Kareem K. v. Ida I.

5 Citing cases

  1. E.T. v. J.U.

    No. 22-P-1002 (Mass. App. Ct. Jun. 28, 2023)

    Although they may have been crude and vulgar, they do not qualify as harassment because there is no evidence that J.U. sent them with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property or that they in fact caused E.T. to experience fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property. Furthermore, they did not constitute "a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals," Kareem K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 904 (2022), quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), or "face-to-face personal insults that are so personally abusive that they are plainly likely to provoke a violent reaction and cause a breach of the peace." O'Brien, 461 Mass. 423, citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). Thus, creating and distributing the photos and video, as a matter of law, did not constitute acts of harassment, particularly where E.T. informed the judge that J.U. never threatened her with physical harm or put her in fear of serious bodily injury.

  2. M.C. v. K.W.

    No. 21-P-752 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 6, 2023)

    However acrimonious, none of the speech alleged in the affidavit constitutes "a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals," Kareem K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 904 (2022), quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (describing true threats), nor "face-to-face personal insults that are so personally abusive that they are plainly likely to provoke a violent reaction and cause a breach of the peace.

  3. G.G. v. J.D.

    No. 21-P-864 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 16, 2022)

    ("As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant engaged in . . . acts . . . aimed at a specific person" [quotations and citation omitted]). Finally, the plaintiff's claim that the defendant threatened to "harm [the plaintiff's] family detrimentally via social media" lacked the quality of a "true threat" and was too vague to constitute the type of conduct barred by G. L. c. 258E. SeeKareem K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 904 (2022). Although this type of conduct may, with added detail, rise to the level of an act or acts of harassment, on the record before us there is insufficient evidence to support such a finding.

  4. P.P. v. J.D.

    No. 21-P-866 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 16, 2022)

    ("As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a defendant engaged in . . . acts . . . aimed at a specific person" [quotations and citation omitted]). Finally, the plaintiff's claim that the defendant threatened to "put us in the social media" lacked the quality of a "true threat" and was too vague to constitute qualifying harassment conduct. SeeKareem K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 904 (2022); A.R. v. L.C., 93 Mass.App.Ct. 758, 760 (2018) ("true threats cannot be threats to do just any kind of harm; they must be intended to cause 'fear of physical harm'" [citation omitted]). Despite the plaintiff's generalized claims of the defendant's "creepy actions for many years" and that he made her feel "unsafe," she acknowledged that he had never threatened to harm her physically.

  5. Commonwealth v. Kim

    No. 21-P-195 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 10, 2022)

    A true threat exists where a person "communicate[s] a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual." Kareem K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass.App.Ct. 902, 904 (2022), quoting Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). A true threat includes "not only . . . direct threats of imminent physical harm, but . . . words or actions that -- taking into account the context in which they arise -- cause the victim to fear such harm now or in the future and evince an intent on the part of the speaker or actor to cause such fear."