Karchnak v. Swatara Township

12 Citing cases

  1. Branch v. Odhner

    3:15-CV-1971 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Under section 1983, "[t]here are two paradigms under which a plaintiff may bring an equal protection claim." Karchnak v. Swatara Twp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 550 (M.D. Pa. 2008). "First, a plaintiff may allege that she is a member of a protected class, similarly situated to members of an unprotected class but treated differently from those in the unprotected class."

  2. Doll v. Williams

    CIVIL NO. 1:CV-08-0675 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2008)

    The plaintiffs add to that paragraph the properly pled allegations of the Township's failure to train in the use of force (¶ 54) and its failure to take appropriate action after excessive force has been used. (¶ 55). See Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 590 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (in part, general allegations that the municipalities failed to implement a policy for the use of force and failed to train officers in the appropriate use of force were sufficient); Karchnak v. Swatara Township, 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 550-51 (M.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Leatherman in rejecting attack on allegations that the municipality had a custom of gender discrimination and a policy of retaliating against police officers who complain about official policies or misconduct). The paragraph refers simply to the defendants but that would include the Township.

  3. Donovan v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist.

    No. 16-4221 (3d Cir. Dec. 5, 2017)   Cited 2 times

    District courts in our Circuit have reached similar outcomes. See Burnett v. Sch. Dist. Of Cheltenham Twp., No. 04-2680 (MAM), 2006 WL 2034700, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 2006) ("Where a public employee's salary and benefits remain the same, a change in his work assignment does not deprive him of a protected property interest."); Karchnak v. Swatara Twp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("The Third Circuit has suggested that employment actions that affect merely the terms and conditions of employment, but do not impact an employee's tenure, do not implicate the employee's property interest in continued employment. Therefore, the state is not required to provide due process before making decisions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.").

  4. Minnich v. Ne. Sch. Dist.

    Civil No. 1:20-CV-00378 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2021)

    "Municipal employers, such as school districts . . . cannot be held vicariously liable for the constitutional violations committed by their employees." Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 983 F. Supp. 2d 516, 524 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Monell v. NYC Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)); see also Karchnak v. Swatara Twp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 545 (M.D. Pa. 2008) ("Respondeat superior is not a viable theory of municipal liability under § 1983. . . ."). Rather, "[m]unicipal liability only attaches when a plaintiff demonstrates that an official policy or custom caused the asserted constitutional deprivation."

  5. Vasquez v. Batiste

    Civ. No. 14-4366 (RBK) (JS) (D.N.J. Jul. 23, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    In this case, plaintiff knew or had reason to know of his injury on March 24, 2011, when Batiste purportedly entered his cell and hurt plaintiff. See Ostuni, 532 F. App'x at 112 (excessive force claim typically accrues on the date of the assault because at that point plaintiff has reason to know of the injury); Hynoski v. Columbia Cnty. Redevelopment Auth., 914 F. Supp. 2d 547, 560 (M.D. Pa. 2013) ("[A] First Amendment retaliation claim would have accrued after any individual act which was intended to punish the person exercising their First Amendment rights.") (citing O'Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006); Karchnak v. Swatara Twp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 547 (M.D. Pa. 2008)). However, plaintiff did not file his complaint in this Court until June 30, 2014, (see Dkt. No. 1-1 at p. 1.)

  6. Johnson v. Dep't of Corr.

    No. 1:14-cv-0896 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    the law is well-settled that the statute of limitations for a Section 1983 claim in Pennsylvania is two years. Karchnak v. Swatara Township, 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 545-46 (M.D. Pa. 2008). Plaintiff's complaint was filed on May 9, 2014.

  7. Salley v. Wetzel

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-1515 (M.D. Pa. Jun. 20, 2013)   Cited 12 times

    The plaintiff does not appear to object to Judge Blewitt's recommendation that any claims arising beyond the two year statute of limitations for §1983 actions be barred. See Karchnak v. Swatara Township, et al., 540 F.Supp.2d 540, 545-46 (M.D.Pa. 2008). Based on the facts presented in the amended complaint and the finding of the absence of a conspiracy, the court can see no reason why the two year statute of limitations would not apply to bar all claims arising before July 25, 2010, as recommended.

  8. Hynoski v. Columbia Cnty. Redevelopment Auth.

    941 F. Supp. 2d 547 (M.D. Pa. 2013)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that property transfer statements are public records subject to judicial notice for consideration on a motion to dismiss

    Similarly, a First Amendment retaliation claim would have accrued after any individual act which was intended to punish the person exercising their First Amendment rights. See O'Connor, 440 F.3d at 127;Karchnak v. Swatara Township, 540 F.Supp.2d 540, 547 (M.D.Pa.2008) (Rambo, J.) The most generous reading of the amended complaint contemplates a claim that plaintiffs were not granted the same property interest as that of the Netchels on account of some protected First Amendment activities in which they participated.

  9. UHS of Del., Inc. v. United Health Servs., Inc.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12-CV-00485 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013)   Cited 10 times
    Declining to "craft a[n intermediate] pleading standard which differs from that articulated by the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal" for trademark infringement or unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act

    When a defendant employs such a custom, the court assumes that allegations brought against "defendants" "includes each individual defendant as if that person or entity had been specifically named." Karchnak v. Swatara Twp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 552 (M.D. Pa. 2008); see also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ficchi, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63282 at *4 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2012) ("where the general 'Defendants' is used, the Court will assume that the particular paragraph refers to all defendants"). PHCI identifies several cases in support of its proposition that a plaintiff must state with particularity the alleged misconduct of each party.

  10. Andrews v. Bureau of Codes Admin. Office

    Civil No. 1:08-CV-1669 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2012)   Cited 6 times
    In Andrews, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants treated her adversely and differently than similarly situated, non-minority property owners and other owners who did not file complaints against the Bureau of Codes.

    Under a "class of one" theory, Plaintiff must establish that (1) Defendant treated her differently from others similarly situated, (2) Defendant did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Karnchak v. Swatara Twp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 540, 550 (M.D. Pa. 2008). As this court stated in Hookey v. Dalton, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112144, *12 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2010), the primary difference between the two theories is that the "traditional theory protects a plaintiff from discriminatory treatment based on membership in a protected class such as gender or race [while] [i]n contrast, under the class-of-one theory, a plaintiff may have an equal protection claim even absent protected-class status if he or she alleges irrational and intentional differential treatment when compared with similarly situated individuals."