Opinion
No. 2013–2195 Q C.
01-15-2015
Djime KANTE, Appellant, v. QUEENS MEDALLION LEASING, INC., Respondent.
Opinion
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County (Larry Love, J.), entered July 31, 2013. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, without costs, and the matter is remitted to the Civil Court for a new trial limited to the issue of punitive damages on the conversion cause of action.
Plaintiff brought this action to recover the principal sum of $25,000 for, in effect, among other things, breach of contract and conversion. At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified, and defendant did not dispute, that plaintiff had purchased a car from defendant for use as a taxicab, and also had entered into a written agreement with defendant for the lease of a taxi medallion. It was uncontested that, after the written lease agreement had expired, defendant continued to lease the medallion to plaintiff pursuant to an oral agreement. Plaintiff indicated that, provided that a car passes inspections by the Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC), it may be driven as a taxi for five years, after which time it must be retired, and expressed his understanding that the term of his oral lease agreement was coterminous with the time period during which his car could be driven as a taxi.
Plaintiff stated that he had gone on a trip outside the United States, and had turned his taxi over to a licensed hack driver for the duration of his trip. While he was away, however, the TLC issued a $100 ticket because plaintiff's brother, who did not have a hack license, had been driving plaintiff's taxi. Although plaintiff denied that he had given his brother permission to drive the car, defendant's witness indicated at trial that by enabling the situation in which plaintiff's brother was ticketed for driving his taxi, plaintiff had breached his agreement with defendant.
After the TLC issued the $100 ticket, defendant removed the medallion from plaintiff's car and placed the car in defendant's storage facility. Plaintiff testified, and defendant's witness did not dispute, that defendant had refused to turn the car over to plaintiff unless plaintiff paid defendant $10,000. Four days after defendant removed the medallion from plaintiff's car, defendant leased the medallion to someone else. It was undisputed that, eventually, acting without permission, defendant”junked” plaintiff's car.
Following the trial, the complaint was dismissed. In a decision announced from the bench, the Civil Court concluded that defendant had not breached a contract with plaintiff by removing the medallion from plaintiff's car and that plaintiff had failed to prove the damages arising from defendant's conversion of plaintiff's vehicle. This appeal ensued.
Defendant's witness, Peter Cosmas, indicated in his testimony that the issuance of the TLC ticket had terminated plaintiff's right to lease the medallion. Since plaintiff failed conclusively to refute that testimony, we conclude that plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract was properly dismissed.
Plaintiff proved a cause of action for conversion, since it was undisputed that defendant, acting intentionally and without authority, had interfered with plaintiff's right of possession and improperly exercised dominion over plaintiff's property by placing plaintiff's vehicle in its storage facility and then junking it (see Colavito v. New York Organ Donor Network, Inc., 8 NY3d 43, 49–50 [2006] ; see also National Ctr. for Crisis Mgt., Inc. v. Lerner, 91 AD3d 920, 921 [2012] ). Plaintiff bore the burden of establishing his damages (see Optimum Physique Inc. v. Best Bros. Auto & Truck Repair, 39 Misc.3d 139[A], 2013 N.Y. Slip Op 50714[U] [App Term, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2013] ). Even though plaintiff may have sustained damages, since he failed to provide any objective information about the value of his car at the time it was junked, such as its make, model, or mileage, the Civil Court properly concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove his actual damages.
Nevertheless, where conversion is established, punitive damages may be awarded if it is proven that a defendant acted with”actual malice involving intentional wrongdoing, or that [its] conduct amounted to a wanton, willful, or reckless disregard of right of possession” (Irving Land Corp. v. Richard & Sons, 262 A.D.2d 286 [1999] ; see also Boston Concessions Group v. Criterion Ctr. Corp., 250 A.D.2d 435, 436 [1998] ). In this case, defendant's conversion of plaintiff's vehicle was demonstrated, but the Civil Court failed to determine whether, under the circumstances presented, an award of punitive damages would be warranted.
Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the action is remitted to the Civil Court for a new trial limited to the issue of punitive damages on the conversion cause of action.
PESCE, P.J., ALIOTTA and SOLOMON, JJ., concur.