Opinion
D053214
7-10-2009
EUGENE KAHAUNAELE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. TRI-CITY MEDICAL CENTER et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Eugene Kahaunaele appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Tri-City Healthcare District (hereafter Tri-City). Kahaunaele contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that his personal injury lawsuit was barred by his failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.) (the Tort Claims Act).
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Government Code.
As we will explain, we conclude that because the information that Tri-City had on file with the Roster of Public Agencies of the California Secretary of State did not substantially conform to the requirements of section 53501, Kahaunaele was not required to file a prelitigation claim with Tri-City under the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that the lawsuit was barred by Kahaunaeles failure to comply with the Tort Claims Act, and we reverse the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 22, 2007, Kahaunaele and his wife Polly (plaintiffs) filed a lawsuit against Tri-City and other related entities, alleging that while visiting Tri-City Medical Center on August 4, 2005, Kahaunaele slipped on a wet floor and fell, causing injury. Kahaunaele asserted causes of action for premises liability and negligence, and his wife asserted a cause of action for loss of consortium.
The entities named as defendants in the complaint were Tri-City Medical Center, Tri-City Hospital District and Tri-City Healthcare District. The only entity to file an answer was Tri-City Healthcare District, which explained that it owns and operates Tri-City Medical Center and stated that it was erroneously sued as Tri-City Hospital District. Evidence in the record establishes that Tri-City Healthcare District was formerly known as Tri-City Hospital District.
As reflected in the record, Tri-City is a local hospital district organized under the local hospital district law. Tri-City filed an answer, in which it asserted as an affirmative defense that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act by timely filing a claim.
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that they were excused from filing a prelitigation claim with Tri-City.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary adjudication, which contended that Tri-Citys affirmative defense based on plaintiffs noncompliance with the Tort Claims Act was without merit. Shortly thereafter, Tri-City filed a summary judgment motion on the same issue, which contended that plaintiffs action was barred because they did not present a claim pursuant to the Tort Claims Act before filing suit. Because they presented the same issue, the motions were considered together by the trial court.
In their briefing of the motions, plaintiffs admitted that they did not timely file a claim with Tri-City pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. However, they contended that based on section 946.4, subdivision (a), they were excused from doing so. Specifically, they pointed out that under section 946.6, subdivision (a), if a public agency does not have on file with the California Secretary of State a statement in the Roster of Public Agencies that substantially conforms to the requirements set forth in section 53051, a party may pursue a lawsuit even if that party has not has not first timely complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) Plaintiffs contended that the statement that Tri-City had on file in the Roster of Public Agencies of the Secretary of State did not substantially conform to the statutory requirements, and that they were thus excused from presenting a timely claim. Plaintiffs also contended that Tri-City should be equitably estopped from asserting noncompliance with the Tort Claims Act as a bar to the lawsuit because Tri-City allegedly did not inform the public that it was a public agency subject to the Tort Claims Act.
Tri-City, on the other hand, contended that despite inaccuracies, its statement on file with the Secretary of State substantially conformed to the requirements of section 53051. It also contended that the applicable facts did not give rise to equitable estoppel.
The trial court ruled (1) that Tri-Citys statement in the Secretary of States Roster of Public Agencies during the relevant timeframe substantially conformed to the statutory requirements, and (2) that Tri-City was not estopped from contending that plaintiffs failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion for summary adjudication, and it granted Tri-Citys motion for summary judgment, concluding that plaintiffs were barred from suing Tri-City because they did not comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Tri-City.
Kahaunaele appeals from the judgment.
Kahaunaeles wife, Polly Kahaunaele, died on June 20, 2008. Kahaunaele alone is proceeding with the appeal.
II
DISCUSSION
The sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred in concluding that Kahaunaeles failure to comply with the claim presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act barred his lawsuit against Tri-City. In considering that issue we review the trial courts rulings on plaintiffs motion for summary adjudication and Tri-Citys motion for summary judgment.
A. Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) provides that summary judgment or summary adjudication is to be granted when there is no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party "bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact." (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) A moving paper may rely on "the pleadings, competent declarations, binding judicial admissions contained in the allegations of the plaintiffs complaint, responses or failures to respond to discovery, and the testimony of witnesses at noticed depositions." (Eisenberg v. Alameda Newspapers, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1375.) "A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question." (Aguilar, at p. 851.)
If the partys prima facie case is met, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show the existence of a triable issue of material fact with respect to that cause of action or defense. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849; Silva v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 256, 261.) Ultimately, the moving party "bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Aguilar, at p. 850.)
We review summary judgment and summary adjudication rulings de novo to determine whether there is a triable issue as to any material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of London v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 945, 972.) "In practical effect, we assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards which govern a trial courts determination of a motion for summary judgment." (Lenane v. Continental Maritime of San Diego, Inc. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1079.) "[W]e are not bound by the trial courts stated reasons for its ruling on the motion; we review only the trial courts ruling and not its rationale." (Gafcon, Inc. v. Ponsor & Associates (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1388, 1402.)
B. Applicable Statutory Provisions
Under the Tort Claims Act, a party seeking damages for personal injury from a public entity generally may not pursue a lawsuit unless it first presents a claim to the public entity within six months after accrual of the cause of action. (§§ 911.2, 945.4.) Within a year from the date that the cause of action accrues, a party who fails to file a timely claim may attempt to seek relief for the late filing from the public entity. (§ 911.4.) The claim presentation requirements of the Tort Claims Act apply to local hospital districts, and thus it applies to Tri-City. (Gov. Code, § 900.4; Health & Saf. Code, § 32492.) Here, Kahaunaele concedes that he did not present a claim to Tri-City, and there is no evidence that he timely sought leave to file a late claim.
Kahaunaele sent a demand letter to Tri-City on October 20, 2006, seeking compensation for his injury. However, the demand letter did not include a request to file a late claim and, in any event, was sent more than one year after Kahaunaeles August 4, 2005 injury. Kahaunaele does not contend that the October 20, 2006 letter satisfied the requirements of the Tort Claims Act.
Section 946.4, subdivision (a), however, provides that in certain circumstances, which Kahaunaele claims are present here, the failure to file a claim under the Tort Claims Act does not bar a lawsuit.
"a) Where provision is made by or pursuant to law that no suit may be brought against a public agency as defined in Section 53050 unless and until a claim is presented to the agency, the failure to present a claim does not constitute a bar or defense to the maintenance of a suit against such public agency if, during the 70 days immediately following the accrual of the cause of action:
"(1) No statement pertaining to the public agency is on file, or is placed on file, in the Roster of Public Agencies in the office of the Secretary of State and of the county clerk of each county in which the public agency then maintains an office, as required by Section 53051; or
"(2) A statement or amended statement pertaining to the public agency is on file, or is placed on file, in the Roster of Public Agencies in the office of the Secretary of State and of the county clerk of each county in which the public agency then maintains an office, but the information contained therein is so inaccurate or incomplete that it does not substantially conform to the requirements of Section 53051." (§ 946.4.)
The statute further provides: "On any question of fact arising within the scope of paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (a) [of section 946.4], the burden of proof is upon the public agency." (§ 946.4, subd. (b).)
As our Supreme Court has explained, "As is apparent from the language of section 946.4, substantial noncompliance by the agency with the requirements of section 53051 unconditionally excuses the claimant from filing a claim." (Wilson v. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (1977) 19 Cal.3d 555, 560 (Wilson ).) "[T]he agencys failure to comply with section 53051 entitles the claimant to ignore the claim-filing requirement entirely." (Ibid.)
Thus, to determine whether a party is excused under section 946.6 from complying with the Tort Claim Acts claim presentation requirements, we must focus on whether the public agency at issue has substantially conformed to the specific requirements of section 53051. Section 53051 establishes that a public agency must comply with the following requirements.
"(a) Within seventy (70) days after the date of commencement of its legal existence, the governing body of each public agency shall file with the Secretary of State on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State and also with the county clerk of each county in which the public agency maintains an office, a statement of the following facts:
"1. The full, legal name of the public agency.
"2. The official mailing address of the governing body of the public agency.
"3. The name and residence or business address of each member of the governing body of the public agency.
"4. The name, title, and residence or business address of the chairman, president, or other presiding officer, and clerk or secretary of the governing body of such public agency.
"(b) Within 10 days after any change in the facts required to be stated pursuant to subdivision (a), an amended statement containing the information required by subdivision (a) shall be filed as provided therein. The information submitted to the Secretary of State shall be on a form prescribed by the Secretary of State.
"(c) It shall be the duty of the Secretary of State and of the county clerk of each county to establish and maintain an indexed "Roster of Public Agencies," to be so designated, which shall contain all information filed as required in subdivisions (a) and (b), which roster is hereby declared to be a public record." (§ 53051.)
It is undisputed that Tri-City, as a local hospital district, is a public agency within the meaning of section 53051, and thus was required to follow the filing requirements set forth in that statute.
As used in section 53051, "[t]he term `public agency, . . . means a district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state, but does not include the state or a county, city and county, or city." (§ 53050.)
C. Facts Concerning Tri-Citys Compliance with Section 53051
Kahaunaele argues that undisputed evidence establishes that Tri-City did not file a statement with the Secretary of State that substantially conformed to the requirements of section 53051. Tri-City, in contrast, argues that the same undisputed evidence shows that its statement did substantially conform to the statutory requirements. To evaluate whether Tri-City substantially conformed to section 53051, we first set forth the relevant undisputed facts relied on by both parties.
On January 12, 2004, Tri-City filed a "Statement of Facts Roster of Public Agencies Filing" (the January 2004 statement) as required by section 53051 with both the Secretary of State and the San Diego County Clerks office. As required, the January 2004 statement listed the names and addresses of Tri-Citys seven board members, including the names and addresses of Tri-Citys chairman and secretary.
At the end of December 2004, Tri-City attempted to file an updated statement with both the Secretary of State and the San Diego County Clerks office (the December 2004 statement). The December 2004 statement reflected that two of the board members of the seven-member board had been replaced, and that the offices held by the board members had changed, so that the positions of secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, assistant treasurer and vice-chair were held by different board members than held those positions at the time of the January 2004 statement.
The San Diego County Clerks office accepted the December 2004 statement, but the Secretary of State rejected it for filing because the name of the filing party differed from the name on the previous filings. Tri-City attempted to correct the error and submitted another statement to the Secretary of State in February 2005 with a revised description of its legal name, but the Secretary of State again rejected the statement for the same reason. Tri-City admits that after the second rejection by the Secretary of State, it "inadvertently" did not attempt a third time to correct the error and have the statement filed. Tri-City did not file another statement with the Secretary of State until February 20, 2006, which was slightly more than six months after the August 4, 2005 slip-and-fall incident that gave rise to Kahaunaeles lawsuit.
The December 2004 statement identified the filing party as "Tri-City Healthcare District (a California Hospital District) (dba Tri-City Medical Center)," whereas the January 2004 statement identified the filing party as "Tri-City Healthcare District (a California Hospital District)."
On the statement that Tri-City attempted to file in February 2005, the filing party was identified as "Tri-City Healthcare District (a California Hospital District)/Tri-City Medical Center[;] Tri-City Hospital District; Tri-City Open MRI; Tri-City Open Air MRI."
It is thus undisputed that at the time of Kahaunaeles August 4, 2005 injury, there was no amended statement on file with the Secretary of State reflecting changes in board membership that had occurred after January 2004, and the information in the January 2004 statement was inaccurate in that it listed two board members who were no longer on the board as well as the wrong board members for the offices of secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, assistant treasurer and vice-chair. The failure to update the statement on file with the Secretary of State violated section 53051, subdivision (b). However, the statement on file with San Diego Countys Clerks Office was correct and up-to-date.
In his appellate briefing, Kahaunaele states that the January 2004 statement may also have been inaccurate in that it did not reflect Tri-Citys current legal name. He bases this assertion solely on the fact that the amended statement that Tri-City attempted to file with the Secretary of State in February 2005 identified the filing party as "Tri-City Healthcare District (a California Hospital District)/Tri-City Medical Center[;] Tri-City Hospital District; Tri-City Open MRI; Tri-City Open Air MRI." However, there is no evidence in the record of a legal name change by Tri-City. On the contrary, the evidence submitted by Tri-City establishes that as of August 2005, Tri-Citys legal name remained "Tri-City Healthcare District (a California Hospital District)," which is the name reflected on the January 2004 statement.
As we have explained, pursuant to section 946.4, subdivision (a), a party is not barred from maintaining a lawsuit against a public agency despite the failure to file a prelitigation claim "if, during the 70 days immediately following the accrual of the cause of action: . . . (2) A statement or amended statement pertaining to the public agency is on file, or is placed on file, in the Roster of Public Agencies in the office of the Secretary of State and of the county clerk of each county in which the public agency then maintains an office, but the information contained therein is so inaccurate or incomplete that it does not substantially conform to the requirements of Section 53051." (§ 946.4, subd. (a).)
There appears to be no dispute that Kahaunaeles causes of action against Tri-City accrued on August 4, 2005, when Kahaunaele was injured. Thus, to decide whether Kahaunaeles failure to file a claim under the Tort Claims Act bars this lawsuit, we must focus on the information on file in the Roster of Public Agencies within the 70 days following August 4, 2005 — i.e., from August 4, 2005 through October 13, 2005 — to determine whether it was "so inaccurate or incomplete that it [did] not substantially conform to the requirements of Section 53051." (§ 946.4, subd. (a)(2).) Because the January 2004 statement constituted the information that Tri-City had on file with the Secretary of State within the 70 days following Kahaunaeles injury, the January 2004 statement is the focus of our analysis.
In general, an action for personal injury "accrues on the date of injury" (McKelvey v. Boeing North American, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 151, 160), unless the discovery rule applies, under which accrual is delayed "until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action." (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.) Here, neither Kahaunaele nor Tri-City argues that the discovery rule applies.
D. Did Tri-City Substantially Conform to the Requirements of Section 53051?
We thus turn to an analysis of whether Tri-Citys January 2004 statement substantially conformed to the statutory requirements.
1. Case Law Addressing Substantial Conformity with Section 53051
Surprisingly few cases have addressed whether a public agencys statement on file with the Roster of Public Agencies "substantially conform[ed] to the requirements of [s]ection 53051." (§ 946.4, subd. (a)(2).)
As part of his briefing in the trial court, Kahaunaele submitted documents relevant to the legislative history of section 946.4, and he refers to those documents again on appeal. We have reviewed those documents, but we did not find them to contain information that would substantially assist us in defining the circumstances in which a public agency fails to substantially conform to the requirements of section 53051.
First, the authority most on point is Banfield v. Sierra View Local Dist. Hospital (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 444, 451 (Banfield). There the plaintiff submitted evidence showing that "[t]he statements, [filed by two local hospital districts in the applicable Roster of Public Agencies], failed to show `substantial changes which had occurred in the name and address of the secretary of each hospital." (Ibid.) The trial court in Banfield had "grant[ed] . . . relief under . . . section 946.4 from the requirement of presenting a claim because the hospital[s] had not filed the required information with the roster of public agencies." (Id. at p. 452.) The hospital districts did not challenge that finding on appeal, and the appellate court relied on that finding in its analysis of the statute of limitations issue that was before it. (Id. at p. 456.) Thus, Banfield describes a situation very similar to that presented here, namely hospital districts that did not file an amended statement to reflect the identity of their new secretaries. Banfield described and adopted a trial court ruling that the hospital districts failure to update the identity of their secretaries constituted a lack of substantial conformance with the requirements of section 53051.
Second, although it did not directly address whether a public agency substantially conformed to the requirements of section 53051, our Supreme Court in Wilson, supra, 19 Cal.3d 555, provided useful guidance regarding the scope and purpose of section 946.4. In Wilson, the plaintiff did not timely file a claim with the public agency regarding his personal injury claim. (Id. at pp. 558-559.) The plaintiff relied on section 946.4 to contend that he was not required to file a prelitigation claim because the public agencys statement on file in the Roster of Public Agencies "misstated the agencys address and the names of its members and officers." (Wilson, at p. 559.) Because the public agency did "not contend that the alleged inaccuracies involved . . . are insubstantial," Wilson did not address whether the public agencys statement substantially conformed with section 53051. (Wilson, at p. 562.) However, Wilson did make one observation important to our analysis. Specifically, Wilson made clear that "section 946.4 contains no requirement of a showing of actual deception or confusion . . . . [P]ublic agencies should be induced to comply with section 53051; prejudice resulting from incomplete or incorrect roster information should be presumed to exist, so long as the error or omission is a `substantial one." (Ibid.)
Third, and finally, relevant to any analysis of whether a party substantially conformed to the requirements of section 53051 is our Supreme Courts statement in Tubbs v. Southern California Rapid Transit Dist. (1967) 67 Cal.2d 671, 676 (Tubbs) about the purpose of that statute. According to Tubbs, "[t]he purpose of the statute requiring information for the Roster of Public Agencies (§ 53051) was to provide a means for identifying public agencies and the names and addresses of designated officers needed to enable or assist a person to comply with any applicable claims procedure." (Ibid.)
Wilson addressed the purpose of section 946.4, but not section 53051, stating that at least one of the purposes of section 946.4 was to "assure compliance by public entities with section 53051." (Wilson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 558.)
2. Application of the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance
Because the case law defining what constitutes substantial conformity with the requirements of section 53051 is sparse, the parties rely in their briefing on the doctrine of substantial compliance to discuss whether the information contained in Tri-Citys statement on file with the Secretary of State substantially conformed to the requirements of section 53051. We find it appropriate to apply the doctrine of substantial compliance in our analysis because the terms "substantial conformity" and "substantial compliance" appear to be used interchangeably. (See, e.g., Fox Bakersfield Theatre Corp. v. City of Bakersfield (1950) 36 Cal.2d 136, 145 [stating that a provision requiring "substantial conformity" meant that "substantial compliance" was required].) Accordingly, an inquiry into whether Tri-City substantially complied with the requirements of section 53051 will help us determine whether Tri-City substantially conformed to those requirements.
"`"Substantial compliance, as the phrase is used in decisions, means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute," as distinguished from "mere technical imperfections of form."" (Hanf v. Sunnyview Development, Inc. (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 909, 916.) As our Supreme Court has stated, "each objective or purpose of a statute must be achieved in order to satisfy the substantial compliance standard." (Costa v. Superior Court (2006) 37 Cal.4th 986, 1017, fn. 24 (Costa).) "[W]hen there is . . . actual compliance as to all matters of substance then mere technical imperfections of form or variations in mode of expression . . . or such minima as obvious typographical errors, should not be given the stature of noncompliance." (Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman (1962) 58 Cal.2d 23, 29 (Stasher).) "In determining whether a [party] has substantially complied with statutory requirements [ t]he paramount consideration is the objective of the statute." (North Pacifica LLC v. California Coastal Com. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1431.) The doctrine of substantial compliance has been applied in many different substantive areas, including to the Tort Claims Act, to determine whether the claim filed by a party meets the statutory requirements. (See City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447, 456-457.)
Because section 946.4 — the statute which excuses a party from filing a prelitigation claim — applies when there has not been substantial conformity with the requirements of section 53051, we inquire into the objective of section 53051 in determining whether "each objective or purpose of a statute" has been achieved. (Costa, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1017, fn. 24.) According to our Supreme Court, section 53051 has as its objective "to provide a means for identifying public agencies and the names and addresses of designated officers needed to enable or assist a person to comply with any applicable claims procedure." (Tubbs, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 676.) As we have seen, section 53051 accomplishes that objective by requiring that the public agency file a statement with both the Secretary of State and the clerk of each relevant county stating (1) its name; (2) its mailing address; (3) "[t]he name and residence or business address of each member of the governing body of the public agency"; and (4) "[t]he name, title, and residence or business address of the chairman, president, or other presiding officer, and clerk or secretary of the governing body of such public agency" (§ 53051, subd. (a)), and by requiring that the information be updated "[w]ithin 10 days after any change in the facts required to be stated pursuant to subdivision (a)" (§ 53051, subd. (b)).
As we will explain, Tri-City did not comply with the objective of the statute in that it omitted information "needed to enable or assist a person to comply with any applicable claims procedure." (Tubbs, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 676, italics added.) Although there was clearly a "change in the facts required to be stated pursuant to subdivision (a)" (§ 53051, subd. (b)) due to the change in board membership, Tri-City did not file an amended statement with the Secretary of State within 10 days after the change in facts as required by section 53051, subdivision (b). Thus, the statement on file did not contain the current information required by section 53051, subdivision (a).
Kahaunaele argues that we should find lack of substantial compliance because Tri-City did not comply with 53051, subdivision (b), which states that "[w]ithin 10 days after any change in the facts required to be stated pursuant to subdivision (a), an amended statement containing the information required by subdivision (a) shall be filed as provided therein." Kahaunaeles focus on section 53051, subdivision (b) is misplaced. Section 946.4, subdivision (a) provides that when a public agency has information on file in the applicable Roster of Public Agencies, a person is excused from filing a claim if "the information contained therein is so inaccurate or incomplete that it does not substantially conform to the requirements of Section 53051." (§ 946.4, subd. (a)(2).) Thus, according to statute, our focus must be on whether the information a public agency has on file does not substantially conform to the statutory requirements, rather than on whether the public agency failed to comply with the requirement in section 53051, subdivision (b) that it update its information within 10 days of any change in the pertinent facts.
Specifically, the information contained in the Roster of Public Agencies did not reflect the appointment of a different board member to the office of secretary, so that both the name and address of Tri-Citys secretary were incorrect. This inaccuracy was not a "mere technical imperfection[] of form or [a] variation[] in mode of expression . . . or such minima as obvious typographical errors." (Stasher, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 29.) On the contrary, the name and address of Tri-Citys current secretary was relevant to enabling and assisting a person to file a claim because a party may choose to present a claim (or request to file a late claim) to a public agency by delivering it or mailing it to the agencys secretary. (§ 915, subd. (a) [a party presents a claim or request to file a late claim to a public agency under the Tort Claims Act "by either of the following means: [¶] (1) Delivering it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof. [¶] (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body at its principal office"].) Indeed, because Tri-City did not list a clerk or an auditor on the statement on file in the Roster of Public Agencies, the only way a claimant could have filed a claim with Tri-City based on information in the Roster of Public Agencies was by delivering a claim to its secretary or mailing the claim to its secretary or its governing body (i.e., its board). The information about Tri-Citys secretary was thus of central importance, and because that information was inaccurately stated in the Secretary of States Roster of Public Agencies, Tri-City did not substantially conform to the requirements of section 53051.
Because the information that Tri-City had on file with the Secretary of State reflected the name and home address of the previous secretary, it reflected incorrect information about the home address of Tri-Citys current secretary. We find the inaccurate information about the current secretarys home address to be significant for the purpose of our substantial compliance analysis. As we have noted, section 915, subdivision (a) provides that a claim shall be presented by "by either of the following means: [¶] (1) Delivering it to the clerk, secretary or auditor thereof. [¶] (2) Mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, or to the governing body at its principal office." The statute is arguably ambiguous as to whether a claimant may mail or deliver the claim to the secretary at the secretarys home address, rather than at the governing bodys principal office. However, because of the statutory ambiguity, a claimant may reasonably interpret the statute as authorizing delivery or mailing to the secretarys home address as an acceptable method of presenting a claim and may rely on that interpretation when presenting a claim. Accordingly, when an agency has on file inaccurate information about the secretarys home address, it frustrates the purpose of the statute to provide "the names and addresses of designated officers needed to enable or assist a person to comply with any applicable claims procedure." (Tubbs, supra, 67 Cal.2d at p. 676, italics added.)
We also do not find it significant that Tri-City had accurate information on file with the San Diego County Clerks office. Section 53051 plainly requires that a public agency file an accurate statement with both the Secretary of State and the clerks of the counties where it maintains offices. (§ 53051, subd. (a).) Tri-City failed to substantially comply with the statute by failing to maintain accurate information in each of the required rosters. To advance the purpose of section 53051, a party should expect to be able to consult either source to obtain accurate information to assist it in filing a claim.
Our decision that Tri-City did not substantially conform to the requirements of section 53051 is in accord with Banfield, in which the hospital districts information on file in the Roster of Public Agencies was found not to substantially conform when it failed to "show `substantial changes which had occurred in the name and address of the secretary" because it failed to file an amended statement under section 53501, subdivision (b) after a change in board membership. (Banfield, supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at p. 451.)
Tri-City argues that it substantially complied with section 53051 despite the inaccuracies in its statement on file with the Secretary of State because a party would not need accurate information about Tri-Citys secretary to file a valid claim under the Tort Claims Act. Tri-City points out that (1) delivery or mailing to the secretary is only one way of filing a claim; and (2) even if a claimant relied to his or her detriment on inaccurate information about a public agency in the Roster of Public Agencies to file a claim, under section 915, subdivision (e) the claim would nevertheless be deemed to be in compliance with the statutory service requirements.
Section 915, subdivision (e) states: "A claim, amendment or application shall be deemed to have been presented in compliance with this section to a public agency as defined in Section 53050 if it is delivered or mailed within the time prescribed for presentation thereof in conformity with the information contained in the statement in the Roster of Public Agencies pertaining to that public agency which is on file at the time the claim, amendment or application is delivered or mailed."
We reject this argument for two reasons. First, Tri-City has cited no authority, and we are aware of none, holding that substantial compliance will be found unless the errors and omissions at issue were of such a magnitude that the objectives of the statute became impossible to achieve under any circumstance. The proper inquiry is much less demanding and focuses on whether the lack of compliance served to "undermine or frustrate the basic purposes served by the statutory requirements" or "interfered with the purpose underlying the relevant statutory provision." (Costa, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1019, 1018, italics added.) Here, as we have discussed, Tri-Citys failure to provide updated information about its secretarys name and address served to undermine the policy of providing information to enable parties to file a claim against Tri-City. Second, Tri-Citys argument runs counter to the views expressed by our Supreme Court in Wilson with respect to whether prejudice is required before a party may rely on section 946.6 to excuse the claim filing requirement. Wilson states that "section 946.4 contains no requirement of a showing of actual deception or confusion" and establishes that prejudice is presumed from a failure to comply with section 53051 "so long as the error or omission [wa]s a `substantial one." (Wilson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 562.) Here, as we have discussed, Tri-Citys error was a substantial one in that it resulted in the omission of information central to the filing of a claim, namely the name and address of Tri-Citys current secretary. Thus, prejudice due to the existence of the errors and omissions is presumed and need not be separately established.
We accordingly conclude that the trial court erred in (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Tri-City, and (2) denying Kahaunaeles motion for summary adjudication with respect to the affirmative defense asserted by Tri-City alleging that the lawsuit was barred because Kahaunaele failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act.
We need not, and do not, address whether there is any merit to Kahaunaeles claim that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies in this case.
AARON, J.
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed, and this action is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
I CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.