Moreover, where, as here, "a determination as to equitable distribution has been made after a nonjury trial, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the proffered items of evidence is afforded great weight on appeal" ( Kaufman v. Kaufman, 189 A.D.3d 31, 56, 133 N.Y.S.3d 54 ; seeAloi v. Simoni, 82 A.D.3d 683, 685, 918 N.Y.S.2d 506 ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 67 A.D.3d at 990, 890 N.Y.S.2d 71 ). "While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible" ( Kamm v. Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591, 120 N.Y.S.3d 815 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). In this case, the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion with regard to equitable distribution of the marital assets (seeEschemuller v. Eschemuller, 167 A.D.3d 983, 985, 91 N.Y.S.3d 178 ; Greenberg v. Greenberg, 162 A.D.3d 870, 873, 81 N.Y.S.3d 58 ).
The defendant appeals. "The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of marital property and unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised that discretion, its determination should not be disturbed" ( Kamm v. Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591, 120 N.Y.S.3d 815 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Moreover, where, as here, the determination as to equitable distribution has been made after a nonjury trial, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is afforded great weight on appeal" ( id. at 591, 120 N.Y.S.3d 815 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
"Those factors include: the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the time of commencement of the divorce action; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the loss of inheritance and pension rights; any award of maintenance; any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; and any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" (Taylor v Taylor, 140 A.D.3d 944, 945-946 [2d Dept 2016]; Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]). "While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible" (Kamm v Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591 [2d Dept 2020], quoting Eschemuller v Eschemuller, 167 A.D.3d 983, 985 [2d Dept 2018]).The Court has reviewed all of the enumerated statutory factors in order to effectuate the equitable distribution of the parties' marital estate. Although the statute suggests that a trial court consider all of the factors in making its determination, it does not impose a requirement to engage in a point-by-point analysis of each and every one of them (see Morille-Hinds v Hinds, 87 A.D.3d 526, 527 [2d Dept 2011]).
In making its determination, the Court notes that this is a marriage of moderate duration and finds that the assets should be distributed as equally as possible. See Kamm v. Kamm, 2020 NY Slip Op 02465 (2d Dept. 2020); See Achuthan v. Achuthan, 117 N.Y.S.3d 667 (2d Dept. 2020). Although mindful that it will result in the loss of most, if not all of his liquid assets, Husband does not contest a 50/50 distribution.
"The trial court is vested with broad discretion in making an equitable distribution of marital property and unless it can be shown that the court improvidently exercised that discretion, its determination should not be disturbed" (Kamm v Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "Moreover, where, as here, the determination as to equitable distribution has been made after a nonjury trial, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is afforded great weight on appeal" (Tzu Ching Kao v Bonalle, 214 A.D.3d 922, 924).
"Those factors include: the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the time of commencement of the divorce action; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the loss of inheritance and pension rights; any award of maintenance; any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; and any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" (Taylor v Taylor, 140 A.D.3d at 945-946; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d]). "While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible" (Kamm v Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591, quoting Eschemuller v Eschemuller, 167 A.D.3d at 984-985).
case and the consideration of a number of statutory factors" ( Culen v. Culen, 157 A.D.3d at 929, 69 N.Y.S.3d 702 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d] ). "Those factors include: the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the time of commencement of the divorce action; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the loss of inheritance and pension rights; any award of maintenance; any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; and any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" ( Taylor v. Taylor, 140 A.D.3d at 945–946, 34 N.Y.S.3d 127 ; see Domestic Relations Law § 236[B][5][d] ). "While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible" ( Kamm v. Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591, 120 N.Y.S.3d 815, quoting Eschemuller v. Eschemuller, 167 A.D.3d at 984–985, 91 N.Y.S.3d 178 ). The Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in determining that an equal distribution of the defendant's interest in the Agency and JAVE was appropriate (seeKaufman v. Kaufman, 189 A.D.3d at 56, 133 N.Y.S.3d 54 ; Santamaria v. Santamaria, 177 A.D.3d at 804, 112 N.Y.S.3d 751 ; Eschemuller v. Eschemuller, 167 A.D.3d at 984, 91 N.Y.S.3d 178 ).
Moreover, where, as here, "a determination as to equitable distribution has been made after a nonjury trial, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the proffered items of evidence is afforded great weight on appeal" (Kaufman v Kaufman, 189 AD3d 31, 56; see Sufia v Khalique, 189 AD3d 1499, 1500). "While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible" (Kamm v Kamm, 182 AD3d 590, 591 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
"While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible" (Kamm v Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
"Those factors include: the income and property of each party at the time of marriage and at the time of commencement of the divorce action; the duration of the marriage; the age and health of the parties; the loss of inheritance and pension rights; any award of maintenance; any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution made to the acquisition of marital property by the party not having title; and any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and proper" (Taylor v Taylor, 140 A.D.3d 944, 945-946 [2d Dept. 2016]; see DRL § 236[B][5][d]). "'While equitable distribution does not necessarily mean equal distribution, when both spouses have made significant contributions to a marriage of long duration, the division of marital property should be as equal as possible'" (Kamm v Kamm, 182 A.D.3d 590, 591 [2d Dept. 2020], quoting Eschemuller v Eschemuller, 167 A.D.3d 983, 985 [2d Dept. 2018]).