Opinion
3:21-cv-221-SLH-KAP
06-11-2024
STEVEN JAMES KARPINSKI, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KEITH A. PESTO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
Recommendation
The estate of Brian Hyde should be dismissed from this matter.
Report
Plaintiff Karpinski, an inmate now at S.C.I. Huntingdon, filed a complaint, not in forma pauperis, dated December 20, 2021, complaining about the medical care he received between May 29, 2019 and December 29, 2019, when he was at S.C.I. Somerset. The case was closed for failure to pay the filing fee, then re-opened when plaintiff paid the filing fee. Plaintiff did not file a return of service so in March 2022 I issued an order under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4 directing plaintiff to make service; in April 2022 I granted plaintiff's motion for service by the Marshal.
As I have noted before, plaintiff Karpinski named two types of defendants: 1) his medical care providers and 2) Pennsylvania Department of Corrections non-medical personnel, including the former health care administrator, Brian Hyde. Hyde died only days before my Rule 4 order was issued. Like that of other Department of Corrections defendants, Hyde's liability was based on allegations that he was liable for failing to intervene whenever Karpinski complained about the medical care providers, compare Complaint ¶5 with Complaint ¶¶ 1- 2, 4-6, and 7.
The Department of Corrections defendants filed a motion to dismiss, ECF no. 18. The motion was not filed on behalf of Hyde, undoubtedly because he had not been served. In September 2022, I recommended that the Department of Corrections' motion to dismiss be granted, ECF no. 22, and after extensions of time granted to plaintiff by the Court to reply to the motion nunc pro tunc I again recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted, ECF no. 38. The Court adopted that recommendation in June 2023, ECF no. 43. Plaintiff then spent the bulk of the last year in attempts to have the Court reverse that decision and in an improper interlocutory appeal that was dismissed at the end of April 2024. ECF no. 79.
Meanwhile, after considerable turnover in the Attorney General's office, current counsel noticed Hyde's death in March 2024. ECF no. 68. Plaintiff sought to substitute the estate as a defendant. I denied that. Since there is no valid claim against Hyde for the same reason there was no claim against the other non-medical defendants, I recommend that Hyde be dismissed from this matter.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, at 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(e)(2)(B) commands the dismissal at any time of a complaint or portion thereof if the court finds that it:
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
No extended discussion is necessary: the complaint against Hyde fails to state a claim for the same reason this Court has already found it inadequate to state a claim against the other non-medical defendants. Absent actual knowledge or a reason to believe that medical personnel are mistreating a prisoner, a non-medical prison official is not chargeable with the scienter required for deliberate indifference. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). That Karpinski allegedly complained to Hyde is not sufficient to allege anything other than that Hyde had knowledge of Karpinski's complaints. Plaintiff does not allege that Hyde or other any DOC defendant knew (and subjective awareness is necessary for liability) that the medical defendants' treatment decisions were inadequate. That dooms his claim against defendant Hyde. The case I previously cited, Thomas v. Dragovich, 142 Fed.Appx. 33, 39 (3d Cir. 2005), expressly made this point as to health care administrators.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), the parties can within fourteen days file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. In the absence of timely and specific objections, any appeal would be severely hampered or entirely defaulted. See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).