Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen

12 Citing cases

  1. Chittim, Hejde v. Bell Fourche Co.

    60 Wyo. 235 (Wyo. 1944)   Cited 18 times
    In Chittim v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Co., 60 Wyo. 235, 149 P.2d 142 (1944), this Court quoted with approval two definitions of a "mineral" in arriving at the conclusion that bentonite is a mineral.

    Sherlock v. Leighton, 9 Wyo. 303. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held time and again that the findings of the trial Court must stand where supported by substantial evidence, Peterson v. Johnson, 46 Wyo. 473, Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116, and other Wyoming cases cited therein. POINTS OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT

  2. Berg v. Hayward

    133 P.2d 503 (Wyo. 1943)   Cited 2 times

    Fieldhouse v. Leisberg, 15 Wyo. 207. If the finding be supported by substantial evidence it will be sustained. Peoples Finance v. DeBerry, 62 P.2d 307; Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116. The general rule is that a finding unsupported by evidence will be vacated on appeal. Stringfellow v. Botterill Auto Co. (Utah) 221 P. 861; Peters v. Taylor (Ariz.) 251 P. 446; Mahaffey v. McNicoll (Ida.) 244 P. 401; Watkins Co. v. Waldo (Kan.) 230 P. 1051.

  3. Cundick v. Broadbent

    383 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967)   Cited 9 times
    Recognizing “different degrees of mental competency” when addressing whether a contract could be voided for lack of capacity

    * * * A condition which may be described by a physician as senile dementia may not be insanity in a legal sense." Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605, 607. Weakmindedness is, however, highly relevant in determining whether the deficient party was overreached and defrauded.

  4. Street v. Street

    2009 WY 85 (Wyo. 2009)   Cited 11 times

    * * * A condition which may be described by a physician as senile dementia may not be insanity in a legal sense." Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605, 607 [(1937)].Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 948, 88 S.Ct. 1037, 19 L.Ed.2d 1139 (1968).

  5. Barber v. State Highway Commission

    80 Wyo. 340 (Wyo. 1959)   Cited 42 times

    The criterion is the substantiality of the evidence to support the court's decision. Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605; Peterson v. Johnson, 46 Wyo. 473, 28 P.2d 487, 91 A.L.R. 723. In the present case, the matter in issue is the value of the land actually taken and the damages to other portions of defendants' property not actually taken but injuriously affected.

  6. Hanks v. McNeil Corp.

    114 Colo. 578 (Colo. 1946)   Cited 17 times
    In Danks v. McNeil Corporation, 114 Colo. 578, 168 P.2d 256, it was said: "Hence it is a general rule that if a party enters into a contract or any other legal transaction with sufficient mental capacity to understand it, and not under the influence of fraud, coercion, or imposition, the courts will not relieve him of the consequences of his act on the sole ground that the bargain is, as to him, improvident, rash, foolish, or oppressive."

    Clearly manifested symptoms of senile dementia before a will was made, continuing until the extreme degree of dementia was reached a few months later, is held not conclusive of incapacity to make a will. Wisner v. Chandler, 95 Kan. 36, 147 Pac. 849; Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605; nor are senile dementia and improvident expenditures conclusive of lack of capacity to contract. Gosnell v. Lloyd, 215 Cal. 244, 10 P.2d 45.

  7. Laverents v. Gattis

    150 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1944)   Cited 3 times

    * * * A party about to consummate a contract by which he parts from property cannot, when the opportunity is before him, and there is nothing in the situation of the parties to prevent investigation, decline to prosecute a reasonably diligent inquiry, refuse to exercise his own judgment, and then be heard to complain of an imposition or fraud practiced on him. First National Bank v. Swan, 3 Wyo. 356; Baird v. Eflow Inv. Co., et al., 76 Utah 232, 289 P. 112. Where evidence is conflicting and there is substantial evidence supporting trial court's finding and judgment the Supreme Court will not substitute its own conclusions on appeal. Swanson v. Johnson, 58 Wyo. 1; Huber v. State Bank, et al. 32 Wyo. 357; Brown v. Citizens Nat'l. Bank, 38 Wyo. 469; Kaleb et al v. Modern Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116; Wilde v. Amoretti Lodge Co., 47 Wyo. 505. There must be substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is evidence that is reasonable and consistent with the circumstances and probabilities in the case as to raise a fair presumption of its truth when weighed against the opposing evidence.

  8. Long v. Forbes

    58 Wyo. 533 (Wyo. 1943)   Cited 28 times

    This court has held in numerous cases that, on appeal, the criterion in determining sufficiency of evidence is whether the decision below is supported by substantial evidence. Kaleb et al. v. Modern Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116; Peterson v. Johnson, 46 Wyo. 473. In this case the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proof, has merely his own statement and his testimony is impeached, and, as against this, we have the unimpeached testimony of the defendant and, of course, facts and circumstances shown by the evidence.

  9. Morgan v. Thompson

    127 P.2d 1037 (N.M. 1942)   Cited 9 times

    Standing alone his mental weakness is not sufficient to authorize the cancellation of his deed. Ravany et al. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 26 N.M. 514, 515, 194 P. 873; Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of America, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605; In re Nightingale's Estate, 182 S.C. 527, 189 S.E. 890; Fleming v. Consolidated Motor Sales Co., 74 Mont. 245, 240 P. 376; Hayward v. Passaic Nat'l Bank Trust Co., 120 N.J. Eq. 512, 186 A. 728; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 133. We think the finding of the court to the effect that because of ill health, senility and worry the appellee was mentally incompetent to make a contract, is unsupported by substantial testimony and should be set aside.

  10. Page v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.

    12 Wn. 2d 101 (Wash. 1942)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that a beneficiary – the wife of the deceased – was estopped from rescinding the surrender of an insurance policy where she "inferentially, if not actually, indicated [to the insurance company] that her husband was competent to manage any matter concerning the insurance"

    Moreover, that he exercised poor business judgment, likewise, cannot be contradicted. Yet even though these are conceded, they do not spell mental incapacity to contract. Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen, 51 Wyo. 116, 64 P.2d 605. Furthermore, the incidents relative to the sale of the car and the installation of the furnace are very far removed in point of time from the surrender of the policies.