Opinion
99 Civ. 3608 (WK)
July 12, 2002
Anthony Merlino, Esq., Law Firm of Louis Ginsberg, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
Mark A. Saloman, Esq., Grotta, Glassman Hoffman New York, NY, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Currently before us is Magistrate Judge Fox's Report and Recommendation ("the Report") advising us to grant defendants' summary judgment motion dismissing plaintiff's federal claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. Neither plaintiff nor defendants object to the Report's suggestion that we dismiss plaintiff's federal claims.
Defendants, however, argue that we should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's related state law claims and dismiss the entire complaint with prejudice. For the reasons set forth below, we "DOPT the Report in its entirety and DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Carey Adina Karmel ("Karmel" or "plaintiff") alleges that defendant Liz Claiborne, Inc. ("Liz Claiborne") and defendant Dana Buchman Associates (collectively, "defendants") violated state and municipal anti-discrimination laws by "firing plaintiff because they perceived plaintiff as disabled." (Am. Compl. at 8). Plaintiff further alleges that after she sent a letter to defendants accusing them of unlawful discrimination, they retaliated against her by making defamatory statements about her to a perspective employer. In addition, plaintiff contends that defendants breached an employment contract and have been unjustly enriched by plaintiff's labor giving rise to several claims, including promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, and negligent misrepresentation.
For purposes of this Memorandum and Order we assume familiarity with the facts as stated in the Report.
DISCUSSION A. Plaintiff's Federal Law Claims
The Report correctly determines that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that defendants regarded her temporary eye condition as an impairment that substantially limited her in the major life activity of working, and that this perception is what led them to terminate her employment. The record reflects that plaintiff only provided evidence that defendants were aware that her temporary eye affliction prevented her from reading e-mail transmissions from her computer monitor screen. To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff would be required to provide evidence that would permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that the defendants believed her eye problem "substantially limited her ability to work either in `a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes.'" (Report at 13) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(I)). However, plaintiff only alleges that defendants mistakenly viewed her condition as precluding her from holding the position of Design Director, "a single job." (Report at 13). In addition, plaintiff's claim of retaliatory defamation cannot survive a summary judgment motion because it relies entirely upon inadmissible hearsay. Sarno v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons Ives, Inc. (2d Cir. 1999) 183 F.3d 155, 160. The failure to establish the prima facie elements required to establish claims of ADA and retaliation indicate that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff's federal law claims.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claims
Plaintiff's state and municipal claims of discrimination, breach of contract, defamation, New York labor law violations, negligent misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment, do not invoke any federal questions. Therefore, the state and municipal claims can only be brought to federal court by way of either diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, or supplemental jurisdiction, in conformance to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), which grants federal courts jurisdiction to decide claims over which they would not otherwise have jurisdiction if those claims arise from "the same common nucleus of operative fact" as claims over which they do have jurisdiction. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs (1966) 383 U.S. 715, 725-29. See also Keady v. Nike (2d Cir. 2001) 2001 WL 1168334.
Defendants contend that although plaintiff brought her state law claims as supplemental to her federal claims, we can independently hear them because there is diversity jurisdiction. To support this contention defendants state that they are Delaware corporations while plaintiff is a New York citizen. However, it has come to our attention that Liz Claiborne's principal place of business is 1441 Broadway, New York, New York.
Defendants do not deny that they maintain an office at this address and independent research shows that at least one court in this district has found, "Liz Claiborne, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, having its principal place of business at 1441 Broadway, New York, New York." Liz Claiborne v. Mademoiselle Knitwear, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 979 F. Supp. 224, 226. Therefore, we can only hear the state law claims under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction since, "for purposes both of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a corporation is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated, and of the state where its principal place of business is located." R.G. Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc. (2d Cir. 1979) 612 F.2d 651, 654.
In choosing whether or not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, § 1367(c) lists several factors we may consider. A district court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if: (1) the state claim raises a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) the state claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the court has original jurisdiction; (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Seabrook v. Jacobson (2d Cir. 1998) 153 F.3d 70. Where these issues are not present, "a federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims . . . Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs (1966) 383 U.S. 715, 726.
Here, defendants argue that we should exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the concerns raised by § 1367(c) are inapplicable. Defendants' argument ignores the existence of § 1367(c)(3), which specifically grants us discretion to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a claim if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." This alone gives us reason to decline exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state claims which, `but for' plaintiff's now defunct federal claims, would never be before this court. See Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc. (2d Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 442, 447 (adopting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 1367(c) in Executive Software North America, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of California (9th Cir. 1994) 24 F.3d 1545, 1556 ("it is clear that Congress intended section 1367(c) to provide the exclusive means by which supplemental jurisdiction can be declined by a court.")). Thus, "[o]nly one of the four prongs of section 1367(c) must be satisfied in order to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction." Correspondent Services Corp. v. J.V.W. Investments (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2002) 2002 WL 1144631 (citing Riley v. Town of Bethlehem (N.D.N.Y. 1999) 44 F. Supp.2d 451, 467.
Furthermore, "[t]he Second Circuit instructs that `absent exceptional circumstances,' where federal claims can be disposed of on 12(b)(6) or summary judgment grounds, courts should `abstain from exercising pendent jurisdiction.'" Drexel Burnham Lambert v. Saxony Heights Realty (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 777 F. Supp. 228, 240 (quoting Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc. (2d Cir. 1986) 784 F.2d 44, 53).
The permissive language of § 1367(c), whereby the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, enumerates circumstances where it is appropriate to decline supplemental jurisdiction while still maintaining that the several principles initially detailed in Gibbs, "judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants, and comity," may persuade the court to retain jurisdiction. Nowack v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund (2d Cir. 1996) 81 F.3d 1182, 1191 ("In reviewing such a decision to retain jurisdiction we consider factors such as judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity."). Defendants argue that `forcing' the litigants to start the case over again in state court will waste judicial resources and inconvenience all parties. However, "[w]hen federal claims are dismissed early in the litigation — for example, before trial on a summary judgment motion — dismissal of state law claim[s] . . . is appropriate." Cobbs v. CBS Broadcasting Inc. (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1999) 1999 WL 244099 (citing Castellano v. Board of Trustees (2d Cir. 1991) 937 F.2d 752, 758). Similarly here, we are still in the pre-trial stage and the Report did not look to the merits of the state law claims made by plaintiff.
Plaintiff's state law claims for perceived disability discrimination and retaliation are in essence identical to the federal law claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff alleges she was fired because her employer, defendants, perceived her to be disabled. It is this, "unjustified termination . . . [which] violated, among other things, the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), and various common law contractual claims." (Am. Compl. at 5). However, although plaintiff's state and federal claims are identical, the standards which govern a successful state and federal claim are "analytically distinct." Epstein v. Kalvin-Miller International, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 100 F. Supp.2d 222, 229. The New York Court of Appeals has made it clear that the NYHRL definition of disability is to be construed more broadly than the federal definition and the Second Circuit has been clear about its duty to follow the holdings of the New York Court of Appeals on this question of New York law. Id. (citing Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc. (2d Cir. 1998) 140 F.3d 144, 149-50.).
Considering the different analyses and definitions required by plaintiff's state and federal claims, the success of defendants' summary judgment motion on plaintiff's federal claims does not necessarily imply that those brought under state law should also be dismissed. Furthermore, even if plaintiff's state law claims can be dismissed using the Report's findings, this Court would, in reaching such a result, unnecessarily exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims. Where a court is reluctant to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because of one of the reasons put forth by § 1367(c), or when the interests of judicial economy, convenience, comity and fairness to litigants are not violated by refusing to entertain matters of state law, it should decline supplemental jurisdiction and allow the plaintiff to decide whether or not to pursue the matter in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we ADOPT the Report in full and dismiss plaintiff's federal claims. In addition, we DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claim SO ORDERED.