Opinion
Civil Action 21-289
06-30-2021
WILLIAM F. KAETZ, Plaintiff, v. FREDA L. WOLFSON, et al., Defendants.
Judge Ranjan
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Amended Complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) with prejudice.
II. Report
A. Relevant Background
Plaintiff William F. Kaetz brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and various other statutes, arising out of events that have occurred during his pending criminal prosecution. He is a federal pretrial detainee in custody at the Allegheny County Jail in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania related to charges of threats to assault and murder a United States district judge, interstate communications containing threats to injure, making restricted information publicly available and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. See 2:21-cr-71 (D.N.J.).
His criminal case was transferred to this District on May 11, 2021 and is pending before the Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan at Docket No. 2:21-cr-211.
Plaintiff submitted a civil rights complaint to this district along with a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). His motion was granted and the complaint was docketed (ECF No. 6).
In his original Complaint, Plaintiff named as defendants Freda L. Wolfson, the Chief Judge of the District Court for the District of New Jersey, plus “all 3rd U.S. Dist. judges enforcing pandemic Speedy Trial Act continuances, ” “all 3rd Dist. Attorneys enforcing pandemic Speedy Trial Act continuances, ” and the United States. (Compl. at 13-15.) Plaintiff alleged that he has been denied his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment, the Speedy Trial Act, and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection and due process clauses because of “Standing Orders” and “Emergency Orders” that have delayed his criminal trial. He contended that by the issuance of various court orders entered in response to the coronavirus pandemic, he has been denied his constitutional right to be indicted within sixty days of his arrest and proceed to trial within one hundred days of his arrest. Count I of the Complaint alleged that in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1983, the delays in his criminal proceedings have deprived him of his constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment and the Speedy Trial Act. In Count II, he alleged a conspiracy to deprive him of his rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
Given that Plaintiff's charges are being prosecuted in a district in the Third Circuit, the Court concludes that his references to the “3rd District” are meant to refer to the Third Circuit.
In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial....” U.S. Const. amend. VI.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), (c).
A Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) was issued (ECF No. 8), recommending that the Complaint be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The R&R concluded, among other things, that Plaintiff's Complaint impermissibly sought to raise challenges to his criminal case, he could not bring claims against judges and prosecutors who had no part in his criminal prosecution and defendants have absolute immunity.
After the R&R was issued, Plaintiff's motion to amend (ECF No. 9) was granted and he filed an Amended Complaint on May 19, 2021 (ECF No. 12). He describes his pleading as a “Complaint for Injunctive, Writ, Habeas, Monetary relief and Declaratory Damages.” It references the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, 5 U.S.C. § 502 (the Administrative Procedures Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (RICO), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (RLUIPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (FTCA), and N.J.S.A 10:6-2 (the New Jersey Civil Rights Act), and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) as the bases for Plaintiff's claims.
As a review of the Amended Complaint reveals, however, all of Plaintiff's claims stem from the issuance of standing orders, emergency orders and continuances related to the current pandemic.
B. Standard of Review
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (“PLRA”), courts are required to screen complaints at any time where a prisoner has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The PLRA provides in relevant part that:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal-
i. is frivolous or malicious;
ii. fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or
iii. seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Thus, the Amended Complaint must be screened to determine whether it should be dismissed.
C. Analysis
Plaintiff's claims arise out of the criminal charges that were filed against him in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey and subsequently were transferred to this Court. His Amended Complaint alleges that all United States district judges in the Third Circuit have unconstitutionally delayed criminal proceedings, including his own, by issuing standing orders and emergency orders in response to the coronavirus pandemic. He also alleges that all Third Circuit United States attorneys are enforcing these allegedly unconstitutional orders, and that Chief Judge Wolfson improperly issued such orders. He incorporates by reference his criminal case, No. 2:20-cr-01090-01 (D.N.J.), and his previously-filed civil rights case in this district (No. 21-cv-62), in which he alleges that criminal charges were filed against him in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment right to free speech. A Report and Recommendation was issued on June 7, 2021 recommending dismissal of that action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This docket number relates to his appeal from Chief Magistrate Judge Eddy's detention order. That case was closed when Judge Ranjan affirmed the order of detention.
Plaintiff's claims in this case are meritless and should be dismissed, as discussed below.
1. Failure to State a Claim
The Supreme Court has held that a complaint must contain facially plausible claims, that is, a plaintiff must “plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A plaintiff must plead and demonstrate a defendant's “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to assert claims against “all 3rd District Court Judges [sic] enforcing pandemic speedy trial act [sic] continuances” and “all 3rd District U.S. Attorneys [sic] who are enforcing pandemic speedy trial act [sic] continuances.” He cannot state a claim against all judges in the Third Circuit, however, because other than the specific judges involved in his criminal case, there are no allegations in the Amended Complaint that they committed any acts or failed to take some action that allegedly caused harm to Plaintiff or violated his civil rights. Simply put, they are not alleged to be involved in his criminal proceedings in any way, including, but not limited to, issuing orders related to the Speedy Trial Act or the pandemic. The Court also takes judicial notice of the criminal dockets related to Plaintiff's current criminal charges. These dockets confirm that only Chief Judge Wolfson and Judge Ranjan allegedly have taken or failed to take any action that relates in any way to Plaintiff's criminal proceedings.
Similarly, the Amended Complaint does not allege that “all” Third Circuit prosecutors or the United States generally have engaged in any conduct related to Plaintiff or are involved in his criminal proceedings.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not pleaded any basis for asserting claims on behalf of other potential criminal defendants in matters in which he is not involved. He may not do so because “the federal courts adhere to a prudential rule that ‘[o]rdinarily, one may not claim standing ... to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.'” The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 362 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114 (1976)).
Because Plaintiff's generalized claims against all Third Circuit judges, Third Circuit prosecutors and the United States fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, they should be dismissed.
2. Plaintiff's Claims Relating to his Pending Prosecution
A federal pretrial detainee cannot challenge the proceedings in his pending federal criminal case by filing a civil lawsuit or a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Rather, a defendant who seeks to challenge some aspect of his criminal prosecution must assert such claims in the criminal case itself. “Where a defendant is awaiting trial, the appropriate vehicle for his constitutional rights are pretrial motions or the expedited appeal procedure provided by the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), (c).” Whitmer v. Levi, 276 Fed.Appx. 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2008). See also Falcon v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 52 F.3d 137, 139 (7th Cir. 1995) (“It seems to us to go far afield to seek habeas corpus relief which could conceivably interfere with the trial judge's control of the criminal case pending before him.”)
Thus, the only appropriate proceeding in which Plaintiff may challenge his confinement or the timing of his trial is his current criminal proceeding before Judge Ranjan, not in a civil lawsuit. For that reason alone, his claims must be dismissed.
Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel in his criminal case previously filed two motions to dismiss which raised similar challenges to his confinement and delays in his prosecution. See 21-cr-71 (D.N.J.), ECF Nos. 43, 44. Judge Ranjan denied both motions. See ECF Nos. 60, 61.
As relevant here, Judge Ranjan dismissed Plaintiff's contention that his rights under the Speedy Trial Act were violated when an indictment was returned more than thirty days after his arrest. The Court held that the time was effectively tolled by the standing orders entered by Chief Judge Wolfson in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, orders which were “well supported” and “predicated on findings pertaining to ‘real time' public health risks.” Judge Ranjan also concluded that Plaintiff failed to show that his speedy trial rights under the Sixth Amendment were violated as his defense would not be impaired by the delay.
The Court further held that Plaintiff's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment were not violated as he failed to show that the delay between the alleged crimes and the federal indictment prejudiced his defense. Further, Plaintiff did not demonstrate that the government deliberately delayed bringing the indictment to obtain an improper tactical advantage or to harass him.
Because Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment, Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act challenges to his pending criminal proceeding have been decided, he cannot attempt to circumvent Judge Ranjan's rulings through a civil lawsuit that raises the same issues. Similarly, any further challenges to his criminal prosecution must be raised in those proceedings.
As for the prosecutors involved in Plaintiff's criminal case, they have no role in “enforcing” the Court's standing or emergency orders related to the pandemic or deciding Speedy Trial Act motions. Courts, not federal prosecutors, enforce their standing orders and rule on speedy trial matters. Indeed, prosecutors are required to comply with court orders.
As previously referenced, Plaintiff identifies a number of other constitutional amendments, statutes and decisions under which he purports to bring claims. Merely reciting a series of constitutional amendments or statutes does not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, however. As stated by the Supreme Court, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff has not connected any of the cited legal doctrines, statutes or amendments to factual allegations that support any such claims. As a review of the Amended Complaint demonstrates, all of Plaintiff's claims arise from standing orders and continuances related to the pandemic that purportedly have an impact on his criminal case. See Amended Complaint at pp. 10-30. All such issues must be resolved by Judge Ranjan.
Thus, because Plaintiff is precluded from bringing a civil lawsuit to challenge issues related to his pending criminal prosecution, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed.
3. Immunity
Even if Plaintiff could survive these challenges, all of the defendants are immune from suit. Plaintiff's claims against all Third Circuit district judges must be dismissed because “judges are immune from suit under section 1983 for monetary damages arising from their judicial acts.” Gallas v. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). While judges are not immune for any actions taken in a nonjudicial capacity, or “in the complete absence of all jurisdiction, ” id. at 768-69, Plaintiff's claims do not relate to such acts despite contention that district judges “acted in all absence of jurisdiction, ” and standing orders are “administrative” in nature. Chief Judge Wolfson, who entered the standing order, was acting in her judicial capacity, as is Judge Ranjan, who is presiding over Plaintiff's criminal prosecution, and Chief Magistrate Judge Eddy, who presided over his initial criminal proceedings. Regardless of Plaintiff's views about the constitutionality of the Courts' orders, the orders that were issued and the decisions rendered were made in a judicial capacity in matters in which they had jurisdiction. See Kaplan v. Miller, 653 Fed.Appx. 87, 89-90 & n.3 (3d Cir. 2016).
Plaintiff has also named all federal prosecutors who “enforce” standing orders related to the pandemic. Any such claim that is even potentially implicated by the allegations in the Amended Complaint relate to their conduct “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, ” and thus are barred by absolute immunity. See Johnson v. Koehler, 733 Fed.Appx. 583, 585 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976)).
Finally, the United States is also immune from suit. “It is a fundamental principle of sovereign immunity that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over suits against the United States unless Congress, via a statute, expressly and unequivocally waives the United States' immunity to suit.” United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 412 (3d Cir. 2000). Neither the Constitution nor 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides subject matter jurisdiction for federal question cases, contains such a waiver. See Clinton County Comm'rs v. U.S. E.P.A., 116 F.3d 1018, 1021 (3d Cir. 1997). “Neither the United States nor its agencies have waived sovereign immunity for constitutional claims.” Mierzwa v. United States, 282 Fed.Appx. 973, 976-77 (3d Cir. 2008).
D. Conclusion
A plaintiff should be granted leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff has already amended his complaint once. More importantly, he has no basis to assert claims on behalf of himself or others against all district court judges, prosecutors and the United States. In addition, claims related to his prosecution and incarceration must be raised in the context of his criminal proceedings. Thus, amendment of his claims would be futile.
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
If Plaintiff wishes to challenge this Report and Recommendation, he must seek review by the district judge by filing objections by July 19, 2021. Failure to file timely objections will waive the right of appeal.