See, e.g., Crechale v. Carroll Fulmer Logistics Corp., No. 19-cv-617, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152091 (S.D.Miss. Aug. 21, 2020); Babenko v. Dillon, No. 19-cv-199, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130015 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 2, 2019); Evans v. Slezak, No. 16-cv-159, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137258, at *20-21 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2018); Riffey v. CRSTExpedited, Inc., No. 12-cv-294, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 20, 2013); see also Hines v. Nelson, 547 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Flodberg v. Whitcomb, 224 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Ill.App.Ct. 1967); W.L. Felix v. Stavis, 385 S.W.2d 72, 74-75 (Ky. 1964); Kaplan v. Taub, 104 So.2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958). Booker's Response argues that 18-wheelers are “dangerous.” Doc

" In Kaplan v. Taub (Fla. App.), 104 So.2d 882, the court said: ". . . the real test . . . is to determine whether a gratuitous undertaking of the automobile operator had begun when the injury occurred. Illustrative of the application of the test and factually in point is the case of Head v. Morton, 1939, 302 Mass. 273, 19 N.E.2d 22, 25. . . . The appellant had her hand on the door of appellee's automobile as an act preparatory to entering the vehicle.

Smith v. Pope, 53 Cal.App.2d 43, 127 P.2d 292 (1942); Chapman v. Parker, 203 Kan. 440, 454 P.2d 506 (1969); McCann v. Terhune, 12 Mich. App. 364, 162 N.W.2d 906 (1968); Economou v. Anderson, 4 Ohio App.2d 1, 211 N.E.2d 82 (1965); Colin v. Rogers, 5 Wn. App. 113, 486 P.2d 1101 (1971). Dunakin v. Thomas, 141 F. Supp. 377 (D.C. NM 1956); Kaplan v. Taub, 104 So.2d 882 (Fla App 1958); Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 118 N.W.2d 41, 1 ALR3d 1074 (1962); Head v. Morton, 302 Mass. 273, 19 N.E.2d 22 (1939). Our choice between these two interpretations involves us again in the task of marking out on a continuum the point at which we think that a factual situation falls within or outside the policy of the statute.

" The facts in Kaplan v. Taub, Fla. App., 104 So.2d 882, are much like the case at bar. Plaintiff in that case had accepted defendant's invitation to ride in defendant's car.

All of the parties at this time were of a mind that the gratuitous furnishing of transportation had not terminated. The cited case is, therefore, not here apposite. In Kaplan v. Taub, 104 So.2d 882 (Fla.), the Florida court, in construing that state's host-guest immunity statute, which contains the word "transported," held that the act applied to one who had not yet entered the automobile, but was "about to be transported" when the injuries were sustained. The New Mexico host-guest statute also contains the word "transported," and, in Hobbs v. Irwin, supra, the court held that a guest standing outside the automobile at the time the injury occurred was within the purview of the statute.

The Utah Court said that the host-guest relationship must include getting into the car at the beginning and getting out of it when the ride is completed and any incidents which happen in the course of and arising out of the ride. See also: Marsh v. Hogeboom, 167 Kan. 349, 205 P.2d 1190 (1949); Castle v. McKeown, 327 Mich. 518, 42 Ill. App. 299, 112 N.E.2d 723 (1st Div. 1953); Adams v. Baker, 317 Mass. 748, 59 1953); Adams v. Baker, 317 Mass. 748, 59 N.E.2d 701 (Sup.Jud.Ct. of Mass. 1945); Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 118 N.W.2d 41 (1962); Kaplan v. Taub, 104 So.2d 882 (Fla.Dist.Ct. of App.3rd Dist. 1958); Dunakin v. Thomas, 141 F. Supp. 377 (D.C., New Mexico 1956); Annotation, 50 A.L.R.2d 974; Blashfield, Automobile Law and Practice, § 212.17. Plaintiff relies primarily upon the holding by the California Court of Appeals (4th District) in Elisalda v. Welch's Sand Gravel Co., 260 Cal.App.2d 46, 67 Cal.Rptr. 57 (1968, no writ), wherein it was held that a fact issue was raised as to whether a plaintiff who was injured while getting off the front fender was 'riding in said automobile' within the meaning of the California Guest Statute.

This rule has subsequently been applied in several factual settings. See Fleming v. Smart, Fla.App. 1963, 153 So.2d 748; La Rue v. Hoffman, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 373; Kaplan v. Taub, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 882. It appears to us that the operation of hitching the trailer was an integral step in carrying out defendant's gratuitous undertaking of providing round-trip transportation for the fishing party.

There being no evidence of gross negligence, the trial court committed no error in directing a verdict for the defendants. See: Kaplan v. Taub, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 882; LaRue v. Hoffman, Fla.App. 1959, 109 So.2d 373; Fleming v. Smart, Fla.App. 1963, 153 So.2d 748. The judgment appealed is affirmed.

These cases present fact situations different from the case at bar in that the injured party was in actual contract with the vehicle in which they either were to become or had been guests; or, their momentary departure from the vehicle in which they were guests and their subsequent injury was a mere interruption in a journey that had not as yet ended. Rainsbarger v. Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 118 N.W.2d 41 (1962), Kaplan v. Taub, Fla.App., 104 So.2d 882, Castle v. McKeown, 327 Mich. 518, 42 N.W.2d 733. Marsh v. Hogeboom, 167 Kan. 349, 205 P.2d 1190.

Here, as stated previously, the host was indicating the location of the car light to her passengers as the latter were entering the vehicle. In Kaplan v. Taub, Fla.App. 1958, 104 So.2d 882, the host driver parked her automobile in reverse gear with the emergency brake on and the motor running. When the guest opened the door, preparing to enter the vehicle, the driver intentionally released the brake causing the car to be propelled backward at a high rate of speed injuring the guest.