Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG-06-301614
McGuiness, P.J.
Defendant Janet Stanford appeals from an order granting a preliminary injunction directing her to stay away from plaintiffs’ facilities unless she needs medical care. Stanford presents various arguments challenging the court’s order. We conclude none of the contentions has merit. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 11, 2006, Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and The Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (hereinafter Kaiser) sued Stanford for trespass. On the same day, Kaiser filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause seeking a preliminary injunction asserting that Stanford’s conduct threatened to cause irreparable harm unless the court immediately enjoined her from entering any Kaiser facility except for medical care.
The basis for the request for interim injunctive relief was set forth in declarations from Karen Dastmalchian, Director at the Kaiser South San Francisco medical facility; Rich Bettencourt and Jon Bini, security managers for Kaiser; and Jason Curliano of Buty & Curliano LLP, attorney for Kaiser. Stanford had been previously employed at a Kaiser facility but she ceased employment there in or about 1998. Since that time, Stanford has attempted to gain access to the confidential files and member information that is stored at various Kaiser facilities. Stanford passed herself off as an employee by simply walking into a Kaiser facility and starting to work as though she was a newly hired or temporary employee. According to Kaiser, because it is a fairly large system, someone with Stanford’s knowledge can manipulate the system and individuals into hiring or permitting her to work until such time as a person with knowledge of her prior problems discovers that she is working at the facility.
According to Kaiser, interim injunctive relief was required because Stanford was continually attempting to gain access to nonpublic areas of the various Kaiser facilities. The Kaiser staff described several incidents in which they were able to prevent Stanford from entering nonpublic areas of the facilities. On February 29, 2006, the security staff at a Redwood City facility intercepted Stanford while she attempted to pass herself off as an employee. The police were called and Stanford was told she was not welcome at the facility. The police action caused a 30-day stay away order to be issued against Stanford at the request of the police department. On March 29, 2006, Stanford entered another Redwood City facility and claimed to be a new employee. The police were contacted and told Stanford that she was to leave and not return unless she needed medical attention. On March 31, 2006, Stanford attempted to start work at Kaiser’s business facility in San Bruno. Stanford asserted that she had been hired to replace the Administrative Services Director. A Kaiser security manager told Stanford she had not been hired for the position and she was not to enter the premises. Three police officers were called, and Stanford was told that she was to stay away from Kaiser facilities unless she was seeking medical treatment. Stanford was told that she would be trespassing if she returned to a Kaiser facility unless she needed medical care.
On July 21, 2006, PrideStaff, a temporary employment agency, sent Stanford to work at Kaiser’s office building in San Bruno. Stanford worked for approximately several hours until her presence was discovered by Kaiser staff. After an investigation, Kaiser staff learned that PrideStaff did not have a contract with Kaiser to provide temporary employees. An employee of PrideStaff “placed” Stanford at the Kaiser facility even though no one at Kaiser had authorized Stanford to work at the facility.
On July 25, 2006, Stanford faxed a cover letter and document to one of Kaiser’s business offices. In the cover letter, Stanford asked the recipient, Leticia, to “sign the attached Service Agreement, so that we can get started on this project.” The “Service Agreement” is purportedly between “Kaiser Permanente” and Stanford. According to Kaiser’ counsel, “Kaiser Permanente” is a trade name, and not a legal entity, and therefore, it would never draft or sign a contract bearing that name. The agreement provided, in relevant part, that Kaiser was to provide Stanford with office space and compensation of $10,000 a month so she could process medical claims to be submitted to Medicare and Healthcare Recoveries, Inc. According to Kaiser’s counsel, Kaiser did not accept Stanford’s offer to provide billing services, and no authorized Kaiser representative knowingly signed Stanford’s agreement. Although requested by counsel, Stanford never produced a signed copy of the agreement.
On July 31, 2006, Stanford left a message at Kaiser stating she intended to start work. And, on August 1, 2006, Stanford entered a Kaiser facility in Oakland and asserted that she had an employment contract. At that time, Kaiser’s counsel explained to Stanford that she did not have a contract with Kaiser, and he asked her to leave the premises, but she refused. Counsel told Stanford that although Kaiser was working on obtaining a restraining order against her, it would like to resolve the situation informally. However, Stanford would not agree to stop attempting to work at a Kaiser facility or to stop passing herself off as an employee without a court order. When counsel again asked her to leave, Stanford refused to leave and she stood in the elevator hallway area for almost an hour and a half. She agreed to leave after the police arrived.
Despite being told she had no employment contract with Kaiser, and that Kaiser had rejected her offer to work at its facilities, on September 29, 2006, Stanford filed two lawsuits (one in San Mateo County and one in Alameda County) seeking damages for breach of contract based on the agreement she had sent to Kaiser by facsimile on July 25, 2006. Stanford attempted to serve Kaiser by mailing the pleadings to one of Kaiser’s legal departments. In response, Kaiser’s staff and counsel sent Stanford letters explaining the proper name of the corporate entity allegedly sued in the pleadings, and identifying Kaiser’s agent for service of process. Although Stanford had not properly served Kaiser, its counsel offered to accept service of the pleadings in both lawsuits on behalf of any Kaiser entity. Stanford did not attempt to re-serve the summons and complaints. On December 4, 2006, both actions were dismissed without prejudice after Stanford filed a “Notice of Resolution” in both actions on December 1, 2006.
On December 6 and 7, 2006, Stanford again attempted to enter a Kaiser facility in Oakland. On December 6, Stanford unsuccessfully sought a security pass. She filled out a Kaiser “Photo Id and Card Access Information Request Sheet,” falsely representing that she was a contract employee, that she had an employee number, and that her job title was Medical Billing Coordinator. On December 7, Stanford again tried to get a security pass and she was told to leave the premises.
Stanford opposed the request for interim injunctive relief. She submitted several documents regarding the circumstances surrounding her presence at Kaiser facilities on July 21, 2006, and on August 1, 2006. As to the incident on July 21, 2006, Stanford asserted that she had been present on that day because she had accepted a temporary assignment to work at Kaiser through the PrideStaff temporary agency. As to the incident on August 1, 2006, she asserted that she was present on that day to perform billing services at the Kaiser facility, pursuant to a contract signed by Kaiser’s employees. Stanford did not explain her presence at the Kaiser facilities on the other dates asserted in the declarations submitted by Kaiser.
In reply, Kaiser’s counsel refuted Stanford’s claims that she had a viable breach of contract cause of action, noting that while Kaiser received a facsimile of Stanford’s proposed agreement on July 25, 2006, her offer to work for Kaiser was not accepted, no authorized Kaiser representative knowingly signed that agreement, and Stanford never produced a copy of the agreement signed by a Kaiser employee although she had been asked for a copy. Counsel additionally asserted that Kaiser was never properly served with any legal documents, no default was entered against Kaiser, Kaiser did not sign a resolution regarding Stanford’s claims, and Kaiser never agreed to settle either lawsuit.
The trial court granted Kaiser’s request for a temporary restraining order against Stanford and scheduled a hearing on the issue of a preliminary injunction for January 2, 2007. Before the hearing, Stanford did not call to contest the court’s tentative ruling, which granted the preliminary injunction. On January 4, 2007, the court filed its written order granting the requested preliminary injunction after considering Kaiser’s motion papers, Stanford’s opposition, Kaiser’s reply, and the evidence contained in those papers. The order enjoined Stanford from entering any facility or building she knew or should know was owned, operated or controlled by Kaiser unless she “presents for medical care.” The order was to remain in effect until a final judgment was rendered in the matter. Stanford filed a timely notice of appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(6); County of San Diego v. State of California (1997) 15 Cal.4th 68, 110 [order granting preliminary injunction is immediately appealable under Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6)].)
DISCUSSION
Stanford challenges the issuance of the preliminary injunction on both procedural and substantive grounds. None of her contentions warrants reversal of the trial court’s ruling.
Stanford incorrectly relies upon cases pertaining to motions for summary judgment. The order under review grants a preliminary injunction pending the resolution of Kaiser’s cause of action for trespass. “At this initial stage in the proceeding, the scope of our inquiry is narrow. We review an order granting a preliminary injunction under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citations.] Review is confined, in other words, to a consideration whether the trial court abused its discretion in ‘ “evaluat[ing] two interrelated factors when deciding whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction. The first is the likelihood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial. The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction were denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued.” ’ [Citation.] (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1090, 1109.)
Stanford contends that Kaiser offered no evidence in support of its request for injunctive relief because the documents submitted by Kaiser were hearsay, consisting only of signed “declarations” from alleged Kaiser employees. Stanford did not raise this specific contention below and she raises it for the first time in her reply brief. Accordingly, her argument is waived for purposes of appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); see Haskell v. Carli (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 124, 129; see also Tisher v. California Horse Racing Bd. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 349, 361.) In any event, a “statutory exception to the hearsay rule permits courts to rely upon affidavits in certain motion matters,” (Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1355), including a proceeding for a preliminary injunction (Alvarez v. Eden Township Hospital Dist. (1961) 191 Cal.App.2d 309, 313). (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 526, subd. (a)(2), 527, 2009.) In this case, Kaiser’s declarations subscribed “under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California” were the equivalent of affidavits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) Accordingly, the declarations were sufficient to support the grant of a preliminary injunction.
The copy of Drexwell Jones’ declaration that appears in Kaiser’s appendix does not include a subscription showing that it meets the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. However, because the other declarations, executed in full conformity with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5, sufficiently support the court’s order, we do not address the effect of any defect in Jones’ declaration.
Similarly unavailing is Stanford’s argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s ruling. “ ‘The essence of the cause of action for trespass is an “unauthorized entry” onto the land of another.’ . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . ‘[T]he intent required as a basis for liability as a trespasser is simply an intent to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred. . . . The defendant is liable for an intentional entry although he has acted in good faith, under the mistaken belief, however, reasonable, that he is committing no wrong.’ ” (Miller v. National Broadcasting Co. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1480-1481.) Kaiser sought injunctive relief only after Stanford refused its repeated requests not to enter its facilities unless she needed medical care and she thereafter continued to enter facilities pretending to be an employee and seeking a security pass that would give her access to nonpublic areas of the facilities and confidential patient files. We therefore reject Stanford’s argument that Kaiser gave no reason why it was seeking an injunction against her. To the extent Stanford argues interim relief should not have been granted because the facts are in dispute, we note that an order granting a preliminary injunction “reflects nothing more than the [trial] court’s evaluation of the controversy on the record before it at the time of its ruling; it is not an adjudication of the ultimate merits of the dispute.” (People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1109.)
DISPOSITION
The order filed on January 4, 2007, granting the preliminary injunction is affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, J. Siggins, J.