Opinion
Civil No. 03-3318 ADM/AJB.
August 18, 2004
Leslie L. Lienemann, Esq., Culberth, Lienemann Stratton, L.L.P., St. Paul, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Plaintiff.
Gregory J. Stenmoe, Esq., Briggs Morgan, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, appeared for and on behalf of Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Federated Mutual Insurance Company's ("Defendant" or "Federated") Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 15] was argued before the undersigned United States District Judge on June 25, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is liable for retaliation under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3a; Minn. Stat. § 363A.15. Defendant seeks summary judgment and argues that Plaintiff has not established a prima facie reprisal claim. For the reasons explained below, Defendant's Motion is granted and Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is dismissed with prejudice.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant illegally terminated her employment approximately one year after she reported that a co-worker was being sexually harassed by a male supervisor. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from 1978 until her termination in October 2002. Kasper Dep. at 12, 206 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 1). Plaintiff held various positions at Federated, and became a Team Support Supervisor for Team 408 on August 3, 1998. Kasper Dep. at 25-26; see Employment Record of Karen Kasper at 1 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 6). Team Support Supervisors are responsible for supervising and directing the "underwriting team support area," and must provide "high quality, timely processing." See Position Description for Team Support Supervisor (Hedican Aff. Ex. 7). District Underwriting Manager Mike Melcher supervised Plaintiff from August 1998 through August 2001, and was generally satisfied with her performance. Kasper Dep. at 24-25, 40-41; Melcher Dep. at 10-12 (Lienemann Aff. Ex. 7).
The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff because she is the non-moving party. See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995).
In August 2001 Federated altered its organizational structure and implemented a new process called segmentation. Kasper Dep. at 30, 42. Segmentation, which was designed to improve underwriting, divided underwriting into two groups called select and select express. Id. at 20. Before segmentation was implemented, underwriting teams processed both complex and routine files. Bucher Dep. at 10 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 2); Kuck Dep. at 22-23 (Hedican Dep. Ex. 3). With segmentation, select teams processed complex files, and select express teams handled routine cases.Id.
As a result of this reorganization, Plaintiff was reassigned as a Team Support Supervisor to Team 403, a select express team. Kasper Dep. at 32-35. G.J. replaced Mike Melcher as Plaintiff's program manager and became her immediate supervisor. Id. at 41-42. G.J. reported to Regional Underwriting Manger Scott Goodew ("Goodew"), who in turn reported to Dave Bucher ("Bucher"), the Director of Risk Selection. Bucher Dep. at 6; Goodew Dep. at 7 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 4). Neither G.J. nor Goodew had previously supervised Plaintiff. Kasper Dep. at 41, 56.
G.J. is not a party to this case and his alleged actions are not directly at issue. Therefore, he will be referred to by his initials, rather than his full name, throughout this Order.
In September 2001, Goodew and G.J. identified problems with Plaintiff's performance, in part based on complaints from other teams. Id. at 42-46; Goodew Dep. at 45-46, 55; G.J. Dep. at 69-70. G.J. met with Plaintiff on September 26, 2001 to discuss her performance, and relayed his concerns about Plaintiff to Goodew following the meeting. Kasper Dep. at 42; Memo from G.J. to Kasper of 09/26/01 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 9). On September 27, 2001, both Goodew and G.J. met with Plaintiff to discuss weaknesses in Plaintiff's job skills. Kasper Dep. at 59. Plaintiff did not feel she needed additional training at that time, and disagreed with some of the criticism directed at her. Kasper Dep. at 51-52, 59-60. Goodew reported his concerns about Plaintiff's performance to Bucher on September 29, 2001, and followed up with Plaintiff in a second meeting held on November 5, 2001. Id. at 67-71, 107; E-mail from Goodew to Bucher of 9/29/01 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 13); Memo from Goodew to Kasper of 11/08/01 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 15).
Plaintiff first filed a report of sexual harassment with Defendant's Human Resources Department on October 10, 2001. Specifically, Plaintiff told Human Resources Manager Dee Ann Snaza ("Snaza") that G.J. had made one of Plaintiff's subordinates, Cathy Hall ("Hall"), feel uncomfortable because he had touched his penis while speaking to her. Snaza Dep. at 51 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 5). While the incident occurred in early September 2001 and Plaintiff was informed about it at this time, Plaintiff did not immediately report G.J.'s conduct. Kasper Aff. ¶¶ 4, 8. Plaintiff claims to have witnessed G.J. engage in similar behavior during a discussion in late September 2001.Id. However, when she reported G.J.'s behavior to Snaza, Plaintiff said that G.J.'s touching of himself had not offended her, but she was bringing it to Snaza's attention on behalf of Hall. Kasper Dep. at 91-92. After investigating Plaintiff's claim, Defendant demoted G.J. due to questions about his conduct and leadership ability. Id. at 92-93; Bucher Dep. at 37-39. Defendant also informed Plaintiff that she should immediately report any incidents of sexual harassment in the future. Kasper Dep. at 93; Memo from Snaza to Kasper of 10/23/01 at 1 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 17).
Plaintiff alleges that both G.J. and Goodew began retaliating against her after she complained about G.J.'s actions. Kasper Dep. at 109-10. Snaza met with Plaintiff to discuss her concerns on November 9, 2001, and was told that G.J. would be moving to a different position and would no longer be her supervisor. Id. Plaintiff agreed to continue working for G.J. until Defendant found a suitable replacement. Id. at 111-12. After investigating Plaintiff's claim, Snaza met with Plaintiff on November 14, 2001, to discuss her findings. See Memo from Snaza to Kasper of 11/16/01 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 22). Snaza could not confirm the accuracy of Plaintiff's complaints about G.J. retaliating against her, but noted he would no longer be evaluating her performance. Id. Further, Snaza concluded that Goodew had not retaliated against Plaintiff. Id.; see also Kasper Dep. at 112. Plaintiff later criticized Snaza's handling of her retaliation complaint, and asked to be placed in a different position within Federated. Id. at 119-20, 128-30; Memo from Kasper to Snaza of 12/29/01 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 23).
Defendant's concerns about Plaintiff's performance continued after she reported G.J.'s behavior. In December 2001, Lisa Kuck ("Kuck") replaced G.J. as Plaintiff's supervisor, but was not informed of Plaintiff's complaint against G.J. Kasper Dep. at 116-17; Kuck Dep. at 65-66 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 3). Kuck met with Plaintiff to discuss performance issues on March 29, 2002, and the two developed an action plan to help Plaintiff meet Federated's expectations. Kasper Dep. at 132; Memo from Kuck to Kasper of 04/01/02 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 25). Kuck and Plaintiff met again in May and June 2002 regarding Plaintiff's continuing performance deficiencies. Kasper Dep. at 150, 155; Memo from Kuck to Kasper of 05/23/02 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 30); Memo from Kuck to Kasper of 06/18/02 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 32). At this time, Plaintiff also sought Kuck's support for other jobs within Federated. However, Kuck informed Plaintiff that she could only recommend her for non-supervisory positions because of concerns about Plaintiff's abilities. Kasper Dep. at 156, 159-60; Kuck Dep. at 129; Memo from Kuck to Kasper of 06/18/02 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 32).
This pattern of meetings between Defendant and Plaintiff concerning performance problems continued throughout the Summer and Fall of 2002. After receiving a "needs improvement" rating in a performance review, Plaintiff met with Kuck, Goodew and Lisa Hyland ("Hyland"), Defendant's Employee Relations Manager, on October 7, 2002, and received a document entitled "Performance Expectation and Corrective Action Plans" ("Plans"). Kasper Dep. at 185-86; Plans for Karen Kasper of 10/07/02 (Hedican Aff. Exs. 49-50). The Plans required Plaintiff to finish five file reviews per month or fifteen per quarter. Plans at 2. Team Support Supervisors are required to complete file reviews or audits to evaluate processing quality. Kuck Dep. at 265-66, 272-73. Plaintiff had completed file reviews in the past, but said she did not know how to conduct "deep technical" audits and requested four to six months of training. Kasper Dep. at 189-90. Defendant felt this training was not necessary, and Kuck offered to provide one-on-one training to Plaintiff instead. Kuck Dep. at 224-25, 228, 261-62; Notes from Meeting of 10/07/02 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 51).
Kuck, Hyland and Plaintiff met again on October 8, 2002 to discuss this impasse concerning the file audits. Kasper Dep. at 188-89; Memo from Kuck to Kasper of 10/08/02 (Hedican Aff. Ex. 53). After Plaintiff repeated that she could not do the file reviews without four to six months of training, she was terminated. Kasper Dep. at 195. Plaintiff filed the present Complaint alleging retaliation on June 3, 2003.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendant now moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not "rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial." Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).
B. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim
Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie claim for Title VII retaliation. Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he [the employee] has opposed any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3a. The burden shifting framework described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), applies to both Plaintiff's Title VII and MHRA claims. See Kiel v. Select Artifacts, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1134-36 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying framework to Title VII claim); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 444 (Minn. 1983) (analyzing MHRA reprisal claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework). Under this framework, the plaintiff employee must initially establish a prima facie case of discrimination. This showing creates a presumption that the employer acted unlawfully. See Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1134-35. The burden of production then shifts to the employer who must provide legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. Id. If the defendant meets this requirement, the burden returns to the plaintiff to show that the employer's explanation is pretextual. Id.
However, the plaintiff cannot necessarily avoid summary judgment at this stage by simply establishing a prima facie case and showing that the employer's purported justification is false. Summary judgment may still be warranted if the evidence reveals some other non-discriminatory reason for the employer's action, or if the plaintiff creates only weak factual issues concerning pretext and additional, uncontroverted evidence shows that there was no discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuasion in showing discrimination throughout this analysis. Id. at 143.
To demonstrate a prima facie retaliation claim, Plaintiff must prove the following elements: 1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; 2) she suffered an adverse employment action; 3) the adverse action was causally linked to the protected activity.See Kipp v. Mo. Highway Transp. Comm'n, 280 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 2002); Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136. An adverse employment action "is exhibited by a material employment disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities." See LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 240 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2001). Thus, "not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse employment action." Id. In proving causation, normally "more than a temporal connection between the protected conduct and the adverse employment action is required to present a genuine factual issue on retaliation." Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1136.
Plaintiff has not established all three elements to constitute a prima facie claim. Plaintiff meets the first two prongs of the analysis because reporting alleged sexual harassment is statutorily protected conduct, and being terminated is an adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); LaCroix, 240 F.3d at 691. However, Plaintiff has not linked her termination to her reporting of the sexual harassment, and consequently fails to establish causation. Plaintiff has not demonstrated a temporal connection between these two events because she was not terminated until October 8, 2002, nearly a year after she first reported that G.J. sexually harassed another employee. See Kipp, 280 F.3d at 897 (holding that two-month interval between the protected conduct and the adverse action does not support causation); Kasper Dep. at 74, 80-88. Further, while Plaintiff avers that Defendant retaliated against her by giving her poor reviews shortly after she officially reported G.J. on October 10, 2001, Defendant confronted Plaintiff about her work performance in September 2001, before she formally disclosed the harassment. See Compl. ¶¶ 15-16; see also Kasper Dep. at 59, 67-71, 74; E-mail from Goodew to Bucher of 9/29/01. Thus, the evidence does not support Plaintiff's accusation that Defendant bode its time and built a "false file" against her instead of terminating her immediately.
Plaintiff claims that she first expressed concern about G.J. in Spring 2001. At that time, Plaintiff learned that G.J. had made inappropriate remarks at a happy hour after she attended a meeting where another employee, Denise Miller, described G.J.'s behavior. See Pl's Mem. in Opp. at 3-4; Supplemental Mem. at 2;see also Kasper Dep. at 80, 83-85; Miller Dep. at 11-13 (Lienemann Aff. Ex. 8), Snaza Dep. at 11-12 (Lienemann Aff. Ex. 9). However, Plaintiff did not report any alleged sexual harassment to human resources or management until October 10, 2001. See Kasper Dep. at 80.
Similarly, Plaintiff's argument that Defendant failed to properly investigate her sexual harassment claim does not establish causation, even assuming Plaintiff's allegation is accurate. Plaintiff attempts to compile a long series of allegedly adverse employment actions that ultimately concluded with her termination. According to Plaintiff, one link in this chain was Defendant's deviation from its regular practices in reviewing her sexual harassment claim. She asserts that this alleged departure proves that Defendant bore a discriminatory animus against her. However, Plaintiff has not shown how failing to thoroughly investigate her claim, even if true, relates to her termination. Defendant questioned Plaintiff's competency before she reported G.J.'s behavior, and in fact met with her to discuss performance issues. Id. This is evidence that Plaintiff was terminated because of her performance problems and not because she reported the harassment. Id. Thus, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie claim. Kipp, 280 F.3d at 896.
Finally, even if Plaintiff has somehow established a prima facie claim, Defendant has provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her. Defendant avers that it terminated Plaintiff because she refused to complete file audits, an integral part of her job, without an additional four to six months of training.See Kasper Dep. at 195. All personnel holding Plaintiff's position were required to audit files, and Plaintiff had completed this task previously. See id. at 189-90; Kuck Dep. at 265-66, 272-73; Compl. ¶ 44.
Plaintiff's attempt to rebut Defendant's nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her is unavailing. Tellingly, Plaintiff does not contest Defendant's assertion that she refused to complete file audits without additional training. See Kasper Dep. at 195. Rather, Plaintiff emphasizes that she received positive reviews, and avers that management scrutinized her performance more closely compared with other employees. However, these assertions, even if true, fail to rebut Defendant's stated reason for terminating her. Regardless of whether Plaintiff excelled in other areas of her job, her refusal to perform a basic job task presents a nondiscriminatory basis for termination. See Kiel, 169 F.3d at 1135 (citing insubordination and violations of company policy as legitimate reasons for termination). Further, employers are entitled to make their own subjective personnel decisions "for any reason that is not discriminatory." Stemmons v. Mo. Dep't of Corrs., 82 F.3d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Scamardo v. Scott County, 189 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying "business judgment" analysis to retaliation case). Therefore, Plaintiff's retaliation claim fails as a matter of law.
C. Plaintiff's Discovery Abuse Claim
Plaintiff also initially argued that the Court should deny Defendant's Motion because Defendant refused to provide discovery materials necessary to defend against the Motion. Plaintiff apparently received the material after filing her Memorandum in Opposition, and was given permission to file a supplemental brief to incorporate the new material. Consequently, this argument is no longer relevant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 15] is GRANTED and,
2. Plaintiff's Complaint [Docket No. 1] is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.