Opinion
28917/94.
August 31, 2010.
It is ordered that the motions are decided as follows:
In motion Sequence No. 02, non-party State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") moves, pursuant to CPLR § 2221(d), for re-argument and reconsideration of the February 22, 2010 Order of the Honorable Joseph P. Spinola granting the motion of plaintiffs to accelerate and immediately collect a present lump sum payment in lieu of a future structured settlement payment. In motion Sequence No. 03, non-party State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") moves, pursuant to CPLR § 2201, for a Stay of the Order entered by the Honorable Denise L. Sher on April 9, 2010, entered by the Clerk of Nassau County on April 23, 2010 and submitted on notice dated May 5, 2010. No opposition was submitted by any parties to either of the motions.
In Motion Sequence No. 02, State Farm argues that the Court should permit re-argument and should reconsider and vacate the February 22, 2010 Order of the Honorable Joseph P. Spinola because said decision is erroneous as a matter of law. State Farm states that the Order "violates the express terms of the governing contracts; constitutes an improper collateral attack on the April 7, 1997 Order approving the settlement agreement; substantially and materially changes the underlying contracts to State Farm's detriment; permits Mr. Kalatizadeh to restructure an annuity contract that he does not own; and will potentially expose State Farm to a 40% excise tax because such an acceleration of the future payments fails to comply with Section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code and the New York Structured Settlement Protection Act, NY Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1701 et seq."
State Farm submits that the April 3, 1997 Settlement Agreement entered into between Mavash Kalatizadeh, as mother and natural guardian of Navid Kalatizadeh, and the insureds of State Farm, as the resolution of a personal injury claim, states that "Claimant ( i.e., Mr. Kalatizadeh) shall have no right to accelerate, defer or otherwise modify the amount or timing of the said payments." The Settlement Agreement was approved pursuant to an Order entered on April 7, 1997 which states, "the sum as aforestated pursuant to the proposed settlement agreement and release, shall be payable directly to the infant plaintiff at the time and in the amount stated." Said Order also provided that Navid Kalatizadeh "shall not have rights or incidents of ownership in the aforesaid annuity policy."
A motion to reargue must be made upon the basis that the court overlooked or misapprehended the facts or law in arriving at the underlying decision. See CPLR § 2221(d)(2). State Farm contends that the Court misapprehended the law when granting plaintiffs' motion to accelerate and immediately collect a lump sum payment in lieu of the future payment. State Farm argues that the February 22, 2010 Order of the Honorable Joseph P. Spinola violates the express terms of the governing contracts, that the acceleration ordered constitutes an improper collateral attack on the April 7, 1997 Order, that the acceleration would materially change the underlying contracts to State Farm's detriment, that the Order permits Navid Kalatizadeh to restructure an annuity that he does not own and the Order fails to comply with Section 5891 of the Internal Revenue Code and NY Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-1701 et seq. Based upon these arguments, the Court grants State Farm's motion to the extent that it seeks re-argument.
Upon re-argument, State Farm's motion (Motion Seq. No. 02) is granted and the Court hereby vacates the February 22, 2010 Order of the Honorable Joseph P. Spinola as said Order was erroneous as a matter of law.
State Farm's motion (Motion Seq. No. 03) for a Stay of the Order entered by the Honorable Denise L. Sher on April 9, 2010, entered by the Clerk of Nassau County on April 23, 2010 and submitted on notice dated May 5, 2010 is hereby made moot by the Decision and Order of this Court in Motion Sequence No. 02. Additionally, the Court notes that plaintiffs had consented to the requested stay and, on April 23, 2010, entered into Stipulation to Stay Order.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of this Court.