does not demonstrate that Defendant's explanations for laying him off are pretextual.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. An appropriate Order follows.