The foregoing is also dispositive of plaintiff's Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims, as the same proof demonstrates that SCS neither supervised or controlled the work giving rise to plaintiff's injury. Moreover, there is no evidence that it had either actual or constructive notice of any allegedly defective or dangerous condition which may have caused him to fall ( see Reilly v. Newireen Assoc., 303 AD2d 214 [1st Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 508; accord Sattar v. Natural Stone Indus., 19 AD3d 681 [2nd Dept 2005]; Karapati v. K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 414-415 [2nd Dept 2004]; Santoro v. New York City Tr. Auth., 302 AD2d at 582). "General supervisory authority at the work site for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability for common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200" ( Dos Santos v. STV Engrs. Inc., 8 AD3d at 224; see Perri v. Gilbert Johnson Enter., Ltd., 14 AD3d 681, 683 [2nd Dept 2005]).
The Supreme Court properly rejected the contentions in the injured plaintiffs affidavit submitted in opposition to the motion since it contradicted his prior deposition testimony ( see Amplo v Milden Ave. Realty Assoc., 52 AD3d 750, 751; Jimenez v T.J. Maxx, Inc., 17 AD3d 638). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Vitanza's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action insofar as asserted against it, and denied that branch of the plaintiffs' cross motion which was for summary judgment on the issue of liability on that cause of action. Vitanza also established its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action insofar as asserted against it by demonstrating that the plaintiffs failed to allege the violation of a specific Industrial Code provision ( see Gasques v State of New York, 59 AD3d 666, 668; Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
The Court of Ap-peals has recently stated that "the single decisive question is whether plaintiff's injuries were the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a risk arising from a physically significant elevation differential" ( Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d at 603). With respect to that branch of its motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) claim insofar as asserted against it, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that the disposal of the debris and studs was not encompassed within that section ( see Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415; cf. Novak v Del Savio, 64 AD3d 636, 638). The plaintiff, however, established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on his cause of action under Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against the defendant.
and related cross claims insofar as asserted against it. The appellant did not make a prima facie showing that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as it failed to establish that it neither created nor had actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that allegedly caused the injured plaintiff to slip and fall ( see DiSalvio v Young Men's ChristianAssn. of City of N.Y., 51 AD3d 711, 712; cf. Brown v Brause Plaza, LLC, 19 AD3d 626, 628; DeBlase v Herbert Constr. Co., 5 AD3d 624). However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the appellant's motion which was to dismiss the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action and related cross claim insofar as asserted against it. The plaintiffs did not allege a violation of any Industrial Code provision in their complaint or bill of particulars, or in opposition to the appellant's motion for summary judgment ( see Dooley v Peerless Importers, Inc., 42 AD3d 199, 206; Lofaso v J.P Murphy Assoc., 37 AD3d 769, 771; Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415).
The defendants established their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law with respect to so much of the plaintiffs' first cause of action as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) on the basis of the plaintiffs' admission that the ladder was not defective ( see generally Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280). In opposition, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact by demonstrating the placement of the ladder in proximity to the rain gutter, and the absence of any device protecting a worker descending the ladder from tripping on the gutter ( see Cunningham v Alexander's King Plaza, LLC, 22 AD3d 703, 706; Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415). However, since the plaintiffs did not establish in support of their cross motion for summary judgment that in these circumstances the ladder did not provide proper protection, the cross motion was properly denied ( see Taglioni v Harbor Cove Assoc., 308 AD2d 441, 442; Chan v Bed Bath Beyond, 284 AD2d 290) without regard to the sufficiency of the defendants' response ( see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853).
Therefore summary judgment was properly denied to all parties on the plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action ( see Marin v Levin Props., LP, 28 AD3d 525; Cunningham v Alexander's King Plaza, LLC, 22 AD3d 703). The Supreme Court also properly granted those branches of the defendants' separate cross motions which were for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action pursuant to Labor Law § 241 (6), as the plaintiff failed to allege a violation of a relevant provision of the Industrial Code ( see Cunningham v Alexander's King Plaza, supra; Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413). The Supreme Court, however, should have granted those branches of the motion of the Bush Realty Group which were for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's causes of action under Labor Law § 200 and alleging common-law negligence insofar as asserted against it as there was no evidence of its supervision or control of the work site, or any notice of a hazardous condition ( see Comes v New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877; LaRose v Resinick Eighth Ave. Assoc, LLC, 26 AD3d 470).
nd cross-appealed from, without costs or disbursements. The Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the separate motions of the defendants Alexander's Kings Plaza, LLC, Alexander's Kings Plaza Center, Inc., Kings Plaza Corp., Alexander's Department Stores of Brooklyn, Inc., Alexander's of Brooklyn, Inc., Kings Plaza Shopping Center of Flatbush Avenue, Inc., Kings Plaza Shopping Center of Avenue U, Inc., and Vornado Realty Trust (hereinafter the owner defendants), and the defendants The Gap, Inc. (hereinafter The Gap) and its subsidiary, Old Navy, Inc. (hereinafter Old Navy), which were for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240 (1) insofar as asserted against them. Although there is no dispute that the ladder from which the defendant fell was not defective, these defendants failed to establish, prima facie, either that the plaintiff was provided with proper additional safety devices, or that no such devices were necessary ( see Karapati v. K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415; Alesius v. Good Samaritan Hosp. Med. Dialysis Ctr., 6 AD3d 470, 471; see generally Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562). Moreover, the plaintiff's work in splicing telephone wires as part of the construction of an Old Navy store within a shopping mall was a protected activity under Labor Law § 240 (1) ( see Prats v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 100 NY2d 878, 882; Joblon v. Solow, 91 NY2d 457, 465).
Plaintiff testified that "the square pipe" caused the ladder to fall" because "it was not welded well" (see p. 44 of transcript of plaintiff's January 11, 2016 deposition). Rather than resolve all issues of fact the depositions raise numerous issues of fact including how the accident occurred, whether plaintiff fell from a ladder and if he did, whether the ladder provided proper protection or were additional safety devices necessary (see Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415 [2004]; Gange v Tilles Inv. Co., 220 AD2d 556, 558 [1995]). Accordingly, the branch of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in his favor on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim and the defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's Labor Law § 240(1) claim are denied.
However, in Weber v 1111 Park Ave. Realty Corp. (253 AD2d 376, 377 [1st Dept 1998]), the First Department decided that "[w]here a plaintiff is injured in a fall from a ladder, which is not otherwise shown to be defective, the issue of whether the ladder provided the plaintiff with the 'proper protection' required under this statute is a question of fact for the jury." The Second Department has denied summary judgment even when the ladders were without defect (see Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc., 12 AD3d 413, 415 [2d Dept 2004] [defendant movants failed to establish that plaintiff had been provided with additional safety devices, or that no such devices were necessary]; Gange v Tilles Inv. Co., 220 AD2d 556, 558 [2d Dept 1995] [plaintiff denied summary judgment because of questions of fact, i.e., whether ladder without defects "failed to provide proper protection, and whether the plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices"]).
"the fact that the plaintiff fell off of the ladder only after he sustained an electric shock does not preclude recovery under Labor Law § 240 (1), . . . [but] the plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment . . . as there are questions of fact as to whether, inter alia, the ladder, which was not shown to be defective in any way, failed to provide proper protection, and whether the plaintiff should have been provided with additional safety devices" ( 253 AD2d at 378). Similar holdings that an issue of fact is raised when a worker falls off a nondefective ladder as a result of an electric shock were rendered in Karapati v K.J. Rocchio, Inc. ( 12 AD3d 413 [2d Dept 2004]); Donovan v CNY Consol. Contrs. ( 278 AD2d 881 [4th Dept 2000]); and Grogan v Norlite Corp. ( 282 AD2d 781, 782-783 [3d Dept 2001] ["we note that under circumstances essentially identical to the case at bar, each of the other Departments has held that a question of fact exists on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) when a plaintiff worker falls from an A-frame stepladder as a result of an electric shock" (citing the foregoing cases)]).