In Mississippi, a plaintiff may espouse one of three theories in support of a claim of negligence such as this: (1) that the defendant's own negligence created a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injury; (2) that the defendant had actual knowledge of the danger she faced as an invitee or (3) that based upon the passage of time, the defendant should have known about the dangerous condition caused by another party and if defendant had acted reasonably, i.e., constructive knowledge of that condition should be imputed to that defendant. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999) (citing Downs v. Choo, 656 So.2d 84, 86 (Miss. 1995); Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss. 1992)).

Admissibility of witness testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Pounders, 970 So.2d 141, 145 (¶ 13) (Miss.2007); K–Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (¶ 21) (Miss.1999). “For a case to be reversed on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the defendant must show that it resulted in harm and prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant.”

To prevail on a claim of negligence under Mississippi law, "a plaintiff must prove by the preponderance of the evidence each element of negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate causation and injury." Schepens v. City of Long Beach, 924 So. 2d 620, 623 (Miss.Ct.App. 2006) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 981 (Miss. 1999)). Defendants do not challenge whether Toulmon owed a duty to Bridges, and a review of Mississippi law clearly shows that a duty was owed.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy , 735 So. 2d 975, 983 (Miss. 1999) ). We conclude that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion by admitting the medical records because they were excepted from the rule against hearsay and were properly authenticated by way of certification.

Blake v. Clein, 903 So.2d 710, 723 (Miss. 2005) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss. 1999)). Accordingly, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when excluding these records.

The reviewing court may reverse a case only if, "the admission or exclusion of evidence . . . results in prejudice and harm or adversely affects a substantial right of a party." K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss. 1999). It is self evident that a defendant loses a substantive right when he is prohibited from examining a close family member regarding his or her firsthand knowledge of plaintiff's physical and mental condition both before and after the alleged injury was incurred, as well as the plaintiff's post-surgical condition and activities, and any acts or statements contrary to those espoused in court.

We must review the "entire record and must accept that `evidence which supports or reasonably tends to support the findings of fact made below, together with all reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom and which favor the lower court's findings of fact.'" Id. (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted)). As the evidence clearly supports the circuit court judge's findings, this Court should not second guess his good judgment, especially in light of the fact that he viewed the evidence and heard the testimony of the witnesses.

Negligence may be proven by circumstantial evidence in the absence of testimony by eye witnesses, provided the circumstances are such so as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and place it within the field of legitimate inference. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy , 735 So.2d 975, 981 (Miss. 1999). If proof of a causal connection is to be established by circumstantial evidence, it must be sufficient to make the plaintiff's asserted theory reasonably probable, not merely possible, and it is generally for the trier of fact to say whether circumstantial evidence meets this test.

In his negligence claims against both Turtle Creek and TLW, Patterson had the burden to “prove by a preponderance of the evidence each element of negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate causation and injury.” McIntosh v. Victoria Corp., 877 So.2d 519, 522 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (quoting K–Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 981 (¶ 14) (Miss.1999)). ¶ 24.

In his negligence claims against both Turtle Creek and TLW, Patterson had the burden to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence each element of negligence: duty, breach of duty, proximate causation and injury." McIntosh v. Victoria Corp., 877 So. 2d 519, 522 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 981 (¶14) (Miss. 1999)). ¶24. Because the "basis of liability is negligence and not injury," Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Tisdale, 185 So. 2d 916, 917 (Miss.