[1] Finally, the opinion of the Attorney General concludes that these political contributions are not authorized. Attorney General Opinion, Oct. 26, 1978. Although not binding, opinions of the Attorney General in construing statutes are entitled to considerable weight. In re Chi-Dooh Li, 79 Wn.2d 561, 488 P.2d 259 (1971); Kasper v. Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 420 P.2d 346 (1966). This is especially true in the instant case given the legislature's acquiescence to the Attorney General's interpretation of RCW 41.04.230 as evidenced by its failure, in subsequent legislative sessions, to modify the statute.
We do not agree. The companion cases of Kasper v. Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 420 P.2d 346 (1966) and Thymian v. Massart, 69 Wn.2d 806, 420 P.2d 351 (1966), upon which appellants rely, hold that a municipality may not dilute LID protestors' right of protest by contributing "public funds," Kasper, at 802, to the "total cost of the improvement" as contemplated by RCW 35.43.180. After numerous and extensive hearings, Tukwila's city council determined that the City's interests would best be served by the formation of a comprehensive local improvement district.
It is basic canon of statutory interpretation that a statute should be construed so that no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant. HomeStreet, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 210 P.3d 297, 301 (Wash. 2009) (citing Kasper v. City of Edmonds, 420 P.2d 346, 349-50 (Wash. 1966)). Luken's preferred "liberal" interpretation rendering the "cash or negotiable instrument" language of the statute superfluous is an unacceptable result.
Washington believes they are entitled to "considerable weight" unless the court is "constrained by reason, legislative history, or other rules of statutory construction to decline to follow an Attorney General's opinion." Kasper v. City of Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 420 P.2d 346, 350 (1966). And Wyoming has held that the opinions are entitled merely to "judicial consideration."
Whenever possible, we interpret the statutory language such that " ‘no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ " City of Seattle v. Long , 198 Wash.2d 136, 148, 493 P.3d 94 (2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kasper v. City of Edmonds , 69 Wash.2d 799, 804, 420 P.2d 346 (1966) ). ¶8 Where the statutory language is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain language and our inquiry ends.
¶17 Whenever possible, statutes are to be construed so " ‘no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ " Kasper v. City of Edmonds , 69 Wash.2d 799, 804, 420 P.2d 346 (1966) (quoting Groves v. Meyers , 35 Wash.2d 403, 407, 213 P.2d 483 (1950) ). "If a statute is ambiguous, we ‘may look to the legislative history of the statute and the circumstances surrounding its enactment to determine legislative intent.’ " Five Corners Family Farmers v. State , 173 Wash.2d 296, 305-06, 268 P.3d 892 (2011) (quoting Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc. , 150 Wash.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598 (2003) ).
If the legislature’s intent is clear from the statute’s plain meaning, then the court "must give effect to that plain meaning." Id. at 9-10, 43 P.3d 4. "Whenever possible, statutes are to be construed so ‘ "no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’ " " HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 166 Wash.2d 444, 452, 210 P.3d 297 (2009) (quoting Kasper v.City of Edmonds, 69 Wash.2d 799, 804, 420 P.2d 346 (1966) (quoting Groves v.Meyers, 35 Wash.2d 403, 407, 213 P.2d 483 (1950) )). But the court "must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them."
Whenever possible, statutes are to be construed so "`no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.'" Kasper v. City of Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 804, 420 P.2d 346 (1966) (quoting Groves v. Meyers, 35 Wn.2d 403, 407, 213 P.2d 483 (1950)). A court "is required to assume the Legislature meant exactly what it said and apply the statute as written."
Although not controlling, attorney general opinions are entitled to great weight. Kasper v. City of Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 805, 420 P.2d 346 (1966). A 1974 attorney general letter opinion (AGLO) is particularly instructive here.
Opinions of the Attorney General are entitled to considerable weight, but are not controlling upon this court. Elovich v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 104 Wn.2d 543, 550, 707 P.2d 1319 (1985) (citing Kasper v. Edmonds, 69 Wn.2d 799, 805, 420 P.2d 346 (1966)); Everett Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Department of Labor Indus., 109 Wn.2d 819, 828, 748 P.2d 1112 (1988). In particular, we give less deference to such opinions when they involve issues of statutory interpretation.