Opinion
2:23-cv-00643-HL
07-24-2024
CHRISTA KAINO, an Individual, Plaintiffs, v. HARNEY COUNTY HEALTH DISTRICT d/b/a HARNEY DISTRICT HOSPITAL, a Public Benefit Corporation, and DOES 1 THROUGH 50, Inclusive, Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
ANDREW HALLMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Christa Kaino (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant Harney County Health District d/b/a Harney District Hospital (“Defendant”) and Defendant Does 1-50, alleging religious discrimination under Or. Rev. Stat. 659A.030 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff claims Defendant failed to make a good faith effort to accommodate her religious beliefs when denying her a religious exemption from Defendant's COVID-19 vaccination policy and then terminating her employment. Defendant has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. ECF 13. For reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion should be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Does 1-50 and DENIED in all other respects.
BACKGROUND
The Court recites the following facts from Plaintiff's complaint and assumes that they are true for the purposes of reviewing the pending Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 572 (2007). In addition, the documents attached to the Complaint -which includes the correspondence concerning the exception - are properly incorporated by reference. See United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding a document “may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim”).
In August 2021, in an effort to limit the spread of the COVID-19, the Oregon Health Authority (“OHA”), under an executive order from then Governor Kate Brown, issued a vaccine mandate to all healthcare workers requiring they be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 2021. Pl's First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF 7, ¶ 12. Pursuant to federal and state laws prohibiting employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of religion, OHA's mandate allowed healthcare workers to seek and be granted exemptions from the vaccination requirement by submitting a request form. Id. ¶ 13. Defendant followed the OHA's vaccination mandate and required that its employees be vaccinated by October 18, 2021, and allowed any employee seeking religious exemptions to fill out and submit a form to be reviewed by Defendant's vaccine exemption committee. Id. ¶¶ 14 & 15. The exemption committee had the authority to approve or deny religious exemption requests as well as ask for more information about the request. Id.
Plaintiff is a “devout Christian” who began working for Defendant as their Unit Coordinator in April of 2007. Id. ¶¶ 2 & 3. Seven years later she began working in Defendant's radiology department as a limited license technician and was later promoted to radiology imaging manager. Id. On or about September 30, 2021, Plaintiff sought a religious exemption by filling out the necessary OHA request form. Id. ¶ 19. When asked to describe her religious belief and how it affected her ability to receive a COVID-19 vaccination, Plaintiff stated: “My faith lies in God as my healer, which has blessed me with natural immunity. To receive the vaccine would be a lack of my faith and accepting the immoral practice used in it's development.” Id. ¶¶ 19 & 20. She did not specifically identify herself as Christian on her request form. Id. Ex. B.
On October 15, 2021, Plaintiff received an email from Defendant's Human Resources department explaining that the committee could not reach a clear majority on her request and asked for more information. Id. ¶ 22. Specifically, the exemption committee noted they were “unclear about how the vaccine violated [her “religious belief”] and asked her to answer the question, “Are all medicines/treatments for you and your family avoided?” Id. ¶¶ 23 & 24. Plaintiff was further advised that she “may add more information to this request or reapply.” Id. Ex. C.
Plaintiff believed that the description she provided in OHA's religious exemption form was sufficient and that Harney's request for more information, particularly concerning what medicines she and her family avoid, was invasive and did not respond to Harney's email or provide additional information. Id. ¶ 26. On October 18, 2021, Harney notified Plaintiff that her employment would be terminated, effective the next day, “for failure to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 or to have a documented exemption to this mandate.” Id. Ex. D.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A court may dismiss “based on the lack of cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged” under a cognizable legal theory. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Cap. Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also CallerID4u, Inc. v. MCI Commc'ns Servs. Inc., 880 F.3d 1048, 1061 (9th Cir. 2018). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Teixeira v. Cty. of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. When a plaintiff's complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, the plaintiff's complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. at 557 (brackets omitted).
The court must accept as true the allegations in the complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff. Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 678; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Kwan v. SanMedica Int'l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1096 (9th Cir. 2017). The pleading standard under Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). “A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations omitted); Kwan, 854 F.3d at 1096. A complaint also does not suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. “Rule 8 does not empower [the] respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action ... and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Def. Mot. Dismiss, ECF 13. Specifically, Defendant argues the complaint fails to state a claim for religious discrimination because Plaintiff's objections did not amount to a bona fide religious belief, and instead were a personal preference, and because Plaintiff was terminated for her failure to provide information to the exemption committee, and not because of her religious beliefs. Id. 7-13. Defendant also asserts that granting Plaintiff's exemption without requiring further information would pose an undue hardship for Defendant. Id. 13-14. Finally, Defendant asserts that Defendant Does 1-50 should be dismissed because Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to conclude that they aided and abetted in any alleged religious discrimination. Id. 14-15.
I. Plaintiff has stated a claim for religious discrimination.
To establish religious discrimination under Title VII based on a failure to accommodate theory, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of the belief and conflict; and (3) the employer discharged her because of her inability to fulfill the job requirement. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs state-law claims are analyzed the same way. See Pullom v. U.S. Bakery, 477 F.Supp.2d 1093, 1100 (D. Or. 2007) (“Because O.R.S. 659A.030 is modeled after Title VII, plaintiff's state law discrimination claim can be analyzed together with her federal discrimination claim.”) (citing Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1437 n.2 (9th Cir. 1993) and Winnett v. City of Portland, 118 Or.App. 437, 847 (1993)). Title VII defines “religion” quite broadly and includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Tiano v Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
This Court first concludes that Plaintiff has alleged facts that would plausibly demonstrate that she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with her taking the COVID-19 vaccine. Determining whether an employee's religious belief is sincerely held or “truly religious in nature” can be challenging. Alvarado v City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1996). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned against second-guessing or interrogating the reasonableness of an individual's asserted religious belief. Bolden-Hardge v Off. of Cal. State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2023) (“we do not interrogate the reasonableness of [Plaintiff's] beliefs and instead focus our inquiry on whether she has alleged an actual conflict”); Doe v San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 19 F.4th 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 2021) (the court may not “question the legitimacy of [an individual's] religious beliefs regarding COVID-19 vaccinations”). However, many courts have been hesitant to find broad or sweeping statements of religious opposition sufficient to state a viable claim of religious belief. E.g., Kather v Asante Health Sys., No. 1:22-cv-01842-MC, 2023 WL 4865533, *5 (D. Or. July 28, 2023) (“[V]ague expressions of sincerely held Christian beliefs alone cannot serve as a blanket excuse for avoiding all unwanted employment obligations.”); see also Gage v Mayo Clinic, No. CV-22-02091-PHX-SMM, 2023 WL 8715519 (D. Ariz., May 3, 2023) (a “threadbare reference” to a religious belief cannot suffice to meet the first element of a bona fide religious belief at the motion to dismiss stage).
This Court is persuaded by the more recent decisions in the District of Oregon that declined to interrogate the reasonableness of Plaintiff's asserted religious belief at the motion to dismiss stage. Here, Plaintiff asserts that her faith lies in God as her healer, which has “blessed her with natural immunity” and “to receive the vaccine would be a lack of faith and accepting the immoral practice used in it's development.” FAC ¶¶ 19 & 20. This is similar to assertions found sufficient to state a claim in Small v OHSU, where the Plaintiff alleged that “[s]he believes that God is her creator and that her body is a temple” and that the vaccine would “go against her moral integrity, believing that God created her body to have a substantial immune system, with proper care.” No. 3:23-CV-01290-JR, 2024 WL 2153608, at *1 (D. Or. May 14, 2024).Similarly, in Bird v Randol, Plaintiff submitted an exemption request alongside multiple scripture verses, personal thoughts relating the verses to the current COVID-19 pandemic, and the belief that her “body as a temple of the Holy Spirit” should not be “defiled with potentially harmful substances.” No. 6:23-cv-1678-MC, 2024 WL 964244, *3 (D. Or. Mar. 6, 2024). The Court emphasized that the plaintiff's belief meets the plausibility standard of Rule 12 because courts cannot and should not “easily distinguish between beliefs springing from religious and secular origin.” Id. at *4 (citing Callahan v Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 687 (9th Cir. 1981)).
In contrast, four additional plaintiffs in Small failed to identify a “religious teaching that conflicted with the defendant's vaccination policy” or simply stated a “general reference to Christianity” and were found to not even meet the “fairly minimal” burden at the pleading stage.” Id. at *4 (citing Stephens v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-CV-00206-SB, 2023 WL 7612395, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 7623865 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023) (general references to “deeply held religious beliefs that God is [their] protector” or because of “deeply held religious beliefs” are insufficient)).
Here, Plaintiff's “God as her healer” assertion was coupled with her statement that to accept the “immoral practice used” in COVID-19 vaccine development “would be a lack of her faith.” FAC Ex. B. When considered in totality, and drawing every reasonable inference in Plaintiff's favor, this statement is not a vague expression nor a simple threadbare reference to her religious belief. It is instead one that specifically relates to the conflict between the COVID-19 vaccine and Plaintiff's faith in God as her healer. Thus, this Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a sincerely held religious belief that conflicted with the COVID-19 vaccine.
In her response, Plaintiff did not identify why she believes that the vaccine was immorally developed. But it can be inferred that her belief in God informed her opposition to receiving the vaccine based on immoral practices in its development. See Kather, 2023 WL 4865533, at *4 (concluding that it can be inferred that the plaintiff's “belief in God informs his opposition to receiving a vaccine he alleges originates from the use of fetal cells.”).
Defendant also alleges that Plaintiff was not terminated for declining a vaccine, but instead because she failed to comply with Defendant's request for information, which they were required to undertake as part of OHA's mandate. Def. Mot. Dismiss 10 (citing § 5:146, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) Guidance on COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and other EEO laws). This assertion is not supported by the applicable law. The EEOC guidance cited by Defendant does not require an employee to respond to information requests directed at the sincerity of the employee's religious beliefs. Id. It simply permits the employer to make that inquiry if it has an objective basis for “questioning either the religious nature or the sincerity of a particular belief[.]” Id. To be sure, some courts have held that once defendants determined the plaintiff's religious beliefs were sincerely held and prevented his vaccination, the employee's failure to participate in the interactive process for a reasonable accommodation can be fatal to the claim. See., e.g., Bartholomew v Washington, No. 3:23-CV-05209-DGE, 2024 WL 1426308, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 26, 2024) (so holding). But requiring an employee to participate in an interactive process is markedly different from requiring an employee to respond to requests for additional information to verify the sincerity of the employee's beliefs. Thus, if an employee has provided sufficient information for the employer to determine that the employee's beliefs were sincerely held, the employee is not required to respond to inquiries into the sincerity of their belief.
Furthermore, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, it is not clear that Plaintiff was terminated for failing to provide additional information. Plaintiff was never advised that her failure to provide additional information would be a basis for her termination. Instead, when seeking additional information, Defendant advised Plaintiff that she “may add more information to this request or reapply.” FAC Ex. C (emphasis added). In the termination notice, Defendant did not specifically reference Plaintiff's failure to provide information as the basis for her dismissal. Id. Ex. D. Thus, it is not clear from the complaint that Plaintiff was terminated for failing to provide additional information.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a sincerely held religious belief that conflicted with the COVID-19 vaccine. At the pleading stage, this is all the was required to state a claim under Title VII and Oregon state law. Thus, Defendant's argument that Plaintiff was required to respond to its request for information should be rejected, and Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied.
II. Undue hardship is not clear from the face of the complaint.
Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, the burden shifts to the employer to show “either that it initiated good faith efforts to accommodate reasonably the employee's religious practices or that it could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Bolden-Hardge v Off. of California State Controller, 63 F.4th 1215, 1224-25 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing Tiano v Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 139 F.3d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1998). “Undue hardship is an affirmative defense ... and accordingly, dismissal on that ground is proper only if the defendant shows some obvious bar to securing relief on the fact of the complaint or in any judicially noticeable materials.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). For this reason, undue hardship must generally be raised on summary judgment. MacDonald v. Oregon Health & Sci. Univ., 689 F.Supp.3d 906, 914 (D. Or. 2023)
Here, Defendant argues that granting Defendant's accommodation request without additional verification would constitute undue hardship as “negative impact and liability exposure [are a] basis to deny even valid requests for accommodation.” Def. Mot. Dismiss 13. Defendant also references other impacts of COVID-19, such as direct monetary costs and the risks of COVID-19 to other employees and the public. Id. These assertions are not supported by the facts pleaded in the complaint or in any judicially noticeable materials. Accordingly, Defendant's arguments concerning undue hardship cannot be considered on a motion to dismiss, and the motion to dismiss on those grounds should therefore be denied.
III. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Does 1-50.
“As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe' to identify a defendant is not favored.” Gillespie v Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted). “However, situations arise ... whe[n] the identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing of a complaint.” Id. “In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants[.]” Id. (citation omitted). The use of Doe pleading is appropriate only “where the identity of the alleged defendant is not known prior to the filing of a complaint” and the claims would not be otherwise subject to dismissal. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999).
Plaintiff's third claim for relief seeks to hold Defendant Does 1-50 liable for aiding and abetting under Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.030(1)(g), which provides, in relevant part, that it is an unlawful employment practice for “any person, whether an employer or an employee, to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.” Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Does 1-50 are members of Defendant's exemption committee and “acted in concert with, or gave substantial assistance to, [Defendant] in unlawfully discriminating against Plaintiff on account of her religion. [Defendant Does 1-50] did this knowing that it was unlawful for [Defendant], as Plaintiff's employer, to engage in religious discrimination against Plaintiff.” FAC ¶62.
Although Plaintiff has stated a claim for religious discrimination, her conclusory allegations against the Defendant Does 1-50 do not state a claim because they “fail to include any well-plead supporting facts.” Quinn v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-CV-00331-JR, 2023 WL 10354251, at *8 (D. Or. June 16, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 620344 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 2024) (so holding). Plaintiffs do not make any factual allegations regarding the individual Doe Defendants' conduct and, as a result, the allegations against them are insufficient to state a claim, even if they were later identified in the discovery process. Accordingly, the allegations against the Defendant Does 1-50 in the Third Claim for relief should be dismissed. Because Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to cure this pleading deficiency, the dismissal should be without prejudice and with leave to amend.
RECOMMENDATION
For reasons set forth above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF 13, should be GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Does 1-50 and DENIED in all other respects. Defendant Does 1-50 should be dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE and with leave to amend.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Findings and Recommendations will be referred to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due fourteen (14) days from service of the Findings and Recommendation. If no objections are filed, then the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. A party's failure to timely file objections to any of these findings will be considered a waiver of that party's right to de novo consideration of the factual issues addressed herein and will constitute a waiver of the party's right to review of the findings of fact in any order or judgment entered by a district judge.
These Findings and Recommendation are not immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure should not be filed until entry of judgement.