Kaminski v. Taylor

Full title: MARIAN KAMINSKI v. ANN TAYLOR LOFT and UNEMPLOYEMENT INSURANCE APPEALS…

Court: Superior Court of Delaware

Date published: Oct 27, 2000

C.A. No: 00A-05-008 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2000)

Opinion

C.A. No: 00A-05-008

Decided: October 27, 2000

Carol Kendrick, representative for Ann Taylor Loft, and UIAB.

T. HENELY GRAVES

Dear Ms. Kaminski, Representative for Ann Taylor Loft, and UIAB:

This case presents an appeal of a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("Board") that denied unemployment benefits to Marian Kaminski ("Claimant") because it found that she voluntarily quit her position as an assistant manager at Ann Taylor Loft ("Respondent"). For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On December 21, 1999, Claimant applied to the Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment Insurance for unemployment compensation. The claims deputy allowed her claim, finding that Claimant was constructively discharged without just cause. Subsequently, a hearing was held before the appeals referee who reversed the decision of the claims deputy The referee's findings were as follows.

Findings of Fact This tribunal finds that when the claimant was hired, she was in a 90-day probationary period. On October 27, she was given a 30-day review. There were several areas where the claimant was below standards. The claimant and the employer representative discussed ways of improvement. The claimant needed to show some improvement before the 60-day review. Between the 30 and 60-day reviews, the employer representative took notes on problems that were still occurring. However, she said nothing to the claimant about these problems.

The 60-day review was held on December 13. The employer representative informed the claimant that she had improved in some areas, however there were still problems with other areas and it was a below standard review. The claimant became upset and started crying during this conversation. The employer representative told the claimant that they could set up an action plan and objectives for her to work on in the next 30 days. The claimant did not hear this because she was so upset. The claimant said that she could not do it. The employer representative asked her if she was resigning. She said that if she were, they would work with her through Christmas so that there would be no period of unemployment. The claimant said that she could not do it. She put her keys on the desk and left the store. The employer representative did not intend to discharge the claimant at this meeting, nor does she have the authority to discharge and employee. All of that is handled by the corporate office.

The referee concluded that "the employer representative did not tell the claimant that she was discharged, nor does she have the authority to discharge any employee," and ruled that Claimant "left her work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work" and thus was ineligible to receive benefits. Claimant appealed the referee's decision to the Board. After a hearing which included personal testimony from Claimant and Ann Taylor's representative, Kim Olsen ("Olsen"), Claimant's direct supervisor, the Board adopted the referee's findings of fact and affirmed the referee's decision.

Claimant appealed the findings of the Board to this Court arguing that the Board should not have credited Olsen's account of events. Claimant also provided this Court with new evidence, a letter from Allanora Thompson which extolls Claimant's virtues in the area of retail customer service. The Court may not consider new evidence when reviewing an appeal from the Board, however, and must base its decision solely on the evidence that existed in the record at the time of the Board's decision. 19 Del. C. § 3323. Respondent did not file a brief in answer to Claimant's appeal, declined to present any further evidence, and asked the Court to resolve this matter solely on the record below. Pursuant to Superior Court Rule 107(E), this Court has opted to decide the issue based on the pleadings filed.

SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE

Claimant was employed by Respondent as an assistant manager from September 20, 1999, until December 13, 1999. She worked full-time and earned a yearly salary of $28,000. Respondent has a policy that requires all newly hired employees to be evaluated after thirty, sixty and ninety days of employment to review performance expectations and to provide suggestions for improvement.¹ Olsen testified that the first two weeks of Claimant's employment were spent working with the training manual and learning various policies and procedures that were necessary for her to master in order to effectively perform her job as an assistant manager.

1 Ann Taylor Practices and Procedures Guide" reads as follows:

The first 90 days of training are considered to be a Probationary Period. This period is essential for the training, observation, and preliminary performance evaluation of new associates. During this time, your supervisor will review performance expectations with you and coach you as necessary for successful performance. It is the associate's responsibility to comply with Ann Taylor practices and procedures, and to perform assigned job duties.

At Claimant's thirty-day review Olsen informed her that there were several areas where her work performance fell below Respondent's standards. Claimant testified that she agreed with Olsen's assessment and the two agreed that Claimant would strive to improve these areas before her sixty-day review. Claimant's sixty-day review was held on December 14, 1999. Claimant's and Olsen's accounts of the events of the sixty-day review materially differ, and were the source of a factual dispute that the Board had to resolve in order to determine whether Claimant was eligible for unemployment compensation.

Olsen testified for Respondent as follows. When Claimant came into the office for her sixty-day review, Olsen told her that there were still problems with her ability to take initiative, to prioritize projects, and to effectively manage the associates. Claimant was informed that the review was below standard and that Olsen had not seen the improvement that was expected of Claimant after the thirty-day review. Olsen then went into detail with Claimant telling her that an "action plan" would be put into place. Three objectives would be defined, and Claimant's progress toward achieving them would be monitored on a daily and weekly basis. Claimant's response was, "I can't do that." Olsen was very surprised and asked her what she meant by that comment, if she was saying that she chose to resign. Olsen told Claimant that if she chose to resign, Respondent would work with her so that there would be no time of unemployment before the holidays. Claimant repeated that she could not do that and said she was just going to leave. At this point, Claimant put her management keys on the desk, walked out of the office, and out of the store. Claimant never returned to work.

Olsen testified that it was never her intention that Claimant's sixty-day review would result in the termination or resignation of Claimant. She drew up the action plan for Claimant with the goal of improving Claimant's performance so that it would be up to Respondent's standards before Claimant's ninety-day review. Olsen was flabbergasted when Claimant walked out before the sixty-day review was concluded.

Claimant's version of events differs from Olsen's. She testified before the Board as follows. Claimant went into the office to go over her sixty-day review with Olsen. Upon entering the office, Claimant was informed that her performance was still below Respondent's standards in several areas and that she was being offered the opportunity to resign. If she chose not to resign, Claimant was told that she would retain her employment for approximately two weeks, until the paperwork necessary for her termination was processed by Respondent's corporate office. At this point, Claimant became very upset and began to cry. She asked for a day to think about her decision, but was told that an answer had to be given immediately. Claimant was devastated and decided to hand in her keys immediately rather than work in an environment where she felt she was no longer welcome. When asked if Olsen had presented her with an action plan which listed improvement goals that would have to be achieved by Claimant by the ninety-day review, Claimant responded, "When she, yes, when we sat down to review she was starting to go over something and I don't honestly remember because I was very emotional." (Transcript p. 10). In any event, Claimant asserts that the option of quit-or| be-fired was presented to her before the action plan was mentioned.

DISCUSSION

I. Was there substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Claimant voluntarily resigned her position?

The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decisions. Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 6-7 (1965); General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Super., 517 A.2d 295, 297(1986), app. dism., Del. Supr., 515 A.2d 397 (1986). The appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, 213 A.2d at 66. It merely determines if the evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 19 Del. C. § 3323(a).

In this case, whether or not Claimant voluntarily quit is a critical factual finding to the Board's determination of Claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation. If the Board had determined that Claimant was given only the option of resigning or facing imminent termination, Claimant would be entitled to compensation as Delaware courts have held this situation to represent a constructive discharge by the employer. Anchor Motor Freight. Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del. Super., 325 A.2d 374 (1974). However, the Board did not so find. Instead, it chose to credit the testimony of Olsen. The Board found that Claimant was not offered this option, but was encouraged to stay on with more intense supervision under the action plan.

This Court finds that the Board did rely on substantial evidence when it determined that Claimant voluntarily resigned her position. Olsen stated that it was not her intention to terminate Claimant's employment at the sixty-day review. She did not have the authority to do so without approval from the corporate office. Also, the Board could have reasoned that Olsen would not have taken the time to create an "action plan" designed to improve Claimant's performance if she intended to discharge Claimant. The Board found that Claimant was too upset at this point to understand that Olsen had offered her a means for keeping her employment. Claimant testified that Olsen "might have gone over an action plan. I'll be quite honest with you; I don't know because I was very upset at this point." (Transcript, p. 23). "[T]he credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are for the Board to determine." Coleman v. Department of Labor, Del. Super., 288 A.2d 285, 287 (1972). The Board had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses firsthand, and to accept either Olsen's version of events or Claimant's version of events as more credible. The Board's finding that Olsen's account was more credible is supported by the record..

II. Did the Board err as a matter of law by determining that Claimant was not entitled to unemployment compensation when it found that she voluntarily quit her position with Respondent?

19 Del. C. § 3315(1) states that an individual will be disqualified for benefits "for the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work....". When a claimant voluntarily quits her employment, the burden falls to her to establish that she left for good cause and thus is eligible for unemployment compensation. White v. Security Link, Del. Super., 658 A.2d 619 (1994). "Good cause for quitting a job must be such cause as would justify one in voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed." O'Neal's Bus Serv.. Inc. v. Employment Sec. Comm'n, Del. Super., 269 A.2d 247, 249 (1970).

In this case, Claimant became very upset about her poor review and simply walked out of the store. She said that she felt she was in a very hostile environment, that she was not wanted there and she was not appreciated. (Transcript, p. 23) Good cause to quit does not exist merely because the employee faces an undesirable situation connected with her employment. O'Neal's at 249. In order for an employee to demonstrate that her resignation was for just cause, she first must show the exhaustion of her administrative remedies. Id Here Claimant did not try to discuss the review with Olsen, and in fact, did not even wait until the review had concluded before she handed over her keys. Claimant made no attempt to rectify the situation she perceived as hostile before giving up her position with Respondent. The Court finds that the Board's decision was supported by the record.

CONCLUSION

This Court finds that the Board was acting within the bounds of its discretionary authority when it credited Olsen's version of events over Claimant's as the basis for its conclusions. Determinations of credibility are reserved as a function of the Board, and the reviewing court will defer to its findings absent fraud or mistake of law. Because the Board relied upon substantial evidence in making its decision that Claimant voluntarily quit her position with Respondent, and made no errors of law in reaching that decision, the Court affirms the decision of the Board.

IT IS SO ORDERED.