Further, so much of the Journal's motion which seeks sanctions is denied. Defendant has failed to show that plaintiffs actions were frivolous or that her position was taken or continued in bad faith (see, 22 NYCIRR 130-1.1; Karnes v City of white Plains, 237 AD2d 574,655 NYS2d 615 [19971; Watson v City of New York, 178 AD2d 126,567NYS2d 864 [1991]).

Further, so much of the Journal's motion which seeks sanctions is denied. Defendant has failed to show that plaintiffs actions were frivolous or that her position was taken or continued in bad faith (see, 22NYCIRR 130-1.1; Karnes vCity of white Plains, 237 AD2d 574,655 NYS2d 615 [19971; Watson v City of New York, 178AD2d 126,567NYS2d 864 [1991]). Defendants, Robert F. Kozakiewicz and Riverhead GOP, seek (#002) an order precluding plaintiff from offering evidence at trial based upon plaintiffs failure to comply with discovery demands.

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to grant the plaintiff's motion and to deny, without a hearing, those branches of the defendant's cross motion which were, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) to vacate his default in appearing and pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8) to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction (seeNYCTL 2009–A Trust v. Tsafatinos, 101 A.D.3d 1092, 956 N.Y.S.2d 571 ; Citimortgage, Inc. v. Phillips, 82 A.D.3d at 1033, 918 N.Y.S.2d 893 ). We also agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny that branch of the defendant's cross motion which was to impose a sanction upon the plaintiff and her attorney, as the defendant failed to demonstrate that the conduct of the plaintiff or her attorney was frivolous as that term is defined in 22 NYCRR 130–1.1(c) (seeKarnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 574, 576, 655 N.Y.S.2d 615 ). We have not considered the defendant's affidavit that was submitted for the first time in his surreply papers before the Supreme Court (seeAmodeo v. Kolodny, P.C., 35 A.D.3d 773, 774, 828 N.Y.S.2d 446 ; Severino v. Classic Collision, 280 A.D.2d 463, 719 N.Y.S.2d 902 ).

In opposition, Alpha failed to raise a triable issue of fact ( see Persaud v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 93 A.D.3d 831, 833, 941 N.Y.S.2d 208). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of Tulger's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. However, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Tulger's motion which was to impose sanctions against Alpha ( see22 NYCRR 130–1.1; Karnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 574, 576, 655 N.Y.S.2d 615).

Moreover, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting the defendants' cross motion for an award of costs and an attorney's fee against Providence pursuant to CPLR 8303-a and 22 NYCRR 130-1.1. The defendants failed to demonstrate that Providence's conduct was frivolous within the meaning of 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (c), or that its actions were commenced or continued in bad faith ( see CPLR 8303-a [c] [i]; Broich v Nabisco, Inc., 2 AD3d 474, 475; Karnes v City of White Plains, 237 AD2d 574, 576). We note that the Supreme Court did not follow the proper procedure for imposing costs and an attorney's fee, since it failed to specify in a written decision the conduct upon which the award was based and the reasons why it found the conduct to be frivolous ( see 22 NYCRR 130-1.2; Badillo v Badillo, 62 AD3d 635, 636; Hamilton v Cordero, 10 AD3d 702, 703).

The Supreme Court also correctly denied the cross motion of the defendant Sag Harbor Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Sag Harbor), for an award of an attorney's fee and costs pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 and CPLR 8303-a. Sag Harbor failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff's conduct was frivolous as that term is defined under 22 NYCRR 130-1.1(c), or that the action was commenced or continued in bad faith ( see CPLR 8303-a[c][i]; Karnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 574, 576). The plaintiff's remaining contentions either are unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.

The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit. We find no basis for the imposition of a sanction against the plaintiffs on this appeal (see CPLR 8303-a; Karnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 574; Ltown Ltd. Partnership v. Sire Plan, 108 A.D.2d 435, mod 69 N.Y.2d 670). RITTER, J.P., LUCIANO, COZIER and RIVERA, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs. The Supreme Court properly granted the defendant's cross motion for leave to renew its prior motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see, Karnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 574). While a motion for leave to renew generally should be based on newly-discovered facts, the rule is flexible, and a court has the discretion to grant renewal upon facts known to the movant at the time of the original motion, provided the movant offers a reasonable justification for the failure to submit the additional facts on the original motion (see, CPLR 2221[e]; Morrison v. Rosenberg, 278 A.D.2d 392).

The application was not without legal merit, was not brought in bad faith, and did not assert false material factual statements. Accordingly, the imposition of costs and sanctions for frivolous conduct was unwarranted (see, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1; Bahamonde v. State of New York, 269 A.D.2d 551; Musumeci v. Musumeci, 267 A.D.2d 364; Karnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 575). In light of our determination, it is unnecessary to reach the appellants' remaining contention.

Moreover, there is no proof that the Village had actual or constructive notice of the alleged defective condition of the walkway, and the plaintiffs' speculative and conclusory allegations were insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the Village may have created the alleged defect through negligent repair ( see, Sloan v. Village of Hempstead, 223 A.D.2d 632; Mendes v. Whitney-Floral Realty Corp., 216 A.D.2d 540; Tyschak v. Incorporated Vil. of Westbury, 193 A.D.2d 670). Accordingly, the court properly granted the motion of the Village which was, in effect, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as it was asserted against it ( see, Village Law § 6-628; Kiernan v. Thompson, 73 N.Y.2d 840; Karnes v. City of White Plains, 237 A.D.2d 574). Ritter, J. P., Santucci, Joy and Florio, JJ., concur.