But for every case cited by Plaintiff, there are others in which Florida courts reduced more modest damage awards. See Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (upholding the remittitur of a $150,000 verdict to $100,000 awarded to eighteen-year old woman facing "the prospect of continuous dental repair" for "severe dental injuries" causing "great physical pain and suffering"). Plaintiff did not introduce any evidence relating to her medical expenses, and thus economic damages are not at play.
AFFIRMED. See Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). BARFIELD, C.J., KAHN and DAVIS, JJ., CONCUR.
The doctrine of unavoidable accident is applicable "only when, under some theory of the case, the injury does not result from the negligence of either party." Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). While rejecting unavoidable accident as a separate affirmative defense, the second district in Tropical Exterminators, Inc. v. Murray, 171 So.2d 432, 433-34 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 177 So.2d 475 (Fla. 1965) attempted to define the term: The phrase "unavoidable accident", as related to the question of liability in tort actions involving damages to person or property, is somewhat of a misnomer.
The granting of a continuance is a matter of discretion with the trial judge. Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). However, we reverse the order denying the objections to the accountings for the period August 1, 1975 to May 31, 1982.
Based on the controlling and indistinguishable authority of Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1985) and Anderson v. State, 463 So.2d 276 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1985), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 2870, 101 L.Ed.2d 905 (1988), the plaintiff has not been harmed by the ruling complained of and, therefore, no reversible error has been shown. Finally, no reversible error has been shown in either the denial of the post-trial motion to interview jurors because no juror misconduct was shown on this record to merit such an interview, Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); see Judson v. Nicson Eng'g Co., 478 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. dismissed, 496 So.2d 143 (Fla. 1986); Dover Corp. v. Dean, 473 So.2d 710, 712 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 475 So.2d 693 (Fla. 1985); Cummings v. Sine, 404 So.2d 147, 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), or in the closing argument of counsel for Metropolitan Dade County because no objection to the argument was made, and the complained-of comments do not rise to the level of fundamental error. See Honda Motor Co. v. Marcus, 440 So.2d 373, 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), rev. denied, 447 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1984); Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So.2d 825, 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1986); Russell v. Guider, 362 So.2d 55 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1373 (Fla. 1979).
We also find no error in the trial court's exercising its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to interview the jurors. Cummings v. Sine, 404 So.2d 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Kasper Instruments, Inc., v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); National Indemnity Company v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978). The court correctly ruled Westinghouse was entitled to contribution from Sears for 25% of the compensatory damages and taxable costs.
The decision to permit or deny the interview is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court. Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 925, 102 S.Ct. 1970, 72 L.Ed.2d 440 (1982); Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). A court should exercise its discretion and permit a party to interview a juror where "a miscarriage of justice will result if the jurors are not permitted to be interviewed or interrogated." National Indemnity Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454, 456 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1210 (Fla. 1978).
We also find no reversible error in the trial court's denial of Tri-County's post-trial motion to interview the jurors. See Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). The final judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
A review of the cases on the subject demonstrates that interviewing jurors after trial is no perfunctory exercise, but rather requires a showing of something more than conjecture and speculation by the movant as to what went wrong. Brassell v. Brethauer, 305 So.2d 217 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); National Indem. Co. v. Andrews, 354 So.2d 454 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Kasper Instruments, Inc. v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Ortega v. Perrini Sons, Inc., 371 So.2d 203 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). As we said in Brassell, "Absent the requirement of a factual allegation in the notice the subjective conclusion of the loser in every trial would warrant a jury interview." 305 So.2d at 219.
PER CURIAM. Affirmed. Binger v. King Pest Control, 401 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1981); Bergen Brunswick Corporation v. State of Florida Department of Health Rehabilitative Services, 415 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Kasper Instruments, Inc., v. Maurice, 394 So.2d 1125 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Goodell v. K.T. Enterprises, Inc., 394 So.2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Padgett v. First Federal Savings Loan Association of Santa Rosa County, 378 So.2d 58 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Southeast First National Bank of Miami v. Taines, 339 So.2d 275 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Rule 1.270 Fla.R.Civ.P.