Summary
In Kania v. Shaffer, 31 Colo. App. 438, 506 P.2d 384 (1972), a division of this court looked to the underlying cause of the lockout to determine whether the locked-out claimants were eligible for unemployment benefits.
Summary of this case from SAFEWAY STORES 44 INC. v. ICAOOpinion
No. 71-443
Decided November 14, 1972.
Claim for unemployment benefits by several employees. Finding that the unemployment arose as result of labor dispute and that subsequent developments in that dispute did not entitle claimants to benefits, Industrial Commission denied the claim. Claimants appealed.
Affirmed
1. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION — Claimants — Unemployed — Result — Notice to Strike — Subsequent Lockout — Ineligible for Benefits. Where unemployment compensation claimants, through their union, had served notice of their intent to strike at the termination of the existing contract, the closing of the plants was due to a labor dispute between the union and the employers, and the lockout resulted from demands of the employees as distinguished from an effort on the part of the employers to deprive the employees of some advantage they already possessed; therefore, pursuant to applicable provisions of Unemployment Compensation Statute, the claimants were ineligible for benefits.
2. Unemployment of Claimants — Caused — Labor Dispute — Subsequent Concessions — Not Terminate Dispute — Remained Ineligible — Benefits. Where unemployment benefits claimants' unemployment is found to be due to a labor dispute, such claimants are not eligible for benefits for the duration of that dispute, and where claimants, after initial lockout, offered to work under conditions of previous contract for thirty days and to agree to 72-hour strike notice, such offers did not terminate the labor dispute, and thus, claimants remained ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits.
3. State Statute — Relative — Benefits Eligibility — Inapplicable — Federal Court — Enjoined Further Action — Department of Labor. Statute stating conditions under which lockouts and strikes are unlawful relative to actions by director of department of labor in regard to labor dispute was inapplicable in determining claimants' eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits in situation where federal court had enjoined director from taking any further action in dispute.
Review of Order from the Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado
Hornbein and Goldin, for petitioners.
Feder Morris, P.C., Paul D. Rubner, for respondents United Packing Company, Litvak Meat Company and Pepper Packing Company.
Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, John P. Moore, Deputy, Robert L. Harris, Assistant, for respondents James M. Shaffer and Industrial Commission of Colorado (Ex-Officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado).
This is a review of a decision of the Industrial Commission which denied petitioners' claim for unemployment benefits.
Petitioners, hereinafter referred to as claimants, were members of Local 641 of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butchers Union and were employed by the respondent employers, who operate slaughterhouses and packing plants. The employers had formed a multi-employer group for the purpose of negotiating labor agreements. With existing collective bargaining agreements due to expire on November 30, 1970, the Union notified the employers on October 23, 1970, of its desire to open contract negotiations and also sent written notice of intent to strike. The parties negotiated throughout the month of November without reaching an agreement. There was discussion of a 72-hour strike notice before any actual strike to enable the employers to "load out" perishables, but it was disputed whether this discussion pertained to the proposed future contract or the impending strike on December 1, 1970. On November 30, 1970, Union representatives stated that the Union wished to rescind the strike notice and that the employees would work on a day-to-day basis. Because of their "loading out" problems, this was not acceptable to the employers, who had already paid employees for work that day and sent them home. The plants were then shut down and remained so until February 1, 1971, on which date the parties began operating under new collective bargaining agreements.
Several acts occurred during the interim period while the plants were closed. On December 2, 1970, the Director of the Division of Labor of the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction of the labor dispute and ordered a continuation of the prior conditions of employment for 30 days pending the Director's investigation of the labor dispute. The Union expressed its willingness to comply with this order on December 3, 1970. The employers sent letters to the employees on December 8, 1970, advising them that the reason the plants were not operating was the Union's failure to agree to the 72-hour strike notice. On December 11, 1970, counsel for the Union replied to employers that such notice would be given. Upon application by the employers, the U.S. District court issued a restraining order on December 17, 1970, preventing further action in regard to the labor dispute by the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment on the grounds of preemption by federal law. This order was made a preliminary injunction on December 23, 1970, with the consent of the State.
In appealing denial of unemployment compensation benefits, the claimants assert that the Commission made no findings as to the effect of the Director's order, the Union's acceptance of that order and the employers' noncompliance therewith and that, by virtue of these events, the claimants were entitled to benefits pursuant to 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 80-1-30, and C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-9. The respondents (the employers and the Commission) contend that the evidence supports the findings and conclusions of the Commission that the unemployment arose due to a labor dispute and that subsequent actions did not entitle the claimants to benefits. We agree with the contentions of respondents and affirm the order of the Commission.
There is ample evidence to support the finding by the Commission that a labor dispute was in progress. It is also evident that, as a result of the labor dispute, a work stoppage in the form of a lockout occurred and that the claimants' unemployment was due to this lockout.
The claimants contend that notwithstanding the existence of a labor dispute they are eligible for benefits because the lockout resulted from the employers' effort to deprive the employees of some advantage they already possessed. The pertinent statute is C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-9(1), which reads as follows:
"An individual shall be ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits for any week with respect to which the department finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a strike or labor dispute in the factory, establishment, or other premises in which he was employed and thereafter for such reasonable period of time, if any, as may be necessary for such factory, establishment, or other premises to resume normal operations. For the purposes of this section a lockout by any member of a multi-employer bargaining unit shall constitute a labor dispute if such lockout was initiated because of a strike or labor dispute involving any member of such multi-employer bargaining unit; provided, that if his unemployment is due to a lockout involving a multi-employer bargaining unit member or otherwise, the individual will not be determined ineligible unless the lockout results from the demands of employees as distinguished from an effort on the part of the employer to deprive the employees of some advantage they already possess."
[1] Claimants, through their Union, had served notice of their intent to strike at the termination of the existing contract. The closing of the plants was due to the labor dispute between the Union and the employers, and the lockout resulted from demands of the employees as distinguished from an effort on the part of the employers to deprive the employees of some advantage they already possessed; therefore, pursuant to C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-9, the claimants were ineligible for benefits. The Commission so found. The findings by the Commission are supported by competent evidence and are binding on the court on review. Burak v. American Smelting and Refining Co., 134 Colo. 255, 302 P.2d 182; Bryant v. Hayden Coal Co., 111 Colo. 93, 137 P.2d 417.
The appellants strongly urge that, regardless of the validity of the Director of the Division of Labor's order on December 2, 1970, and regardless of any initial justification for the lockout, they became eligible for benefits under C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-9(1), because of their agreement to comply with the order to work under conditions of the previous contract for at least 30 days and further because of their offer on December 11th to agree to a 72-hour strike notice.
[2] By disqualifying an employee from benefits for any week within which unemployment is due to a strike or a labor dispute and thereafter for such reasonable time as may be necessary for a plant to resume normal operations, the statute, C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-9(1), expresses a clear intent to avoid interference with labor negotiations. The Commission must ascertain the initial cause of the unemployment to determine eligibility for benefits. If unemployment is found to be due to a labor dispute, the employees are not eligible for benefits for the duration of the dispute.
In the present case, the claimants were found to be unemployed due to a labor dispute. No agreement was reached regarding the operation of the plants during the negotiations, and the dispute on that issue was not resolved until the new contract became effective on February 1, 1971. Offers or concessions made subsequent to the commencement of the dispute which were not acceptable to the other party are merely negotiations and do not terminate the dispute. Therefore, the claimants' unemployment continued to be due to the dispute, and they remained ineligible for benefits.
[3] In support of their claim, claimants seek to use 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 80-1-30. Claimants contend that regardless of whether this statute was superseded by federal law in this case, it should be considered in construing C.R.S. 1963, 82-4-9(1). We disagree. The Director of Labor was enjoined from taking any further action in this proceeding. The subject matter of 1969 Perm. Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 80-1-30, was therefore not pertinent.
Order affirmed.
CHIEF JUDGE SILVERSTEIN and JUDGE DWYER concur.