Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2014-0017
07-02-2014
KARENA H., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY AND A.G., Appellees.
Scott W. Schlievert, Tucson Counsel for Appellant Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND
MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. J186194
The Honorable Catherine M. Woods, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Scott W. Schlievert, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
Thomas C. Horne, Arizona Attorney General
By Cathleen E. Fuller, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kelly authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Espinosa concurred. KELLY, Judge:
¶1 Karena H. appeals from the juvenile court's order finding her seventeen-year-old daughter, A.G., a dependent child as defined in A.R.S. § 8-201(14). She argues there was insufficient evidence to warrant a dependency finding on the basis of abuse or neglect. We affirm.
The statute has been amended effective May 29, 2014. 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 2d. Spec. Sess., ch. 1, § 10. Because the changes are not material to the issues presented in this appeal, we refer to the current version of the statute.
¶2 "On review of an adjudication of dependency, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court's findings. We generally will not disturb a dependency adjudication unless no reasonable evidence supports it." Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, ¶ 21, 119 P.3d 1034, 1038 (App. 2005) (citations omitted). In October 2013, Karena took A.G. to the Crisis Response Center (CRC) and requested that she be put on psychiatric medication and placed in a group home. Karena told staff that A.G. could no longer live in her home and that she would refuse to pick up A.G. at discharge. An investigation by the Department of Child Safety (DCS) revealed that A.G. had been living with Karena for about two weeks after having lived with relatives and a friend since March 2013; that Karena had no "regular" contact with A.G. while her daughter had been out of the home; that Karena had not enrolled A.G. in school; and that she had not made A.G. an appointment with an obstetrician despite her being approximately eight weeks' pregnant. A.G. told investigators she did not wish to live in her mother's home because Karena had told her to leave. A.G. was placed in a group home.
A.G. had previously been diagnosed as bipolar with oppositional defiant disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
¶3 DCS filed a dependency petition in November 2013 alleging that A.G. was dependent as to her father and Karena on abuse and/or neglect grounds. See § 8-201(14)(a)(iii). At a status hearing later that month, Karena admitted the factual allegations in the petition but reserved the right "to have a trial on the abuse and neglect language in the Petition." The parties agreed to submit the matter of whether there had been abuse and/or neglect based on the written record, including the preliminary protective hearing report. The juvenile court concluded Karena had neglected A.G. and the neglect had caused an unreasonable risk of harm to A.G. See A.R.S. §§ 8-201(14)(a)(iii); 8-844. Specifically, the court found that Karena
Based on his admissions, the juvenile court found A.G. dependent as to her father. He is not a party to this appeal.
is unwilling to provide to [A.G.] appropriate supervision, shelter, and medical/mental health care, and her unwillingness creates an unreasonable risk of harm to [A.G]. As a pregnant minor with diagnosed mental health issues, [A.G.] is a child who is in need of proper and effective parental care and control, assistance with obtaining medical care for herself and her unborn child, mental health services, and basic necessities of living such as food, clothing, and shelter. The mother has made it clear that [A.G.] is unwelcome in her home and she has given up on trying
to address [A.G.]'s medical and mental health needs. There is no evidence that [A.G.] is capable of obtaining these things on her own. The mother has failed to identify any other person who can and will provide these things for [A.G].
¶4 On appeal, Karena argues there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's finding of neglect. Relevant here, a child is dependent if his or her "home is unfit by reason of abuse, neglect, cruelty or depravity by a parent." § 8-201(14)(a)(iii). Neglect, as defined by § 8-201(24)(a), means "[t]he inability or unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide [a] child with supervision, food, clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes unreasonable risk of harm to the child's health or welfare." Karena argues only that there was no proof of an unreasonable risk of harm to A.G. because "there is evidence . . . that [she] did many things to assist" A.G., such as taking her to the CRC and requesting she be placed on medication, and permitting A.G. to live in her home until DCS removed her. But these assertions simply do not address the juvenile court's finding that—absent state intervention—Karena's lack of support would deny A.G. "mental health services, and basic necessities of living such as food, clothing, and shelter." And the court's findings amply support its conclusion that Karena's unwillingness to provide such necessities created an unreasonable risk of harm to A.G.'s health and welfare. To the extent Karena asks us to reweigh the evidence on appeal, we decline to do so. See Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, ¶¶ 4, 14, 100 P.3d 943, 945, 947 (App. 2004).
Karena acknowledges that A.G. is dependent, but claims the dependency is properly grounded in § 8-201(14)(a)(i)—that A.G. lacks a parent or guardian "willing to exercise or capable of exercising" proper and effective parental care and control. Her argument appears to be prompted by her belief that her employment may be jeopardized by the juvenile court's neglect finding because A.R.S. § 8-804(A) requires DCS to "maintain a central registry of reports of child abuse and neglect that are substantiated," including a finding "that a child is dependent based on an allegation of abuse or neglect." And, as she did below, she asserts the abuse and neglect allegation in the petition constitutes "abuse of the pleading process and a violation of Rule 11, Ariz. R. Civ. P." The fact the evidence clearly supports the neglect allegation, of course, defeats any such claim. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (providing for sanctions if pleading not "well grounded in fact"). We need not address her irrelevant and unsupported claim that DCS "almost always alleges 'abuse and neglect'" when filing a dependency petition. Nor do we address her argument that the evidence does not support a finding of abuse—the juvenile court made no such finding.
The statute excepts from the definition of neglect the denial of proper care that stems from "the inability of a parent, guardian or custodian to provide services to meet the needs of a child with a disability or chronic illness [that] is solely the result of the unavailability of reasonable services." § 8-201(24)(a). Karena does not suggest that exception applies here.
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¶5 Karena further argues that "[i]t is not abuse or neglect if a de facto emancipated child refuses to live at home." But she does not cite authority in support of this argument or develop the argument in any meaningful way; we therefore do not address it. See City of Tucson v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 218 Ariz. 172, ¶ 88, 181 P.3d 219, 242 (App. 2008) (appellate court will not address issues or arguments waived by party's failure to develop them adequately); see also Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(6) (argument "shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on"); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 106(A) (Rule 13, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., applies to juvenile appeals).
¶6 The juvenile court's order adjudicating A.G. dependent is affirmed.