Following the inquest, the action was dismissed.As "corporate officers may be held personally liable for torts committed in the performance of their corporate duties' " ( Lido Beach Towers v. Denis A. Miller Ins. Agency, Inc., 128 AD3d 1025, 1026 [2015], quoting Kopec v. Hempstead Gardens, 264 A.D.2d 714, 716 [1999] ), Vlahakis was properly joined as a defendant in this action and was liable, with defendant Able Salvage Corp., for conversion. While it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove the value of the vehicle at the time and place of the conversion (see Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 326 [1980] ; see also Rajeev Sindhwani, M.D., PLLC v. Coe Bus. Serv., Inc., 52 AD3d 674, 676 [2008] ), since plaintiff provided information as to the year, make and model of the destroyed vehicle, and its body condition (cf. Kante v. Queens Medallion Leasing, Inc., 46 Misc.3d 139[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 50087[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015] ), as well as Kelley Blue Book valuations for somewhat comparable vehicles, we conclude that plaintiff's evidence was adequate for the court to make a finding as to damages, and that the dismissal of the action as against defendants Able Salvage Corp. and Nick Vlahakis failed to render substantial justice between the parties (see UDCA 1804, 1807 ). At the inquest, plaintiff proved that the converted vehicle was worth $2,697 and, thus, she was entitled to recover that sum from defendants Able Salvage Corp. and Nick Vlahakis. Accordingly, the judgment, insofar as appealed from, is reversed and the matter is remitted to the District Court for the entry of a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants Able Salvage Corp. and Nick Vlahakis in the principal sum of $2,697.
While plaintiffs submitted a Kelley Blue Book valuation at trial, it is insufficient proof of damages without supporting evidence as to the mileage on the vehicle and its condition at the time of the loss (see Hindi v Wajngurt-Levy, 68 Misc.3d 128 [A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50939[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]; cf. Schussheim v Snitkoff, 55 Misc.3d 150 [A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017]). However, plaintiffs provided some proof of the value of the vehicle before the loss and, even where actual damages are not proved, upon establishing a conversion, punitive damages may be awarded "if it is proven that a defendant acted with 'actual malice involving intentional wrongdoing, or that [its] conduct amounted to a wanton, willful, or reckless disregard of right of possession'" (Kante v Queens Medallion Leasing, Inc., 46 Misc.3d 139 [A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50087[U], *2 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015],quoting Irving Land Corp. v Richard & Sons, 262 A.D.2d 286, 286 [1999]). Thus, in the circumstances presented, we find that substantial justice (see UDCA 1804, 1807) requires a new trial.
While it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove the value of the vehicle at the time and place of the conversion (see Fantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., 49 N.Y.2d 317, 326 [1980] ; see also Rajeev Sindhwani, M.D., PLLC v. Coe Bus. Serv., Inc., 52 AD3d 674, 676 [2008] ), since plaintiff provided information as to the year, make and model of the destroyed vehicle, and its body condition (cf. Kante v. Queens Medallion Leasing, Inc., 46 Misc.3d 139[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op 50087[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015] ), as well as Kelley Blue Book valuations for somewhat comparable vehicles, we conclude that plaintiff's evidence was adequate for the court to make a finding as to damages, and that the dismissal of the action as against defendants Able Salvage Corp. and Nick Vlahakis failed to render substantial justice between the parties (see UDCA 1804, 1807 ). At the inquest, plaintiff proved that the converted vehicle was worth $2,697 and, thus, she was entitled to recover that sum from defendants Able Salvage Corp. and Nick Vlahakis.
Without reaching the issue of whether plaintiff established, prima facie, defendant's liability based on her cause of action for conversion, we note that it was incumbent on plaintiff to prove her damages, measured by the value of the lost property at the time and place of the conversion (seeFantis Foods, Inc. v. Standard Importing Co., Inc. , 49 NY2d 317, 326 [1980] ; Rajeev Sindhwani, M.D., PLLC v. Coe Bus. Serv., Inc. , 52 AD3d 674, 676 [2008] ; Henderson v. Holley , 112 AD2d 190 [1985] ; Schussheim v. Snitkoff , 55 Misc 3d 150[A], 2017 NY Slip Op 50732[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2017] ). The fact that, because of defendant's alleged malfeasance, plaintiff was no longer in possession of her receipts for the lost items, did not excuse plaintiff from the requirement to provide objective information about the value of her property at the time it was allegedly converted (seeKante v. Queens Medallion Leasing, Inc. , 46 Misc 3d 139[A], 2015 NY Slip Op 50087[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2015] ), such as information about its size, style, brand, age or condition, from which its reasonable worth at the time of the conversion could be ascertained (seeKodak v. American Airlines , 9 Misc 3d 107 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2005]; see also 36 NY Jur 2d, Damages ยงยง 82, 85, 87 ). We note that plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment based on the sentimental value of her lost items (seeSlepoy v. Kliger , 26 Misc 3d 126[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 52603[U], *3 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009]; see alsoBensen v. Wojsz , 24 Misc 3d 142[A], 2009 NY Slip Op 51724[U], *1 [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2009] ).