Opinion
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1978.
Opinions on pages 998-1018 omitted.
Hearing Granted Sept. 7, 1978.
[146 Cal.Rptr. 54]Hill, Farrer & Burill, Stanley E. Tobin and James G. Johnson, Los Angeles, for petitioner.
Jerome Cohen, Sanford N. Nathan, Thomas M. Dalzell, III, Salinas, Deborah Wiener Peyton, Berkeley, W. Daniel Boone, Ellen Greenstone, Glenn Rothner, E. Michael Heumann II, Linton Joaquin, Kirsten L. Zerger, Salinas, and Diana Lyons for real party in interest.
Dressler, Stoll & Jacobs and Donald G. Dressler, Newport Beach, amicus curiae for real party in interest.
No appearance for respondent Court.
KINGSLEY, Associate Justice.
Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court to vacate its order denying a temporary injunction limiting picketing in a labor dispute. We grant the petition.
I
Acting on declarations before it, the trial court found as follows:
"Court finds there was mass picketing which interferres (sic ) with ingress and egress from petitioner's property but that there is insufficient evidence of violence or threat of violence to support a preliminary injunction."
and denied the preliminary injunction. It is clear from the reporter's transcript of the hearing on the application that the trial court construed the decision of the Supreme Court in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1976) 17 Cal.3d 893, 132 Cal.Rptr. 443, 553 P.2d 603, as prohibiting the issuance of an injunction in a labor case unless the evidence shows both mass picketing that interferes with ingress and egress and also violence or the threat of violence. We conclude that the trial court misconstrued the effect of that decision. The Sears case involved peaceful picketing on private property. The decision went no further than to hold that a mere peaceful trespass was not the kind of conduct that a state court could regulate rather than the National Labor Relations Board.
Two considerations lead us to the conclusion that the trial court's reliance on Sears was in error. (1) Sears involved only peaceful picketing involving no more than a simple trespass, unlike the case at bench [146 Cal.Rptr. 55] which the trial court found involved interference with ingress and egress; (2) more significantly, Sears involved the delicate problem of interaction between a federal agency and a state agency over labor relations an area in which the law has long recognized an obligation on the states to yield if the matter involved is even "arguably" one within the scope of the powers of the federal agency.
Musicians Union, Local No. 6 v. Superior Court (1968) 69 Cal.2d 695, 73 Cal.Rptr. 201, 447 P.2d 313.
II
The Real Party in Interest argues that the preliminary injunction was properly denied for another reason, which we reject.
The petitioner relies on cases involving the interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act and cases under it which, it contends, would permit preliminary injunctions in cases such as this. However, the case at bench involves a dispute not covered by the federal act and it is nowhere suggested that the National Labor Relations Board could, or would, intervene in the present labor dispute. In 1975, the State of California acted to fill the void left by the exclusion of agricultural workers from the coverage of the federal statute by enacting the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (Lab.Code, § 1140 et seq.), supplemented by the enactment of section 527.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. While those statutes follow to a substantial extent the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, they have some differences.
The basic purpose of the Agricultural Labor Relations Act is thus set forth in section 1140.2 of the Labor Code:
"It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of California to encourage and protect the right of agricultural employees to full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and to be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. For this purpose this part is adopted to provide for collective-bargaining rights for agricultural employees."
Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act (29 U.S.C., § 160) provides as follows:
"The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise."
The United States Supreme Court, in United Automobile, etc., Workers of America v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1956) 351 U.S. 266, at page 271, 76 S.Ct. 794, 100 L.Ed. 1162, explained that the effect of the last sentence of that statute, as explained in the Conference Report on the Taft-Hartley Act, permitted state action in cases involving violence. While the California act does not contain language similar to the sentence in the federal act relied on in the Wisconsin case, the Legislature in 1975 enacted, as a companion to the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, section 527.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
"(a) In order to promote the rights of workers to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, picketing or other mutual aid or protection, and to prevent the evils which frequently occur when courts interfere with the normal processes of dispute resolution between employers and recognized employee organizations, the equity jurisdiction of the courts in cases involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be no broader than as set forth in subdivision (b) of this section, and the provisions of subdivision (b) of this section [146 Cal.Rptr. 56] shall be strictly construed in accordance with existing law governing labor disputes with the purpose of avoiding any unnecessary judicial interference in labor disputes.
"(b) The acts enumerated in this subdivision, whether performed singly or in concert, shall be legal, and no court nor any judge nor judges thereof, shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction which, in specific or general terms, prohibits any person or persons, whether singly or in concert, from doing any of the following:
"(1) Giving publicity to, and obtaining or communicating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where any person or persons may lawfully be, or by any other method not involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace.
"* * *
"(i) A case shall be held to involve or to grow out of a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect interests therein; or who are employees of the same employer; or who are members of the same or an affiliated organization of employers or employees; whether such dispute is (a) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (b) between one or more employers or associations of employers and one or more employers or associations of employers; or (c) between one or more employees or associations of employees and one or more employees or associations of employees; or when the case involves any conflicting or competing interests in a 'labor dispute' of 'persons participating or interested' therein (as described in subparagraph (ii)).
"(ii) A person or association shall be held to be a person participating or interested in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or it, and if he or it is engaged in the same industry, trade, craft, or occupation in which such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein, or is a member, officer, or agent of any association composed in whole or in part of employers or employees engaged in such industry, trade, craft, or occupation.
"(iii) The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
"(iv) The term 'labor dispute' does not include a jurisdictional strike as defined in Section 1118 of the Labor Code.
" * * *
"(e) It is not the intent of this section to permit conduct that is unlawful including breach of the peace, disorderly conduct, the unlawful blocking or access or egress to premises where a labor dispute exists, or other similar unlawful activity."
We regard the language in subdivision (e) as an expression of legislative intent, even stronger than the language in the federal statute, that, in California, notwithstanding the powers granted to the Agricultural Labor Relations Board, an employer may seek relief from interference with lawful ingress and egress under the equitable powers of the superior court.
We are cited by the Real Party in Interest to the decision of the Court of Appeal for the Fifth District in United Farm Workers v. Superior Court (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 140 Cal.Rptr. 87. However, that case involved an attempt by an employer to secure an injunction in a dispute involving the right of the petitioner to bargain collectively with the employer. That matter was not one referred to in subparagraph (1) of subdivision (b) or in subdivision (e) of section 527.3, but it involved a matter as to which equitable relief was expressly denied by other divisions of subdivision (b).
Let a Peremptory Writ of Mandate issue, directing the superior court to vacate its [146 Cal.Rptr. 57] order of December 20, 1977, in its action No. C-222,990, denying the petition for a preliminary injunction and to hear and determine the petition for such preliminary injunction in accordance with this opinion.
FILES, P. J., and JEFFERSON, J., concur.
Hearing granted; BIRD, C. J., did not participate.