Opinion
3:21-cv-221-SLH-KAP
03-22-2023
STEVEN JAMES KARPINSKI, Plaintiff v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KEITH A. PESTO, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Recommendation
Plaintiff filed a one-page pleading styled “Petition for Injunction” that because of its title was docketed as a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65. See ECF no. 30. It should be denied without a hearing.
Report
Plaintiff Karpinski, an inmate now at S.C.I Laurel Highlands, filed a complaint at the end of 2021 subject to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, mostly claiming that his medical care was inadequate at S.C.I. Somerset two years earlier. His medical care providers have answered. Plaintiff named corrections personnel as defendants on the theory that they too were liable for any inadequacy in plaintiff's medical care, and added a tag-along conclusory claim that some corrections staff denied him “the basic needs of personal hygiene,” and that one corrections officer denied him unspecified commissary items paid for by plaintiff. My recommendation that those claims be dismissed as inadequate was submitted to the Court.
Plaintiff's filing at ECF no. 30 uses the word “injunction,” which suggests that Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 is implicated. Plaintiff makes no attempt to comply with Rule 65. Plaintiff alleges only past problems he faced doing legal research and without even discussing future problems seeks an order prohibiting the Department of Corrections and S.C.I. Laurel Highlands from “interfering with” his right of access to court. In other words, this court should guess what relief plaintiff needs and impose it on personnel who are not defendants.
Preliminary relief under Rule 65 is for the purpose of maintaining the status quo to avoid the likelihood of irreparable injury before a decision on the merits of a matter can be rendered. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008). A court considering a request for preliminary injunction typically evaluates: (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at the final hearing; (2) the extent to which the plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which the defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest. Hawksbill Sea Turtle v. FEMA, 126 F.3d 461, 478 n.13 (3d Cir.1997), citing Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Building Products, Inc., 963 F.2d 628, 632-33 (3d Cir.1992). This not a balancing test: the moving party must show, before any balance of harms or public interest is considered, both a reasonable likelihood of ultimately prevailing on the merits, and the need for immediate relief to avoid irreparable injury. Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 319 (3d Cir. 2020); Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 511 (3d Cir.1969).
The factors to be considered in granting preliminary relief assume that such relief is being sought for its proper purpose, namely, “to grant intermediate relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.” De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). The final relief that plaintiff seeks is $8 million dollars for the injuries allegedly resulting from inadequate medical care at S.C.I. Somerset and an order requiring the “PA DOC to undergo extensive training about the rights of prisoners.” The motion bears no relation to that relief.
This sort of thing has become a routine part of inmate litigation: an underlying prison conditions complaint is used as a springboard to file ongoing complaints styled as motions, seeking separation from specific inmates or corrections staff, or dietary privileges, or priority and expanded use of the law library. As in this case, sometimes the moving inmate is at a different prison from the one named in the complaint. Styling a pleading as a motion for an injunction, a preliminary injunction, or a TRO does not make it a proper motion under Rule 65. An inmate's complaints about prison conditions are subject to the exhaustion of remedies requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiff cannot bypass the PLRA's exhaustion requirements or bring multiple complaints for one filing fee by labeling his attempt to bring a new dispute to the court as a motion for injunctive relief in a pending matter.
If the Court nevertheless considers the pleading as a Rule 65 motion, plaintiff's single page of unsworn assertions of past deprivations of access to the law library (which is a distinct issue from access to legal materials) due to Covid-related restrictions and to plaintiff being confined in the RHU would not even raise an issue about future access to the law library that would deserve a hearing. No evidence is offered as to probability of success on the merits of the underlying action, or of irreparable harm. An inmate “making an access-to-the-courts claim is required to show that the denial of access caused actual injury.” Jackson v. Whalen, 568 Fed.Appx. 85, 87 (3d Cir.2014) (per curiam) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)). If denial of access were to be raised as a new complaint, plaintiff would have to allege an injury traceable to that alleged denial. Diaz v. Holder, 532 Fed.Appx. 61, 63 (3d Cir.2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of denial of access claims where plaintiff failed to tie alleged deficiencies in library to harm in underlying action). An actual injury occurs where a “nonfrivolous” and “arguable” claim was lost because of the denial of access to the courts. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). Plaintiff fails to allege any such injury.
And finally, if plaintiff were to correct all these defects in a real motion for preliminary injunctive relief, he himself refutes any need for injunctive relief in his pleading at ECF no. 29, which suggests the obvious remedy -additional time- for any inability on his part to adhere to deadlines.
If plaintiff intended ECF no. 30 to be a Rule 65 motion, then pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 636(b)(1), he, like the other parties, can within fourteen days file written objections to this Report and Recommendation. In the absence of timely and specific objections, any appeal would be severely hampered or entirely defaulted. See EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error).