Summary
noting that in small claims action, "the procedural rules are somewhat relaxed compared to a normal civil action" and "[p]arties are given a greater degree of latitude consistent with the purpose behind small claims actions"
Summary of this case from Gibson v. ShephardOpinion
Case No. 99-T-0052.
June 23, 2000.
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Civil Appeal from Niles Municipal Court Case No. 99 CVI 00153.
DELORES M. KARNOFEL, pro se, 1528 Greenwood Avenue, Girard, OH 44420, Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
ATTY. BRIAN A. MEEKER, Skylight Office Tower, Suite 480, 1660 West Second Street, Cleveland, OH 44113, For Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: HON. JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY, P.J., HON. ROBERT A. NADER, J., HON. WILLIAM M. O'NEILL, J.
OPINION
Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Delores M. Karnofel ("Karnofel"), appeals a decision of the Niles Municipal Court granting her judgment in the amount of $250 plus costs for an "ill-fitted" haircut she received from appellee/cross-appellant, Ron Watson ("Watson"), on March 1, 1999. Watson has also filed a cross-appeal. The following facts, as set forth in the parties' App.R. 9(C) statement, and approved by the trial court, are relevant for a determination of this appeal.
Karnofel went to the beauty salon located within the Kaufmann's department store inside the Eastwood Mall in Niles, Ohio, on March 1, 1999, to have her hair cut. Karnofel was a walk-in customer and was referred to stylist Watson. Watson trimmed Karnofel's hair, then gave her the opportunity to examine it. She instructed him to cut more hair. Watson complied with her request, then gave her another opportunity to look at her hair. She did not complain at that juncture. Karnofel then sat under the hair dryer and, according to Watson, she "messed" with her hair while under the hair dryer resulting in a much fuller appearance.
Once her hair was dry, Karnofel was dissatisfied with her appearance and complained about her hair cut. As a result, she was not required to pay the $14 fee normally charged for a haircut. Karnofel later called the salon to complain to the shop manager.
On March 5, 1999, Karnofel filed a small claims complaint in Niles Municipal Court against Watson alleging an "ill-fitted" haircut. She sought a judgment in the amount of $3,000. A hearing was held by the trial court on April 12, 1999. On April 13, 1999, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Karnofel in the amount of $250 plus costs.
Karnofel timely filed a notice of appeal and Watson timely filed a notice of cross-appeal. Karnofel, acting pro se in this matter, has filed her own appellate brief but has failed to articulate any assigned errors in violation of App.R. 16(A)(3) and Loc.R. 12(B) of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. Watson has set forth a single assignment of error:
"The court erred by awarding extra-contractual damages in a case where Plaintiff alleged she received a poor haircut at Defendant's hair salon but did not allege or produce evidence of a tort or an injury that would constitute damages for purposes of tort or contract law."
While Karnofel has failed to identify any particular assignment of error, in her argument, it is clear that her contention is that the trial court's award of damages in the amount of $250 was insufficient to cover her loss. In essence, Karnofel has set forth a manifest weight challenge.
After reviewing the App.R. 9(C) statement, which is all we have to examine in deciding this appeal, it is clear that we cannot increase Karnofel's award. There is nothing in that statement that addresses the issue of monetary damages. The trial court judge listened to the witnesses, determined their credibility, and weighed the evidence. Those tasks are for the trier of fact, not the appellate court. Bechtol v. Bechtol (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 21, 23. Based upon the state of the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court's award of damages was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Hence, Karnofel's sole assignment of error is without merit.
In Watson's cross-appeal, he has raised a single assignment of error. He contends that Karnofel was entitled to nothing since she did not allege or produce evidence of a tort or breach of a contract. We agree that this case would not be proper under any tort theory. However, we can conclude that Karnofel was entitled to recover damages under a contract analysis. There was a breach of a contract, and damages naturally flowed therefrom.
Watson argues that there was no damage "in a legal sense" because Karnofel was not required to pay for the haircut. Additionally, Watson contends that there was no evidence of expense that Karnofel incurred either for substitute performance or to remedy the alleged bad haircut. That is not exactly correct. It is apparent that Karnofel testified that she purchased some type of health food supplement in order to increase the growth rate of her hair. Karnofel bargained for a satisfactory haircut. She believed she did not receive what she bargained for. In fact, she claimed that she was, at least temporarily, made to look worse than if she had not received any haircut. It is apparent that the trial court, after hearing the witnesses and seeing the evidence, agreed with Karnofel. While we do not condone the practice of suing one's hair stylist for a bad haircut, for who knows what that will lead to next, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in entering judgment in favor of Karnofel, and awarding her $250. We also emphasize that this is a small claims action where the procedural rules are somewhat relaxed compared to a normal civil action. Parties are given a greater degree of latitude consistent with the purpose behind small claims actions. Watson's assignment of error is without merit.
The judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed.
_________________________________ JUDGE WILLIAM M. O'NEILL
DISSENTING OPINION
I must respectfully dissent from the judgment and opinion of the majority for the following reasons.
At the outset, I want to note my agreement with the majority's conclusion that this case involves a breach of contract as opposed to a tort action. I, however, part company with the majority on the issue of appellant's entitlement to $250 in damages for the alleged bad haircut she received at the hands of appellee.
First, in the context of a breach of contract action, the award of money damages is designed to place an aggrieved party in the same position that he or she would have been had the contract not been breached. Buckley v. Ollila (Mar. 3, 2000), Trumbull App. No. 98-T-0177, unreported, at 7-8, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 787, citing Schulke Radio Productions, Ltd. v. Midwestern Broadcasting Co. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 436, 439. In other words, damages are to be compensatory in nature and not punitive. Buckley at 8, citing Lake Ridge Academy v. Carney (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 376, 381. A party is not entitled to be placed in a better position than if the contract had not been breached. Brads v. First Baptist Church of Germantown (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 328.
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff in a breach of contract action to bear the burden of proving the nature and extent of his or her damages in order to be entitled to compensation. Akro-Plastics v. Drake Industries (1996), 115 Ohio App.3d 221, 226. An injured party cannot recover damages for breach of contract in excess of the amount that is established by the evidence with reasonable certainty. Cordy v. D G Pools, Inc. (Dec. 26, 1997), Trumbull App. No. 97-T-0079, unreported, at 5, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 5849. Reasonable certainty is defined as "that degree of certainty of which the nature of the case admits." Edwards v. Floyd (Mar. 26, 1999), Trumbull App. No. 98-T-0027, unreported, at 6, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1231, quoting Bemmes v. Public Emp. Retirement Bd. (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 782, 789.
In the instant matter, I believe that the damages awarded by the trial court were not based on a reasonable certainty, but instead, were speculative at best. While the record before the court is sparse, it is undisputed that appellant was not required to pay for the haircut. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record showing that appellant incurred expenses for substitute performance. As for appellant's purchase of the health food supplement to increase the growth of her hair, nothing before us indicates that it cost $250.
I do not dispute the fact that appellant was upset with the haircut she received, and that it caused her some emotional distress. In fact, I believe that at least part of the trial court's award was based on appellant's anxiety over her appearance after the haircut. While I sympathize with appellant's position, the law is very clear in this regard. Because the purpose of damages in a breach of contract action is to compensate a person for the benefit of the bargain which was lost, there is no recovery for emotional distress resulting from that breach. Strawser v. Wright (1992), 80 Ohio App.3d 751, 755.
Therefore, at a minimum, the trial court's award should be reduced to the nominal amount of one dollar. Otherwise, appellant would be placed in better position than she would have enjoyed had appellee cut her hair to appellant's satisfaction.
As noted by the majority, this is a small claims action where procedural rules are sometimes relaxed to accommodate lay people. Even so, there must still be some evidence in the record, hearsay or otherwise, to support and explain the award. Here, the trial court apparently chose an arbitrary figure which it deemed proper under the circumstances.
For the above reasons, I disagree with the trial court's assessment and respectfully dissent. I would reverse and enter judgment for one dollar nominal damage, as appellant presented no evidence as to any other amount.
_____________________________________ PRESIDING JUDGE JUDITH A. CHRISTLEY