Opinion
June 16, 1998
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Alice Schlesinger, J.).
The parties' "so ordered" stipulation of settlement resolved the disputes alleged in the original complaint for partition, and, as such, is tantamount to an agreement not to seek partition based on those same allegations ( see, Ostrager v. Alpert, 177 A.D.2d 287). Accordingly, since plaintiff's have failed to present any ground that would warrant setting aside the stipulation of settlement ( see, Hallock v. State of New York, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230; 1420 Concourse Corp. v. Cruz, 135 A.D.2d 371, 372, appeal dismissed 73 N.Y.2d 868), their motion for summary judgment, seeking partition of the subject property upon the same allegations as had been made in the original action for partition, was properly denied. Plaintiff John Kane's claim that the term of the lease countenanced pursuant to the stipulation constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation of property, and is a ground for vacating the stipulation, is without merit. Apart from the circumstance that he and his mother negotiated the lease term, the lease term itself is not unreasonable (Ostrager v. Alpert, supra). Nothing in this decision is intended to preclude a partition action by any party in the future on grounds other than those alleged in the present complaint.
Concur — Rosenberger, J. P., Ellerin, Nardelli and Wallach, JJ.