[Cit.] (Emphasis in original.) Karan v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 547 ( 629 SE2d 260) (2006) (also explaining the requirements of each doctrine). The previous litigation in the probate court resolved the issues of whether the 2003 notes and instructions were relevant to the claim of undue influence and whether they constituted a revocation of the 1998 will.

While claim preclusion bars “repetitious suits involving the same cause of action,” Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 597, 68 S.Ct. 715 (emphasis added); accord Cromwell v. Cnty. of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876), issue preclusion precludes the re-adjudication of the same issue, where the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous adjudication, even if it arises in the context of a different cause of action, Karan, Inc. v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (2006); Waldroup v. Greene Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 463 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1995); Dep't of Human Res. v. Fleeman, 263 Ga. 756, 439 S.E.2d 474, 475 (1994). Because the instant FAA petition and the state-court litigation as a whole do not share identical causes of action, which is required for the application of claim preclusion, Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 663 S.E.2d 714, 718 (2008), we treat the instant preclusion question as one of collateral estoppel.

Three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies — (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.Karan v. Auto-Owners Ins. , 280 Ga. 545, 546, 629 S.E.2d 260 (2006) (citation omitted); see also OCGA § 9-12-40 ("A judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside.").The related doctrine of collateral estoppel

The doctrine of res judicata prevents the relitigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action. . . . Three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies — (1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546 ( 629 SE2d 260) (2006) (citation omitted). On the other hand,

Under Georgia law, a party asserting res judicata must satisfy three elements: "(1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction." Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (2006) (quoting Waldroup v. Greene Co. Hosp. Auth., 265 Ga. 864, 463 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1995)). i. IDENTITY OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION

"The doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action." Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (2006). A party asserting res judicata must satisfy three elements: "(1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction."

The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication of the same issue, where the issue was actually litigated and decided in the previous adjudication, even if it arises in the context of a different cause of action. See Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1264 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 629 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 2006)). "Although Georgia law has not settled on a canonical list of elements to establish collateral estoppel," the Eleventh Circuit has distilled Georgia case law as requiring the following: that "(1) an identical issue, (2) between identical parties, (3) was actually litigated and (4) necessarily decided, (5) on the merits, (6) in a final judgment, (7) by a court of competent jurisdiction."

"In Georgia, the doctrine of res judicata prevents the re-litigation of all claims which have already been adjudicated, or which could have been adjudicated, between identical parties or their privies in identical causes of action." Starship Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cty., Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1253 (11th Cir. 2013); Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 546 (2006) ("Three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies-(1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.").

OCGA § 9-11-55 (b). From the use of the disjunctive "or," it is clear that the statute establishes three distinct grounds upon which default may be opened – providential cause, excusable neglect, or proper case. See Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. , 280 Ga. 545, 547, 629 S.E.2d 260 (2006). OCGA § 9-11-55 (b) further establishes four conditions with which a defendant must comply in order for a default to be opened: "In order to allow the default to be thus opened, the showing shall be made under oath, shall set up a meritorious defense, shall offer to plead instanter, and shall announce ready to proceed with the trial."

Thereafter, we granted Coen’s petition for certiorari and posed the following question: Did the Court of Appeals err in its formulation and application of the doctrine of res judicata? For the reasons set forth below, we find that the Court of Appeals did err in its formulation, and, accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals' opinion and remand this case for the Court of Appeals to consider the trial court’s alternative holding. Under the proper standard, three prerequisites must be satisfied before res judicata applies—(1) identity of the cause of action, (2) identity of the parties or their privies, and (3) previous adjudication on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Morrison v. Morrison, 284 Ga. 112, 116 (3), 663 S.E.2d 714 (2008) ; Karan, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 280 Ga. 545, 629 S.E.2d 260 (2006). "Cause of action," in turn, is "the entire set of facts which give rise to an enforceable claim."