Opinion
19324
November 30, 1971.
John T. Walker, Esq., of Georgetown, for Plaintiff-Appellant, cites: As to the "Special Fund Doctrine" not applying to the Bonds, proposed to be issued pursuant to Act No. 1406 of 1970 to nullify the requirements of a petition, election and debt limit imposed by Article II, Section 13 and Article VII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution: 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153; 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; 107 S.C. 230, 92 S.E. 477; 123 S.C. 334, 116 S.E. 277; 133 S.C. 189, 130 S.E. 876; 132 S.C. 128 S.E. 712; 185 S.C. 324; 194 S.E. 151; 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 3. As to Act No. 1406 of 1970 violating Article VIII, Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution as an attempt to give to the City of Georgetown powers not given to all other municipal corporations of the same class: 109 S.C. 1, 95 S.E. 121; 239 S.C. 109, 121 S.E.2d 910; 186 S.C. 290, 195 S.E. 539; 114 S.C. 116, 103 S.E. 82; 105 S.C. 180, 89 S.E. 669; 236 S.C. 173, 113 S.E.2d 534. As to Act No. 1406 of 1970 being a special law where a general law can be made applicable and therefore in violation of Article III, Section 34, Subsection 9 of the South Carolina Constitution: 216 S.C. 387, 58 S.E.2d 331; 160 S.C. 150, 158 S.E. 233; Municipal Bond Act (Section 47-831 to 47-860, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962 as amended).
Messrs. Hubbard McDonald, Asst. Atty Gen. of Columbia, Patrick J. Doyle of Georgetown, and Thomas A. Hutcheson, of Sinkler Gibbs Simons and Guerard, Charleston, for Defendants-Respondents, cite: As to the "Special Fund Doctrine" applying to the Bonds proposed to be issued pursuant to Act No. 1406 of 1970 not nullifying the requirements of a petition, election and debt limit imposed by Article II, Section 13 and Article VIII, Section 7 of the South Carolina Constitution: 133 S.C. 189, 133 S.E. 340; 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421; 132 S.C. 314, 128 S.E. 712; 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153; 163 S.C. 242, 161 S.E. 454; 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355; 185 S.C. 324, 194 S.E. 151; 219 S.C. 485, 66 S.E.2d 3; Article II, Section 13 and Article VIII, Section 7 of S.C. Constitution. As to Act No. 1406 of 1970 not violating Article VIII Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution As an attempt to give to the City of Georgetown Powers not given to all other municipal corporations of the same class: 107 S.C. 230, 92 S.E. 477; 123 S.E. 334, 116 S.E. 277. As to Act No. 1406 of 1970 not being a special law where a general law can be made applicable in violation of Article III, Section 34, Subsection 9 of the South Carolina Constitution: 223 S.C. 252, 75 S.E.2d 361; 103 S.C. 10, 87 S.E. 421.
November 30, 1971.
This action for declaratory judgment questions the constitutionality of an Act of the General Assembly approved May 22, 1970, authorizing the City of Georgetown to issue $300,000.00 in general obligation bonds for the construction of a combination police station and fire house. The Act undertakes to authorize the issuance of these bonds without the election required by Article VIII, Section 7 of the Constitution of South Carolina, by requiring the pledge of "revenues to be derived from business licenses to the extent reasonably sufficient to pay such obligations without resorting to the levy of a property tax." Relying upon Briggs v. Greenville County, 137 S.C. 288, 135 S.E. 153 (1926), the authorities therein cited and more recent decisions of this court, e.g., Mims v. McNair, 252 S.C. 64, 165 S.E.2d 355 (1969), the circuit court sustained the validity of the Act by application of what has come to be known in the field of public finance in this State as the special fund doctrine.
We reverse on the authority of Robinson v. White, S.C. 182 S.E.2d 744 (1971), in which, on similar facts, a divided court held this doctrine to be inapplicable to municipal bonds to be paid in substantial part from the pledge of revenues derived from business licenses, which, as here, were unrelated to the public improvement for which the bonds were authorized. It should be noted that the circuit decree in this case was issued several months before the decision in Robinson.
Reversed.