Opinion
Civil No. 00-6133-HA
March 7, 2001
Attorney for Plaintiff :
Kathryn Tassinari, Cram, Harder, Wells Baron, P.C., Eugene, Oregon
Attorneys for Defendant :
Kristine Olson, United States Attorney District of Oregon, William W. Youngman, Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, Oregon
Dominique L. Jinhong, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Seattle, Washington
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Charles Kalamas seeks judicial review of a final decision from the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying his claim for disability insurance benefits. The district court has jurisdiction to review a final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). After a thorough review of the record, and for the reasons that follow, the court remands this matter to the Commissioner for calculation of plaintiff's benefits.
I. Administrative and Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on October 3, 1996. Tr. 94-96, 104-111. He alleged he was disabled by lower back pain, chest pain, fatigue, and depression commencing on June 1, 1996. Tr. 94-95, 104. The Social Security Administration denied his claim initially (Tr. 71-74) and upon reconsideration. Tr. 77-79. Plaintiff made a timely request for a hearing (Tr. 80) and appeared before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on June 17, 1998. Tr. 39.
The administrative decision recites the initial application date as October 3, 1997 (Tr. 13) and this error is repeated in Defendant's Memorandum. A close reading of the record reveals that plaintiff dated his application and Disability Report October 3, 1996. (Tr. 94-96, 104-111)
The ALJ issued her decision on August 27, 1998 finding plaintiff retained the functional capacity to perform the requirements of his past work as a bookstore clerk. Tr. 20, 21. Accordingly, the ALJ denied his claim for disability insurance benefits. Tr. 22. Plaintiff made a timely request for review, and the Appeals Council denied that request on March 10, 2000. Tr. 5-6. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner under 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. See Russell v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision.
II. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born December 6, 1939. Tr. 94. He has a high school education with additional junior college courses and military vocational training. Tr. 14, 41, 108. He served as a merchant marine in the Coast Guard for over 22 years. Tr. 41. After retiring from the Coast Guard, plaintiff had many temporary jobs including kitchen coordinator, winery worker, forklift operator, warehouse manager, bookstore clerk, laborer, driver, tree trimmer, photo engraver, and painter. Tr. 43, 135-178. Plaintiff worked for one week as a kitchen coordinator in July, 1996. Tr. 41, 135. Other than that job, he has not worked since the alleged onset of his disability on June 1, 1996.
The medical records reflect that plaintiff has suffered from a back condition for a number of years. Tr. 14-19, 493-499, 543-546, 637-639. Plaintiff suffered an injury sometime before April 1979 that resulted in nerve root compression due to a ruptured spinal disc. Tr. 494, 637.
On April 19, 1979, he underwent surgery for a laminectomy with removal of the ruptured disc. Tr. 637. He was diagnosed with back pain in August 1996. Tr. 360. On April 22, 1997, Carrie Ware, M.D., observed that plaintiff had chronic low back pain that prevented bending or lifting. based on nerve conduction velocity studies, she concluded the back pain probably resulted from "S1 radiculopathy," and she recommended a finding of complete disability. Tr. 301. On May 27, 1997, plaintiff had an abnormal nerve conduction study that revealed absent left tibial H reflex consistent with S1 radiculopathy. Tr. 296. In July 1997, Dr. Ware obtained a radiology report that showed mild degenerative disc disease at L2-3, L3-4, L4-5 and moderate degenerative disc disease at L5-S1, with a posterior disc protrusion causing nerve root compression. Tr. 392, 580.
Plaintiff has also suffered from a heart condition for several years. He was diagnosed with angina in August 1996. Tr. 360. In September and October 1996, plaintiff saw Dr. Ware for chest pain, hypertension, numbness in his toes, and back pain. Dr. Ware diagnosed plaintiff with probable coronary artery disease and peripheral neuropathy. Tr. 16, 350-51. On October 15, 1996, plaintiff performed a treadmill stress test that had to be terminated because of fatigue, dyspnea and leg pain. Tr. 413. The test showed abnormalities consistent with infarction in the inferior wall. Tr. 414. In January 1997, plaintiff underwent a triple coronary bypass operation. Tr. 637. In December 1997, plaintiff reported dyspnea with exertion and swelling in his feet and ankles to Allen Doyle, M.D. Dr. Doyle diagnosed plaintiff with coronary artery disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and tobacco dependency. Tr. 546. In February, 1998, plaintiff was hospitalized with chest pain and diagnosed with a subendocardial myocardial infarction. Tr. 434-35, 614, 627-28. In March 1998, Rebecca Harrison, M.D., diagnosed plaintiff as having coronary artery disease with subendocardial myocardial infarction and hyperglycemia. At that time, plaintiff underwent a cardiac catheterization procedure and an endocardiogram. Tr. 621-22.
In addition to his back and heart conditions, plaintiff has suffered from mild mental illness. In August 1996, a physician diagnosed plaintiff with a major depressive disorder, a status post substance abuse disorder, and a mood disorder that was possibly substance induced. Tr. 360. In November 1997, Karen Inaba, P.M.H.N.P., performed a psychiatric evaluation and diagnosed plaintiff as having an adjustment disorder with depressed mood and an alcohol and cannabis dependence disorder. Tr. 636.
Plaintiff's hearing before the ALJ was conducted on June 17, 1998. Plaintiff testified that since his bypass surgery in January 1997, he has suffered from fatigue that requires him to lie down to rest every afternoon. Tr. 49-50. He has help doing household chores such as cooking, laundry, dishwashing and shopping. He sometimes does these things himself, but must lie down to rest afterwards. Tr. 49. He used to ride a bicycle for up to two hours at a time, but has not been able to since his last hospitalization. Tr. 47-48. He cannot lift a laundry basket weighing more than 20 pounds. Tr. 50. He is unable to sit for more than an hour because of back and neck pain. Tr. 51. He cannot stand comfortably for more than 30 minutes and his ability to walk is limited by back pain, leg pain, toe numbness and swelling in his ankles and feet. Tr. 51-52. He testified he thought he would be able to stand and walk no more than two hours out of an eight hour shift. Tr. 52. He did not believe he could perform tasks like stocking shelves with books because he could not lift or carry enough weight and he would not be able to climb ladders on a regular basis. Tr. 53.
Terry Lesh, Ph.D., a vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. Tr. 54-65. Dr. Lesh testified that plaintiff's past work as a retail bookstore clerk would be rated as light and semi skilled. Id. The ALJ asked hypothetically whether a person could perform the bookstore clerk job if the person were limited to light work and to work conditions without extremes in such environmental factors as heat, cold, humidity and air quality. Dr. Lesh testified that these limitations would not exclude plaintiff's prior work as a retail bookstore clerk. Id. On cross examination, plaintiff's attorney posed additional hypothetical limitations similar to those alleged by plaintiff. Specifically, he asked Dr. Lesh if a person would be able to perform the bookstore job if he were not able to stand for more than two hours in an eight hour shift (Tr. 56-57) or needed to lie down to rest every afternoon. Tr. 60. Dr. Lesh testified that either of these additional limitations would preclude performance of the retail bookstore clerk job. Id.
Finally, Dr. Lesh testified that a person with plaintiff's education and experience, if limited to no more than sedentary or light work with a sit/stand option, would not be able to perform plaintiff's past work as a retail bookstore clerk. Tr. 64.
The ALJ issued her opinion on August 27, 1998, denying plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits. Tr. 13-22. Plaintiff made a timely request for review, and the Appeals Council denied that request on March 10, 2000. Tr. 5-6. The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner under 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. Plaintiff now appeals that final decision.
III. Standards
A. Statutory definition of "Disability"
Title II of the Social Security Act (the Act) provides for payment of disability insurance benefits to people who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1).
A claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act if he or she is unable "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A person can be "disabled" for these purposes only if his or her impairment is "of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
B. Regulatory definition of "Disability"
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a person is eligible for disability insurance benefits because he or she is disabled within the meaning of the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999). First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in "substantial gainful activity." This is work activity performed for profit that involves significant mental or physical activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. If the claimant is presently working in a substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. If the claimant is not presently working, the Commissioner cannot resolve the case at this stage of the evaluation and must proceed to step two. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b).
Second, the Commissioner determines whether claimant's impairment or combination of impairments is severe. An impairment is severe if it significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant's impairment is not severe, he is not disabled for the purposes of the Act. If the impairment is severe, the Commissioner proceeds to the third step in the evaluation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c).
Third, the Commissioner determines whether the impairment "meets or equals" one of a number of specific impairments listed in the SSA regulations at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app.1. If the impairment meets or equals one listed in that Appendix, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. If it does not, the Commissioner's evaluation must continue to step four. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d).
Under step four, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is able to perform any work he or she has performed in the past. If so, the claimant is not disabled for the purposes of the Act. If the claimant shows he or she cannot do work performed in the past, the Commissioner must proceed to the final step. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e).
Fifth, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is able to do any other work. If it is determined that the claimant is able to do other work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1099. The Commissioner may satisfy this burden through the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt 404, subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden, the claimant is "not disabled" within the meaning of the Act and not entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner cannot meet this burden, the claimant is "disabled" and must prevail on his claim. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(f)(1); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d at 1099.
C. Burden of proof
The claimant bears the initial burden of establishing his disability. Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 881 (1996). In the five-step framework used by the Commissioner, the claimant has the burden of proof as to steps one to four. As to step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that claimant can perform given his impairment and his age, education and work experience. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098. The Commissioner has an affirmative duty to develop the record. 20 C.F.R. § 1512(d); DeLorme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). To that extent, the Commissioner shares the burden of proof at all stages. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098 n. 3.
D. Standard of Review
The district court must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is based on proper legal standards and the findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039; Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). The court must weigh all of the evidence, whether it supports or detracts from the Commissioner's decision. Andrews at 1039;Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d at 1200. The Commissioner's decision must be upheld, however, even if the "evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. Even if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in weighing the evidence and in making the decision. Gonzalez, 914 F.2d at 1200.
IV. Discussion
A. ALJ's Findings and Plaintiff's Objections
The ALJ applied the sequential evaluation described in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the disability onset date of June 1, 1996. Tr. 14. Second, the ALJ found that plaintiff has an impairment or combination of impairments that is severe. The ALJ found medical evidence establishing coronary disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, degenerative disc disease with low back pain and drug and alcohol dependence, all severe impairments. Tr. 14-15. The ALJ also found evidence establishing non-severe depression. Tr. 15.
The ALJ found plaintiff's substance dependence disorders were not contributing factors material to her decision. (Tr. 20, 22)
At the third step, the ALJ found no impairment or combination of impairments that equaled the severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Regulations. Tr. 15, 21.
There is no dispute regarding the ALJ's findings in steps one through three.
In the fourth step of the evaluation, the ALJ found plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to return to the work he performed in the past as a retail bookstore clerk. Tr. 14, 21. Based on this finding, the ALJ found it unnecessary to proceed to the final step of the evaluation. In reaching her conclusion, the ALJ rejected plaintiff's testimony regarding his limitations as "not entirely credible in light of the claimant's own description of his activities and life style, and the medical record." Tr. 19.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by (1) failing to give clear and convincing reasons for rejecting his testimony regarding his limitations, and (2) finding that he retains the residual functional capacity to perform his past work as a bookstore clerk. This court agrees.
B. Analysis
Dr. Lesh testified that a person with the limitations alleged by plaintiff would not be capable of performing plaintiff's former work. Accordingly, the ALJ could not have reached her conclusion without rejecting plaintiff's testimony describing his symptoms and limitations.
In evaluating a claimant's testimony regarding subjective symptoms, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has produced objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the symptoms alleged. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1407-08 (9th Cir. 1986). The threshold test requires only a reasonable inference that the medically shown impairment could cause the subjective symptom. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282.
In addition, the claimant need not show that his impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom he has alleged; he need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom. Id; see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1989).
If there is medical evidence that meets this threshold, and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony about his limitations only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial evidence. Regennitter v. Commissioner, 166 F.3d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir. 1999); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995); Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). General findings are insufficient. The ALJ must identify specific testimony that is not credible and offer specific, cogent reasons for disbelieving it. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990); Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 918; Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 846 F.2d 581, 584 (9th Cir. 1988) (Varney I).
This court is satisfied that the record includes objective medical evidence of impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptoms and limitations plaintiff alleges. Such symptoms include back, neck and leg pain rendering him unable to stand/sit for lengthy periods, and fatigue requiring him to lie down and take a rest in the afternoon. The severe impairments found by the ALJ, including coronary disease, obstructive pulmonary disease and degenerative disc disease with low back pain, support this conclusion. Defendant's only contention in this regard is that plaintiff's allegation of chronic leg pain is not supported in the medical record. This contention is rejected. The medical record includes sufficient references to leg pain, knee and ankle pain, toe numbness, peripheral neuropathy, swelling in the ankles and feet, and radicular leg symptoms to reasonably infer that plaintiff suffers from some degree of chronic, though possibly episodic, leg pain.
This court is also satisfied that there is no affirmative evidence of malingering. Although the record indicates plaintiff has a drug and alcohol dependency disorder, the ALJ found this to be immaterial to her decision. Defendant does not construe these dependencies as malingering. No other findings or arguments present the issue of malingering.
Since there was objective medical evidence supporting plaintiff's symptom testimony, and there were no grounds to raise an inference of malingering, the ALJ was required to offer specific, clear and convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiff's testimony about the severity of his symptoms. This she failed to do.
In determining that subjective testimony is not credible, the ALJ may rely on:
(1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as the claimant's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the claimant's daily activities.
Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). The ALJ should apply these factors in setting forth the reasons for discrediting a claimant's testimony, but the Ninth Circuit requires the ALJ to "state specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.
Here, the ALJ offered three specific reasons for discrediting plaintiff's testimony. First, she cited plaintiff's description of his work as a kitchen coordinator at the Oregon Country Fair for one week in July 1996. While his description does not include the specific physical requirements of that job, this court accepts the ALJ's finding that a person with the limitations alleged by plaintiff could not perform the work he did in that position. However, as defendant concedes, this brief work experience — and plaintiff's description of it — fails to undermine his credibility. Plaintiff performed this work shortly after the alleged onset date of his disability.
The week of work preceded much of the medical history in the record, including at least two hospitalizations resulting from heart attacks. Additionally, the work was of such short duration that it is not probative of his ability to perform at any level on a sustained basis. Accordingly, while this evidence diminishes plaintiff's credibility to some degree, it does not, by itself, reach the level of clear and convincing evidence required.
Second, the ALJ cited a notation written, presumably by plaintiff, on his disability report which states "I haven't been able to find a job." Tr. 104. The ALJ took this as an admission that plaintiff had been job hunting and evidence that he felt himself capable of working. This court is unable to read as much into the quoted notation. The reference to being out of work is ambiguous, and says nothing about whether plaintiff was actually seeking work, and if so, whether he was capable of performing tasks sufficiently to preclude his entitlement to disability benefits. At best, the notation indicates that plaintiff was unsuccessful in seeking means of support. The reasons for his lack of success could be that he was, and is, disabled. The ALJ could have pursued the significance, if any, of the note by posing appropriate questions at the hearing. By itself, however, the note fails to diminish plaintiff's credibility.
Third, the ALJ cited notes written by a clinical pharmacy specialist at the Veterans Administration describing a smoking cessation assessment interview conducted on February 23, 1998. The notes contained the phrase "will keep himself busy with work/go outside for fresh air/walk dog/spend time with friends that will try to help him quit smoking." Tr. 610. The ALJ cited the quoted notation as evidence that plaintiff "can perform many work type activities." Tr. 20. This court concludes that the ALJ's finding is unsupported.
A notation of this kind is a paraphrasing of what transpired in an interview. The reference to "staying busy with work" may have been the interviewer's shorthand means of recording a variety of responses from plaintiff. By itself, the notation fails to establish that plaintiff was working, or that his testimony and the supporting medical testimony should be discredited.
Again, the ALJ could have clarified the meaning of this notation at the hearing, but chose not to. Without further clarification, the notation is not useful as evidence in this credibility determination.
The ALJ relied also upon a general reference to "claimant's own description of his activities and lifestyle, and the medical record." Tr. 19. Presumably, this general reference incorporates plaintiff's hearing testimony that he cooks and cleans and sometimes does grocery shopping for himself (Tr. 45-46), that he is able go down the stairs to his cellar and lift a laundry basket weighing less than 20 pounds (Tr. 49-50), and that he has a limited ability to ride a bicycle (Tr. 47-48) and walk (Tr. 51). These activities have no bearing on the issue of credibility, however, unless the level of activity is inconsistent with the limitations claimed by plaintiff. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Several courts, including the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have recognized that:
disability claimants should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the face of their limitations. See, e.g., Cohen [v. Secretary of Dept. of Health Human Servs.], 964 F.2d [524], 530-31 [(6th Cir. 1992)](ruling that a claimant should not be penalized for attempting to maintain some sense of normalcy in her life); Cooper v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 557, 561 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that a disability claimant need not "vegetate in a dark room" in order to be deemed eligible for benefits). See also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Many home activities are not easily transferable to. . . the more grueling environment of the workplace, where it might be impossible to periodically rest or take medication").
Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722.
In Fair, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a claimant's allegations may be discredited when the claimant is able to spend a substantial part of the day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting. Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. After fully and fairly considering all the evidence regarding the aspects of plaintiff's testimony, his medical records, and his activities, this court is compelled to determine that the ALJ's credibility findings and interpretation of the record were not supported by substantial evidence. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 723. The ALJ's reasons were neither sufficiently specific nor sufficiently clear and convincing to support her decision to discredit plaintiff's testimony. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284.
Overruling the ALJ's credibility determination also compels the conclusion that the ALJ also erred by finding plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity to perform his former work as a retail bookstore clerk. If plaintiff's description of his limitations is credited, there is no dispute that he cannot perform the bookstore job. See vocational expert's testimony on cross examination (Tr. 56-57, 59-60).
Where the ALJ improperly rejects the claimant's testimony regarding limitations, and the court would conclude that the claimant is disabled if the testimony were credited, the court "will not remand solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings regarding that testimony." Varney v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) (Varney II). In such cases, the court is to credit the testimony as a matter of law. Id., see also Lester, 81 F.3d at 834; and see Schneider v. Commissioner, 223 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2000) (the court should remand for an award of benefits in cases in which the evidence, when given the effect required by law, demonstrates that no purpose would be served by remanding for further proceedings). See also Reddick, 157 F.3d at 729 ("We do not remand this case for further proceedings because it is clear from the administrative record that Claimant is entitled to benefits").
In this case, the record has been fully developed. The ALJ improperly disregarded or rejected evidence that established plaintiff's entitlement to benefits. Further proceedings "would serve no useful purpose." See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292; see also Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (if evidence that was improperly rejected demonstrates that claimant is disabled, court should remand for payment of benefits); Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1455 (9th Cir. 1993). Permitting the Commissioner a further opportunity to amend findings to comport with the denial of disability benefits is not in the interests of justice. See Rodriguez v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 759, 763 (9th Cir. 1989) (if remand for further proceedings would only delay the receipt of benefits, judgment for the claimant is appropriate).
V. Conclusion
The court concludes that the record is fully developed, and that further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose. Under the applicable standards, after giving the evidence in the Record the effect required by law, plaintiff is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of his impairments, and that he is disabled under the Act. Based upon the foregoing, this case is remanded to the Commissioner for the calculation and award of benefits. The calculation of the award shall be made from October 3, 1996. The decision of the Commissioner is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings and an award of benefits consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.