Opinion
2012-01-19
Law Offices of Nancy L. Isserlis, Long Island City (Lawrence R. Miles of counsel), for appellants. Kramer & Dunleavy, LLP, New York (Denise M. Dunleavy of counsel), for respondent.
Law Offices of Nancy L. Isserlis, Long Island City (Lawrence R. Miles of counsel), for appellants. Kramer & Dunleavy, LLP, New York (Denise M. Dunleavy of counsel), for respondent.
Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered on or about June 9, 2011, which denied defendants-appellants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims as asserted against them, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted, and the complaint dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Defendants-appellants met their initial burden of establishing their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence that the taxicab owned and operated by them was legally parked at the time of the accident, and that the moving vehicle's negligence in rear-ending the taxi in front of it was the sole proximate cause ( see Agramonte v. City of New York, 288 A.D.2d 75, 732 N.Y.S.2d 414 [2001] ). Assuming arguendo that plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the cab was negligently stopped in violation of 34 RCNY 4–08(a)(3), plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether this negligence proximately caused the accident ( see White v. Diaz, 49 A.D.3d 134, 854 N.Y.S.2d 106 [2008]; Gerrity v. Muthana, 28 A.D.3d 1063, 814 N.Y.S.2d 440 [2006], affd. 7 N.Y.3d 834, 824 N.Y.S.2d 206, 857 N.E.2d 527 [2006] ). Therefore, the IAS court improperly denied defendants-appellants' motion for summary judgment.