Opinion
2013-12-26
Frank Bruno, Jr., Glendale, N.Y., for appellant. Lewis S. Calderon, Jamaica, N.Y., for respondent.
Frank Bruno, Jr., Glendale, N.Y., for appellant. Lewis S. Calderon, Jamaica, N.Y., for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, PLUMMER E. LOTT, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Gurdeep Singh appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated December 22, 2011, which, after a fact-finding hearing, and upon a finding that he committed the family offenses of assault in the second degree, menacing in the second degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, directed him, inter alia, to stay away from the petitioner for a period up to and including November 18, 2016.
ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
In a family offense proceeding, the allegations asserted in a petition seeking the issuance of an order of protection must be supported by “a fair preponderance of the evidence” (Family Ct. Act § 832; see Matter of Hasbrouck v. Hasbrouck, 59 A.D.3d 621, 875 N.Y.S.2d 86; Matter of Patton v. Torres, 38 A.D.3d 667, 668, 832 N.Y.S.2d 599; Matter of Dabbene v. Dabbene, 297 A.D.2d 812, 747 N.Y.S.2d 808; Matter of Hogan v. Hogan, 271 A.D.2d 533, 705 N.Y.S.2d 678). The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the Family Court, and that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed if supported by the record ( see Matter of Luke v. Luke, 72 A.D.3d 689, 897 N.Y.S.2d 655; Matter of Holder v. Francis, 67 A.D.3d 679, 888 N.Y.S.2d 567; Matter of Sblendorio v. D'Agostino, 60 A.D.3d 773, 877 N.Y.S.2d 92; Matter of Fernandez v. Pacheco, 59 A.D.3d 542, 543, 872 N.Y.S.2d 291).
At a fact-finding hearing before the Family Court, it was established by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the appellant committed the family offenses of assault in the second degree ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 812 [1]; Penal Law § 120.05), menacing in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 120.14[2] ), and reckless endangerment in the second degree ( seePenal Law § 120.20). Further, the Family Court's finding that aggravating circumstances were present was supported by the record ( see Matter of Kaur v. Singh, 101 A.D.3d 877, 878, 955 N.Y.S.2d 633; Matter of Hassett v. Hassett, 4 A.D.3d 527, 771 N.Y.S.2d 720; Matter of Reilly v. Reilly, 254 A.D.2d 361, 362, 688 N.Y.S.2d 153). Accordingly, the Family Court properly issued an order of protection directing the appellant to stay away from the petitioner for a period of five years ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 842).