The amount and duration of maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court ( see Fridman v. Fridman, 301 AD2d 567). Considering the plaintiff's age, the length of the marriage, and her limited employment history, the plaintiff was unequipped to become self supporting; accordingly, an award of non-durational maintenance was appropriate ( see Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 AD2d 369, 371; Loeb v. Loeb, 186 AD2d 174, 175). Further, in adjudicating the amount of maintenance, the Supreme Court properly considered the parties' Social Security benefits ( see Wheeler v. Wheeler, 12 AD3d 982, 983; Thomas v. Thomas, 221 AD2d 621, 622; Di Bella v. Di Bella, 140 AD2d 292, 293).
The defendant was not employed during most of the marriage, has limited education and skills, and was 60 years old at the time of the judgment. In addition to the properties awarded to the defendant by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of discretion and upon consideration of all relevant factors, an award of $1,500 as monthly nondurational maintenance is appropriate ( see Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [6]; Hathaway v. Hathaway, 16 AD3d 458, 460; Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 AD2d 369, 371). Finally, the Supreme Court erred in determining that the $200,000 in funds transferred by the plaintiff from an Atlantic Bank account to a Greek bank account on the date of commencement of the action was deposited into a joint bank account of the parties.
The evaluation of the defendant's real properties based on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness should not be disturbed on appeal where determination of value rested primarily on the credibility of the expert witness and his valuation technique ( see, Ferraro v. Ferraro, 257 A.D.2d 596, 598). The amount and duration of maintenance was properly based on the financial circumstances of both parties, the predivorce standard of living ( see, Morrissey v. Morrissey, 259 A.D.2d 472, 473; Walker v. Walker, 255 A.D.2d 375), the age, health, and skills of the parties, as well as the duration of the marriage ( see, Solomon v. Solomon, 276 A.D.2d 547, 548; Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369, 371; Borra v. Borra, 218 A.D.2d 780). The Supreme Court properly reduced maintenance upon receipt of the distributive award ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][6][a][1]; Kearns v. Kearns, 270 A.D.2d 392, 393). In light of the disparity in the income of the parties and the defendant's tactics which unnecessarily prolonged the litigation, the Supreme Court should have required the defendant to pay the plaintiff's counsel and expert fees ( see, Nee v. Nee, 240 A.D.2d 478, 479; Hackett v. Hackett, 147 A.D.2d 611, 613).
It should be emphasized that the IAS Court would have plaintiff's maintenance terminate when she was approximately 60 years old, when her employment prospects would certainly be dimmer. In light of the duration of the parties' marriage, plaintiff's age, her subordination of her career and long absence from the workforce, the level of predivorce standard of income and plaintiff's capability of earning only a modest income, the court should have awarded permanent maintenance ( see, Sergeon v. Sergeon, supra; Dunnan v. Dunnan, supra; Michelle S. v. Charles S., 257 A.D.2d 405; Recuppio v. Recuppio, 246 A.D.2d 342, 343; Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369). However, taking into account both plaintiffs future needs and defendant's future ability to pay, the maintenance should be reduced to $2,000 per month after 10 years.
Although the appellant was properly ordered to pay an attorney's fee ( see, Family Ct Act § 842 [f]), there was no testimony establishing that Kelly Ann Hallissey incurred an attorney's fee in the amount awarded by the court. A hearing is therefore necessary as a "`"meaningful way of testing the [attorney's] claims relative to time and value"'" ( Petek v. Petek, 239 A.D.2d 327, 329; Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369). Thompson, J. P., Sullivan, Joy and Schmidt, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs. The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in precluding the plaintiff from producing expert medical testimony based on her failure to comply with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) ( see, Lyall v. City of New York, 228 A.D.2d 566; Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 199 A.D.2d 257; Corning v. Carlin, 178 A.D.2d 576). The plaintiff did not respond to disclosure demands until after the trial began, and failed to include the substance of the expert testimony sought to be precluded by the defendant ( see, Rassaei v. Kessler, 252 A.D.2d 577). Additionally, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate good cause for her noncompliance with CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) ( see, Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369). O'Brien, J. P., Thompson, Krausman and Luciano, JJ., concur.
.D.2d 668, 669). As for the other experts, however, the record reveals that plaintiff received no notice, prior to defendant's in-court motion, that his responses were considered to be inadequate in any respect. Defendant's memorandum of law (which was apparently the only document submitted in connection with the motion) does not mention these other experts, and there is no indication that plaintiff was informed that the sufficiency of his responses, outlining their qualifications and expected testimony, would be questioned. Given the critical nature of that testimony — which goes to the very theory of liability upon which his case is predicated — and the draconian impact of its preclusion (i.e., dismissal of the case), imposing so drastic a remedy without first affording plaintiff an opportunity to supplement his disclosure to comply with the statutory mandates was inexpedient ( see, Herd v. Town of Pawling, 244 A.D.2d 317; Chapman v. State of New York, 227 A.D.2d 867, 868; compare, Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369, 370-371). Because Supreme Court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint was premised upon his inability to prove causation, and we have concluded that plaintiff should be afforded an opportunity to cure the deficiencies in his disclosure with respect to those experts, the complaint shall be reinstated, without prejudice to a further motion for preclusion should plaintiff fail to furnish defendant with appropriately detailed statements, pursuant to CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i), within 20 days of the date of this Court's decision.
After consideration of these factors, the factors deemed most relevant to the present matter are (1) the duration of the marriage; (2) the present and future earning capacities of both parties; (3) the age and health of the parties; (4) the ability of the party seeking maintenance to become self supporting; (5) the wasteful dissipation of marital assets; and (6) the standard of living established by the parties. See DRL 236(B)(6) ; Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 A.D.2d 369, 653 N.Y.S.2d 634 (2d Dept .1997) ; Loeb v. Loeb, 186 A.D.2d 174, 587 N.Y.S.2d 738 (2d Dept.1992). “The overriding purpose of a maintenance award is to give the [receiving] spouse economic independence, and it should be awarded for a duration that would provide the recipient with enough time to become self-supporting.”
It must also determine the duration of maintenance. There are a plethora of cases awarding nondurational maintenance to a dependent spouse ( see e.g. Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36; Xikis v Xikis, 43 AD3d 1040; Grumet v Grumet, 37 AD3d 534; Kaprelian v Kaprelian, 236 AD2d 369; Nadel v Nadel, 220 AD2d 565). All these cases focus on the inability of the dependent spouse to become self-supporting by considering requisite factors such as the length of the marriage, the age, health, education, skills and work history of the dependent spouse and whether the dependent spouse subordinated a career to care for the payor spouse and/or the parties' children ( see Kaprelian v Kaprelian, supra).
"The overriding purpose of a maintenance award is to give the spouse economic independence" ( Bains v. Bains, 308 AD2d 557, 559). The matrimonial court must consider the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B)(6)(a)(1-11) in order to determine the appropriate maintenance payments ( see Hathaway v. Hathaway, 16 AD3d 458, lv denied 6 NY3d 703; Kaprelian v. Kaprelian, 236 AD2d 369; Phillips v. Phillips, 182 AD2d 746, 747). It is well settled that the amount and duration of such maintenance is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the matrimonial court ( see Fridman v. Fridman, 301 AD2d 567; Plotnick v. Plotnick, 266 AD2d 108; Ferraro v. Ferraro, 257 AD2d 596, 597).