Opinion
Civil Action No. 18-1484
08-07-2019
RONALD E. KAMMERDIENER, Plaintiff, v. ARMSTRONG COUNTY, PHILLIP SHAFFER, REGINA HIMES, and ERIKA KIRKPATRICK, Defendants.
District Judge Cathy Bissoon
Re: ECF No. 11 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Ronald E. Kammerdiener ("Plaintiff") initiated this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's claims arise out of allegations that Defendants deprived him of his federal and state law rights when the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County adjudged him in contempt of court and sentenced him to a maximum term of six-months incarceration without granting him a hearing or access to counsel.
Presently before the Court is a partial Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Regina Himes and Erika Kirkpatrick and brief in support (collectively, the "Motion to Dismiss"), and a brief in opposition filed by Plaintiff. ECF Nos. 11, 12, and 15.
Pursuant to the Order of this Court dated June 11, 2019, ECF No. 19, the parties also submitted supplemental briefing addressing the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)) and Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) to preclude the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction over any and all claims alleged by Plaintiff in his Complaint. ECF Nos. 21, 22, and 23.
For the following reasons, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed. The Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims arising out of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I to IV) pursuant to Heck and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Having dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claim for false imprisonment (Count V), and should therefore dismiss Count V without prejudice to refile in state court.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 6, 2018. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff's Complaint asserts claims against Defendants Armstrong County; Phillip Shafer ("Shafer"), Warden of the Armstrong County Jail; Regina Himes ("Himes"), Chief Adult Probation Officer of Armstrong County; and Erika Kirkpatrick ("Kirkpatrick"), Armstrong County Adult Probation Officer. Plaintiff's claims arise" out of allegations that Defendants violated Plaintiff's federal and state law rights when the Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County adjudged Plaintiff in contempt of court on March 26, 2015 and May 19, 2017, sentencing him to a maximum term of six-months incarceration without granting him a hearing or access to counsel.
1. Factual Background
On June 6, 2013, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to two criminal charges of writing bad checks. Commonwealth v. Kammerdiener, CP-03-CR-0000210-2013 (C.P. Armstrong Cty. March 20, 2013); Commonwealth v. Kammerdiener, CP-03-CR-0000211-2013 (C.P. Armstrong Cty. March 20, 2013) (attached hereto as Appendices A and B, respectively). The Court of Common Pleas of Armstrong County (the "State Court") sentenced Plaintiff to one year of probation, and to pay costs, restitution, and fines. Appendix A at 4; Appendix B at 4. Plaintiff was represented by the Armstrong County Public Defender's Office in connection with both charges. Appendix A at 2; Appendix B at 3.
Although Plaintiff did not cite these criminal charges in his briefs, the criminal charges are the predicate on which all of his claims in the Complaint are based. Furthermore, this Court is "entitled to take judicial notice of public records in considering a motion for dismissal or motion for judgment on the pleadings." DiNicola v. DiPaolo, 945 F. Supp. 848, 854 n.2 (W.D. Pa. 1996): see also Pache v. Wallace, Civ. No. 93-5164, 1995 WL 118457, at *2 (E.D. Pa. March 20, 1995), aff'd, 72 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 1995) (Table No. 95-1307); Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 427 n. 8 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Accordingly, this Court takes judicial notice of the State Court criminal docket for the two bad check writing cases from which Plaintiff's 2015 and 2017 convictions for contempt of court are derived.
Plaintiff did not pay the financial penalty ordered by the State Court in either of the bad check cases. See Appendix A at 5; Appendix B at 5. On March 6, 2015, Consent Orders were entered into by Plaintiff and signed off on by Armstrong County Senior Judge Kenneth G. Valasek. ECF No. 1 ¶ 13; see also id. On March 26, 2015, the State Court filed Consent Orders (the "2015 Orders") on the criminal dockets for Plaintiff's bad check convictions, adjudging him in contempt of court for his failure to pay his financial penalty. Appendix A at 5; Appendix B at 5. The 2015 Orders set forth a payment plan of $25.00 a month through November 1, 2022 (the "Payment Plan"). Id. In the event that Plaintiff failed to adhere to this Payment Plan, the State Court, as set forth in the 2015 Orders, sentenced Plaintiff to an immediate term of incarceration, lasting a maximum of six months, or until his financial penalty was paid in full. Id.; see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13-14. Copies were also provided to the District Attorney's Office and the Probation Department. Appendix A at 5; Appendix B at 5.
Because Plaintiff did not comply with the Payment Plan, he was arrested in Clarion County, Pennsylvania on November 8, 2016. ECF No. 1 ¶ 13. The arrest was made pursuant to a bench warrant issued according to the 2015 Orders. Id. Plaintiff was incarcerated in the Clarion County Correctional Facility until November 16, 2016, and then was transferred to the Armstrong County Jail by two Armstrong County Probation Officers, one of whom was Defendant Kirkpatrick. Id. ¶¶ 15-17. Throughout the course of his incarceration, Plaintiff alleges that he never received access to counsel despite repeated efforts, and that he was never given a hearing to determine his financial ability to pay the penalty. See id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 18-27, 31-33 and 37.
On December 9, 2016, Plaintiff alleges he wrote a letter to Defendant Kirkpatrick regarding his confinement. Id. ¶¶ 28-30. Kirkpatrick responded by informing Plaintiff that he would remain confined until he paid his fines and costs or at the end of a six-month period of incarceration. Id. Plaintiff did not pay the financial penalty he owed. He was released after six months of incarceration on May 7, 2017. Id. ¶ 35.
Just before Plaintiff was released from jail, on May 5, 2017, Plaintiff alleges that Kirkpatrick met with him and directed him to sign additional consent orders. Id. ¶ ¶ 34, 36. On May 8, 2017, Plaintiff was again adjudged to be in contempt. Appendix A at 5; Appendix B at 5. On May 19, 2017, the State Court entered a Consent Order adjudging Plaintiff to be in contempt of court for failing to pay his financial penalty from his bad check convictions (the "2017 Orders"). Id. In the event Plaintiff failed to make the required payments, the 2017 Orders sentenced him to a term of incarceration not to exceed six months. Id.; see also ECF No. 1 ¶ 34.
Both dockets reflect that the 2017 Orders directed that the 2015 Orders were effectively withdrawn as of May 19, 2019. Appendix A at 5; Appendix B at 5.
2. Plaintiff's Claims
On November 6, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising four federal claims and a state law claim of false imprisonment. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff sues Shafer, Himes, and Kirkpatrick in their individual and official capacities. Id.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) after his arrest pursuant to the 2015 Orders, Defendants failed to bring Plaintiff before a magistrate or judge for a hearing to determine his ability to pay fines and costs and thereby violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count I); (2) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights to counsel when they deprived him of access to counsel throughout his six-month incarceration (Count II); (3) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights against wrongful detainment when he was incarcerated for six months without access to counsel or hearing (Count III); and (4) Defendants violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when he was incarcerated for six months without a hearing to determine his financial ability to pay his financial penalty (Count IV). ECF No. 1 at 7, 12, 15, and 17. Plaintiff also asserts that the Defendants conduct constituted state law false imprisonment (Count V), and that the Court has jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Id. at 19.
In sum, Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully arrested and incarcerated "without a court hearing or any process whatsoever." Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiff directly attacks the language in the State Court's 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, which provided that he would not be given a hearing or access to counsel if he was arrested for failing to adhere to the Payment Plan. Id. ¶ 14; see also ECF No. 15 at 4. Plaintiff alleges the language of the Orders was "facially defective," because "on its face, it permitted incarceration for six months without a court hearing (or any process) to determine the individual's ability to pay" in violation of state and federal law. Id. ¶ 14.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and special damages from Defendants in their individual capacities for "actual physical and emotional injuries" and other damages that he sustained as a result of the State Court's purportedly unlawful 2015 Orders. Id. at 11-12,14-19; ECF No. 15 at 5. In addition, Plaintiff requests that the Court issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants and their agents from enforcing the 2017 Orders without granting him a hearing and access to counsel, and a declaratory judgment holding that Defendants' deprivation of counsel and a hearing pursuant to the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders was constitutionally defective. ECF No. 1 at 12, 15, 17 and 19.
3. The Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Briefing Regarding the Applicability of Heck and the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
On January 7, 2019, Defendants Himes and Kirkpatrick filed the instant partial Motion to Dismiss, seeking dismissal of all claims against them in their official capacities. ECF No. 11. Defendants argue that: (1) all claims against Himes and Kirkpatrick in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) Himes and Kirkpatrick, in their official capacities, are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) Plaintiff improperly asks the Court to intervene in ongoing State Court proceedings; and (4) declaratory relief is not available to adjudicate past conduct. ECF No. 12.
Plaintiff opposes the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that: (1) his official capacity claims against Himes and Kirkpatrick are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, because the declaratory and prospective injunctive relief he seeks invokes the Ex Parte: Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), exception to immunity; (2) whether Himes and Kirkpatrick are persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not relevant because claims for monetary damages are only brought against them in their individual capacities; (3) Plaintiff is not asking this Court to direct the State Court to perform any action, but simply to refrain from performing unconstitutional action; and (4) declaratory and prospective injunctive relief is required with respect to the 2017 Orders because Plaintiff fears that he will be rearrested and incarcerated with the same deprivation of process and counsel that he was allegedly subject to pursuant to the 2015 Orders. ECF No. 15.
Upon review of the parties' submissions, this Court took notice of two issues that may require dismissal of Plaintiff's claims: (1) the applicability of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (2) the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because the parties did not raise these potentially dispositive issues, the Court ordered supplemental briefing on the applicability the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and whether Heck bars the claims raised in Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 19. Thereafter, all parties filed supplemental briefs addressing these two issues. ECF Nos. 21, 22, and 23.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must be dismissed if, after viewing the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accepting any well-pleaded facts as true, it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12(b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
In making this determination, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions set forth as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see also McTernan v. City of York, Penn., 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) ("The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). A plaintiff's factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Fed. Practice and Procedure § 1216, at 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). Although the United States Supreme Court does "not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, [the Court does require] enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.
In other words, at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff is "required to make a 'showing' rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief." Smith v. Sullivan, Civ. No. 07-528, 2008 WL 482469, at *1 (D. Del. Feb. 19, 2008) (quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). "This 'does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead 'simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n. 3). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expounded on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, holding that it applies the following test to determine the sufficiency of a complaint:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief."Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)).
"The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, not to resolve disputed facts or decide the merits of the case." Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 197 F. Supp. 2d 42, 53 (D. Del. 2002) (citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that a complaint is properly dismissed under Rule 12(b) where it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, or where the factual content does not allow the court "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "The question is not whether the plaintiff will prevail in the end but, rather, is whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his or her claims." Swope v. City of Pittsburgh, 90 F. Supp. 3d 400, 405 (W.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Oatway v. American Intern. Group, Inc., 325 F.3d 184, 187 (3d Cir. 2003)).
C. DISCUSSION
1. Plaintiff's Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I-IV)
a. Plaintiff's Claims Are Heck Barred.
Although Defendants' Motion to Dismiss only seeks dismissal of the official capacity claims against Kirkpatrick and Himes, ECF No. 11, the Court may sua sponte dismiss claims for failure to state a claim, provided that the plaintiff is provided notice and an opportunity to respond. See Walker v. Pa., 580 F. App'x 75, 78 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2014). Moreover, courts have an independent obligation to confirm that they have jurisdiction. In re Klaas, 858 F.3d 820, 825 (3d Cir. 2017). The Court must sua sponte raise jurisdictional issues not raised by the parties and should dismiss claims over which it lacks jurisdiction. U.S. v. Kalb, 891 F. 3d 455, 459 (3d Cir. 2018); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Found. Surgery Affiliates, 358 F. Supp. 3d 426, 432 (E.D. Pa. 2018). Here, the Court gave notice and an opportunity for the parties to respond to whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck and whether the Court has jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. ECF Nos. 19, 21, 22 and 23. Accordingly, the Court may appropriately dismiss Plaintiff's claims under these doctrines, despite the fact that Defendants did not initially seek such relief in their partial Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1 ¶ 2. "Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. It does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights." Kaucher v. Cty of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145, n. 3 (1979)).
Civil tort actions under Section 1983, however, are "not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments . . . that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486 (1994). Accordingly, in Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that a claimant does not have a cognizable Section 1983 claim for alleged unconstitutional conduct that would render his underlying conviction or sentence invalid unless that conviction or sentence "has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 487. This is known as the "favorable termination" rule.
To determine whether a Section 1983 claim should be dismissed under the favorable termination rule:
[A] district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.
Id.
The favorable termination rule also applies to federal civil rights actions that call into question the validity of contempt orders. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Grondolsky, 341 F. App'x 828, 830 & n.1 (3d Cir. 2009); Tankersley v. Morris, 2:08CV1653, 2009 WL 499264, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2009) ("Alternatively, because success in the Section 1983 suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for contempt, the suit is barred by Heck v. Humphrey); Lewis v. City of Waxahachie, 465 F. App'x 383, 385 (5th Cir. 2012) ("There is no evidence that [plaintiff's] conviction for contempt has been overturned, expunged, or otherwise invalidated; thus, her claims have not yet accrued and are barred by Heck"); Sarlund v. Anderson, 205 F.3d 973, 975 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Many of the plaintiff's claims are barred by the Heck doctrine, because if sound they imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction for contempt . . .").
In their supplemental briefing to the Court, ECF Nos. 22 and 23, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's entire lawsuit should be dismissed pursuant to Heck. Defendants argue that the Complaint necessarily implies that the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders are invalid, and that Plaintiff cannot show that his convictions for contempt of court in 2015 and 2017 have been reversed on direct appeal, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. ECF No. 22 at 4-5; ECF No. 23 at 4. Thus, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the favorable termination rule under Heck, and his Complaint should be dismissed. Id.
Plaintiff counters that dismissal under Heck is improper because his Complaint does not seek to invalidate the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders. ECF No. 21 at 5. Rather than challenging the Orders, he suggests, Plaintiff is merely challenging Defendants' conduct. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff claims that the injuries he suffered were caused by Plaintiff's inability to speak with a lawyer or attend a hearing—not from the underlying Orders. Id. at 5. Plaintiff further argues that, even if the Complaint is construed as contesting the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, Heck does not apply because Plaintiff was not incarcerated at the time the Complaint was filed, and habeas corpus relief was unavailable at that time. Id. at 5.
Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff's arguments unpersuasive. The linchpin of Plaintiff's argument—that he is not challenging the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, but is instead challenging the Defendants' conduct and confinement pursuant to those Orders—would have the Court find that Plaintiff's claims, if successful, would not invalidate the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders. This is not supported by Plaintiff's own Complaint and prior briefing. There, Plaintiff concedes that that the source of Plaintiff's injuries, the alleged denial of counsel and a hearing, are the direct result of language from the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders.
Indeed, as Plaintiff represented, the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders provided "that if [Plaintiff] fails to make payments he could again be incarcerated without a hearing or being afforded counsel ." ECF No. 15 at 15 (emphasis added); see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 36 and 39. The Complaint alleges, moreover, that Plaintiff was not given "any process whatsoever" because the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders are "facially defective." ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 14. Plaintiff's Complaint therefore directly and facially attacks the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders. It is only now in his supplemental briefing on Heck and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine that Plaintiff attempts to pivot to the argument that all of his injuries arose as a result of conduct by the Defendants independent of the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, rather than the validity of the State Court's Orders.
Consequently, the Complaint calls into question and does "necessarily imply the invalidity" of the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, as well as Plaintiff's confinement pursuant to the same. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. And, because the pleadings (and public record) do not reflect that Plaintiff's 2015 Orders and 2017 contempt convictions "[have] been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus," Plaintiff does not establish that the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders satisfy the favorable termination rule. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Battle v. Marquardt, CIV.A. 03-1062, 2006 WL 1073068, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2006) ("The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his claims are not barred by Heck.") (quoting Avery v. Nicol, 208 F.3d 212 (Table), 2000 WL 282903, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000)). Thus, dismissal is proper under Heck.
To the extent Plaintiff contends that he nevertheless can challenge the constitutionality of his confinement under Section 1983 because habeas corpus relief was unavailable after his incarceration and at the time he filed his Complaint, this argument is also unavailing. In support of this position, Plaintiff's sole authority is a concurring opinion in Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 (1998), which posited that Section 1983 relief should be available to redress constitutional wrongs after habeas relief becomes unavailable. See ECF No. 21 at 5; Spencer, 523 U.S. at 20-21 (concurring, Souter, J.).
Plaintiff's theory, however, has been rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 20061 In Williams, plaintiff filed a Section 1983 action to challenge the constitutionality of his parole revocation and other proceedings carried out by the New Jersey State Parole Board. Just as here, plaintiff argued that because habeas relief was no longer available to him, he should be permitted to maintain a Section 1983 action to challenge the constitutionality of a state court judgment. Id. at 177. And, just as here, the plaintiff in Williams relied on the premise set forth in Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Spencer, as adopted by the Second Circuit in Huang v. Johnson, 251 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2011). Id. The Williams court rejected plaintiff's argument, explaining:
As we recently held in Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005), a § 1983 remedy is not available to a litigant to whom habeas relief is no longer available. In Gilles, we concluded that Heck's favorable-termination requirement had not been undermined and, to the extent that its validity was called into question by Spencer, we observed that the Justices who believed § 1983 claims should be allowed to proceed where habeas relief is not available so stated in concurring and dissenting opinions in Spencer , not in a cohesive majority opinion. Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209-10. Thus, because the Supreme Court had not squarely held post-Heck that the favorable-termination rule does not apply to defendants no longer in custody, we declined in Gilles to extend the rule of Heck, and likewise decline to extend it here.Williams, 453 F.3d at 177-78 (emphasis added).
Not only does Plaintiff fail to acknowledge this controlling precedent, he neglects to address that habeas relief is not the sole means to obtain a favorable termination. Under Heck, he may also show that the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders were reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, or declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff has not done so.
Finally, it is of no moment that the Plaintiff's official capacity claims seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Dismissal under Heck is required "no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief ), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to a conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration." Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis added). Therefore, Plaintiff's official capacity claims seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from the State Court's 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders should be dismissed pursuant to Heck, in addition to all of his personal capacity claims.
b. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Court also lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under Rooker-Feldman, "federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments." Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010). The doctrine is narrowly restricted to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
Initially, the United States Supreme Court held that lower federal courts may not hear claims actually decided by a state court, as district courts have no appellate jurisdiction. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). The Supreme Court later extended this holding, explaining that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over any claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 486 (1983).
In determining whether a claim should be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has established the following test:
[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff "complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state-court judgments;" (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (citing Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284).
Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred under Rooker-Feldman. Plaintiff's claims for violations of his Constitutional rights are "inextricably intertwined" with the State Court's 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, they maintain, because the alleged Constitutional violations would render the Orders invalid. ECF No. 23 at 3; ECF No. 22 at 3-4. Because Plaintiff's Complaint directly attacks the validity of the State Court judgments, Defendants assert that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
In his supplemental briefing, Plaintiff counters that Rooker-Feldman does not apply because he is not a state court loser, none of his injuries arose from the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, and the sole source of his injuries are the independent actions of Defendants depriving him of a hearing and legal counsel. ECF No. 21 at 2-4. Plaintiff further claims that he does not seek to invalidate the Orders, nor to enjoin their enforcement, but instead seeks damages and equitable relief from Defendants' purportedly independent conduct. Id. In support of these propositions, Plaintiff relies on the decision of the Third Circuit in Great Western Mining. Id.
As the party asserting jurisdiction, Plaintiff has an affirmative burden to show that his claims are not precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Khalil v. NJ Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 594 F. App'x 88, 90 (3d Cir. 2015). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet this burden, and that his claims fall squarely within the four-pronged test set forth in Great Western Mining, supra. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims should also be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
i. Plaintiff Lost in State Court and Complains of Injuries Caused by that Loss (Requirements 1 and 2)
The first two requirements for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are that the Plaintiff must have (1) lost in state court, and (2) be complaining of injuries caused by that loss. Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 166.
With respect to the second prong, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that "[t]he second requirement—that a plaintiff must be complaining of injuries caused by a state-court judgment—may also be thought of as an inquiry into the source of the plaintiff's injury." Id. at 166 (citing Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006)). "A useful guidepost is the timing of the injury, that is, whether the injury complained of in federal court existed prior to the state-court proceedings and thus could not have been 'caused by' those proceedings." Id. at 167.
Although Plaintiff argues, without explanation, that he did not "lose" in State Court, it is clear according to the Third Circuit's guidepost that the Plaintiff's two convictions for contempt of court were State Court losses, and that all the of the Plaintiff's alleged damages directly arise from those losses. Plaintiff's alleged damages brought against Defendants in their individual capacity stem from his six-month incarceration, which he served pursuant to the 2015 Orders. His official capacity claims, seeking prospective declaratory and injunctive relief from the 2017 Orders, are implicitly predicated on the injury that he is subject to a payment plan and possible arrest according to an allegedly unlawful State Court order.
In Great Western Mining, the plaintiff sought in state court to vacate an arbitration award for various contract and tort claims. The state court dismissed the action, and the plaintiff subsequently filed a Section 1983 action alleging that the losses were the result of a conspiracy between the defendants and certain members of the state judiciary. In particular, the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy involving a revolving door of state judiciary officials who would give favorable rulings to defendants in exchange for future employment as arbitrators. Id. at 161. The court concluded that, although plaintiff's action attacked the validity of the state court's judgment, the allegation of a conspiracy between defendants and the state court was evidence that the "people involved in the decision violated some independent right." Id. at 172 (adopting the reasoning of Nesses v. Shepard, 68 F.3d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1995)); Brokaw v. Weaver, 305 F.3d 660, 662 (7th Cir. 2002)). In Great Western Mining, that "independent right" was the right to an impartial forum. Id.
In multiple cases decided after Great Western Mining, courts within the Third Circuit have rejected Plaintiff's argument that he may escape Rooker-Feldman merely by characterizing his damages as caused by the Defendants' independent conduct rather than challenging the State Court's judgment. See Gage v. Wells Fargo Bank, 521 F. App'x 49 (3d Cir. 2013); Khalil, 594 F. App'x at 91; see also Derr v. Northumberland Cty. Children & Youth Servs., No. 4:17-CV-00976, 2018 WL 3801782, at *8 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2018), report and recommendation adopted in part, No. CV 4:17-0976, 2018 WL 3770047 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2018); Garret v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, No. 3:15-CV-2285, 2016 WL 6089728, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2016); Hatfield v. Berube, No. CV 13-26, 2017 WL 2559635, at *7 (W.D. Pa. June 13, 2017), aff'd, 714 F. App'x 99 (3d Cir. 2017).
In Gage, for example, the plaintiff brought a federal suit after Wells Fargo succeeded on a foreclosure complaint in state court. Gage, 521 F. App'x at 50. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit, reasoning:
Gage cannot evade Rooker-Feldman by arguing on appeal that he was not injured by the foreclosure judgment, but rather by Wells Fargo's purportedly fraudulent actions. The complaint reveals the nature of Gage's claims against Wells Fargo: that the bank had no right to foreclose on the property and therefore committed "criminal acts" by enforcing the foreclosure judgment (Counts I and IV). These claims are in essence an attack on the state court judgment of foreclosure. Furthermore, an aspect of the relief that Gage requests—to have the deed to the property restored to him—makes it abundantly clear that he seeks to overturn the foreclosure judgment. Accordingly, the claims against Wells Fargo were properly dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
In Khalil, the plaintiff brought a federal suit after his parental rights were terminated in state court. Khalil, 594 Fed. App'x at 89. The plaintiff argued that he was complaining of injuries brought on by the defendants' fraud upon the state court in the prior proceeding, and not the state court judgment itself. Id. at 90. Moreover, he argued that "he [did] not ask [the court] to review and reject the state-court judgment because he invite[d] review only of [the defendants'] conduct in the state-court proceedings." Id. The court rejected those arguments, finding that it was "impossible for [the court] to grant [plaintiff] relief without concluding that the foundation for the state court's opinion was incorrect, thereby rejecting the state court's judgment regarding his parental rights." Id. at 91.
Thus, courts within the Third Circuit have rejected a rigid interpretation of Great Western Mining that would enable plaintiffs to perform an end-run around Rooker-Feldman simply by providing rote argument that it is the defendants' independent conduct that caused their injuries, and not any state court judgment.
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint makes it "abundantly clear" that he is seeking to invalidate the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders. See Gage, 521 F. App'x at 51. As Plaintiff argues, his injuries arise from "not being able to speak to an attorney and not having a hearing for the six months" that he was incarcerated. ECF No. 21 at 4. Plaintiff's Complaint contains no allegation that Defendants' alleged "policy, practice, and custom" of holding Plaintiff without hearing or counsel was due to anything other than Defendants' enforcement of the State Court's 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders. ECF No. 1, Counts I-IV.
To the contrary, Plaintiff's Complaint and present briefing suggest that the deprivation was directly pursuant to the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders: Plaintiff notes that Orders stipulated "that if [he] fails to make payments he could again be incarcerated without a hearing or being afforded counsel ." ECF No. 15 at 15 (emphasis added); see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 34, 36, and 39. Plaintiff further alleges that the Orders are "facially defective" because of the provision enabling him to be arrested without providing hearing or counsel. ECF No. 1. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1, 14. Therefore, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff's argument that his injuries were not caused by the State Court's 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders, and finds that the first two requirements are satisfied.
ii. The Orders Were Rendered Before the Federal Suit Was Filed (Requirement 3)
Next, the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders "were rendered before the [Plaintiff's] federal suit was filed" on November 8, 2018. Great Western Mining, 615 F.3d at 166 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284); ECF No. 1. Consequently, the third requirement of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is satisfied.
iii. Plaintiff Asks the Court to Review Proceedings Conducted by the State Court (Requirement 4)
Finally, the fourth requirement is also met. This requirement is satisfied if Plaintiff invites the Court to "review proceedings conducted by a state tribunal to determine whether it reached its result in accordance with law." Middlebrook at Monmouth v. Liban, 419 F. App'x 284, 285-86 (3rd Cir. 2011).
The central "result" in this matter is Plaintiff's State Court convictions for contempt in 2015 and 2017. Plaintiff is careful not to explicitly request his convictions to be vacated. However, by alleging that the language in the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders is facially defective, and that the Orders were issued amidst a complete absence of process, it is evident to the Court that the Plaintiff's Complaint effectively seeks an appellate review of the State Court's Orders. Consequently, this Court "has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear the suit." Id. What should make this abundantly clear is that the prospective injunctive relief which the Complaint seeks herein would be to have this Court prohibit Defendants from doing that which the 2015 Orders and 2017 Orders expressly require that they do, i.e., confine Plaintiff without counsel and without further hearing.
Indeed, Plaintiff's Complaint is closely analogous to two recent cases in this Circuit where courts barred actions alleging unconstitutional conduct of Defendants during the issuance and enforcement of contempt orders—including allegations concerning the deprivation of a hearing to determine the plaintiff's ability to pay a financial penalty, the presence of "consent" orders, and the denial of counsel. Lyman v. Phil. Ct. of Common Pleas Domestic Relations Div., No. CV 16- 5191, 2017 WL 2813228, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 29, 2017), aff'd, 751 F. App'x 174 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that plaintiff's claims that he was deprived of counsel were inextricably intertwined with the state court's orders at issue); see also Tarapchak v. Schuylkill City, No. CV 13-1895, 2014 WL 4626701, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 15; 2014) (holding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiff's due process claim challenging her arrest and imprisonment as a direct result of a contempt order, issued for failing to comply with a support order). For these reasons, Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims should also be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
2. Plaintiff's False Imprisonment Claim (Count V)
Plaintiff's claims arising under federal law in Counts I - IV should be dismissed pursuant to either Heck or the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. However, Plaintiff's state law false imprisonment claim remains, and the sole source of jurisdiction for the claim is supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if the Court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. "When exercising this discretion, a district court should not retain supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state-law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so." Sarpolis v. Tereshko, 625 F. App'x 594, 599 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotations omitted). The Court recommends dismissal of all claims over which it has original jurisdiction and, at this preliminary stage in the litigation, there are no compelling reasons for the Court to maintain jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claim. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed without prejudice.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed. It is true that, generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before dismissing it. See, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). However, in this case, granting leave to amend would be futile because Plaintiff's claims would remain Heck barred, as Plaintiff has not satisfied the favorable termination rule. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) ("Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility."). Here, it appears that amendment would be futile. Therefore, it is respectfully recommended that Counts I, II, III, and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint, ECF No. 1, be dismissed. As to Count V, it is recommended that this claim be dismissed without prejudice to refile in state court.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2. Dated: August 7, 2019
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE cc: The Honorable Cathy Bissoon
United States District Judge
All counsel of record by CM-ECF