” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 92–93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013), quoting Union Carbide Corp. v. Danbury, 257 Conn. 865, 870–71, 778 A.2d 204 (2001). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it ... or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
Because this court previously held in Rhodes that the pre–1997 version of § 21–44 encompassed repurchase agreements; see Rhodes v. Hartford, supra, 201 Conn. at 96–97, 513 A.2d 124; it is necessary to determine whether the legislature's amendment to the pre–1997 version of § 21–44 in P.A. 97–164, § 5, altered the scope of the statute. Although “we do not write on a clean slate” when this court previously has interpreted a statute; Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013); whether the legislature has changed the meaning of a statute is a matter of statutory interpretation. “When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1–2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013). “Notwithstanding the passage of § 1–2z, in our construction of statutes, this court's starting point, when we already have interpreted the statute in question, is our prior construction of that statute.... This approach is consistent both with the principle of stare decisis and the principle that our prior decisions interpreting a statute are not treated as extratextual sources for purposes of construing that statute and may be consulted as part of our reading of the statutory text.”
In doing so, we exercise plenary review. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013). "[Section] 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
It is well established that, in interpreting a statute, this court is bound by our prior constructions of the statute. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia , 309 Conn. 85, 93–94, 70 A.3d 1 (2013) ; Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd. , 282 Conn. 477, 494–95, 923 A.2d 657 (2007). We must presume that the legislature is aware not only of this rule of statutory construction, but also of our interpretation of § 53a-151 (a) in Ortiz .
We decline to do so. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia , 309 Conn. 85, 93–94 and n.10, 70 A.3d 1 (2013) (in interpreting statutory text, this court is bound by our prior constructions of statute); Hummel v. Marten Transport, Ltd. , 282 Conn. 477, 501, 923 A.2d 657 (2007) (enactment of § 1-2z did not overrule existing case law). Although an argument in favor of overruling established precedent may well be strengthened by tension with a statute's plain meaning, we can discern no such conflict in the present case.
Whether bystander emotional distress claims that derive from an employee's compensable injuries are barred by § 31–284(a) is a question that presents an issue of statutory interpretation over which we exercise plenary review, guided by well established principles regarding legislative intent. See Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013) (explaining plain meaning rule under General Statutes § 1–2z and setting forth process for ascertaining legislative intent). Particularly relevant to our analysis in the present case is the principle that in our construction of statutes, this court's starting point, when we already have interpreted the statute in question, is our prior construction of that statute.
If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.... When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter....” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013). Consistent with these principles of statutory interpretation, we turn first to the language of the statute.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kasica v. Columbia , 309 Conn. 85, 93, 70 A.3d 1 (2013).Section 12–119provides in relevant part: "When it is claimed that ... a tax laid on property was computed on an assessment which, under all the circumstances, was manifestly excessive and could not have been arrived at except by disregarding the provisions of the statutes for determining the valuation of such property, the owner thereof ... may ... make application for relief to the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the judicial district in which such town or city is situated.
We have previously construed the meaning of the phrase "weapon ... from which a shot may be discharged" in § 53a-3 and are guided by that precedent. See, e.g., Kasica v. Columbia , 309 Conn. 85, 93–94, 70 A.3d 1 (2013) (observing that, when construing statutes, "we ... are bound by our previous judicial interpretations of the language and the purpose of the statute"). In State v. Hardy , 278 Conn. 113, 896 A.2d 755 (2006), we addressed whether a "weapon ... from which a shot may be discharged," as used in subdivision (6) of § 53a-3, requires "that a shot be discharged by gunpowder ...."