In order to ultimately recover in an action such as this, Plaintiff must espouse one of three theories: (1) that defendant's own negligence created a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injury; (2) that defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition but failed to adequately warn plaintiff of the danger she faced; or (3) that, based upon the passage of time, defendant had constructive knowledge of the condition but failed to adequately warn plaintiff of the danger she faced. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999). The Court addresses those potential avenues individually.

"`[A]dmission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.'" K-Mart Corp. v.Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss. 1999). ¶ 36.

¶ 11. Coll claims that Wal–Mart defectively designed the display. He relies on Hardy ex. rel. Hardy v. K Mart Corp. , 669 So.2d 34 (Miss. 1996) (" Hardy I "), and K–Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex. rel Hardy , 735 So.2d 975 (Miss. 1999) (" Hardy II "), in support of his argument. Both cases involved customer Marion Hardy, who slipped and fell in spilled paint near a paint display at K–Mart.

In Mississippi, a plaintiff may espouse one of three theories in support of a claim of negligence such as this: (1) that the defendant's own negligence created a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injury; (2) that the defendant had actual knowledge of the danger she faced as an invitee or (3) that based upon the passage of time, the defendant should have known about the dangerous condition caused by another party and if defendant had acted reasonably, i.e., constructive knowledge of that condition should be imputed to that defendant. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999) (citing Downs v. Choo, 656 So.2d 84, 86 (Miss. 1995); Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1284 (Miss. 1992)).

Id. at 726. Mississippi premises liability law recognizes three means of establishing liability to an invitee: (1) defendant's own negligence created a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injuries; (2) defendant had actual knowledge of a dangerous condition which defendant did not cause, but defendant failed to adequately warn plaintiff of the danger she faced; or (3) based upon the passage of time, defendant should have known of the dangerous condition caused by another party if defendant had acted reasonably, but failed to warn of same. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999). As explained hereafter, Plaintiff fails to offer any proof to support any of these means.

(See Def.'s Brief in Supp. of Mot. for SJ [39] at p. 12.) "Mississippi law imposes upon a business owner or operator a duty to the invitee to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition and to warn of dangerous conditions which are not readily apparent to the invitee." K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 981 (¶ 14) (Miss. 1999) (citations omitted.) However, a business owner is not an insurer against all accidents and injuries that may occur on its premises.

Under Mississippi Law, there are three theories a plaintiff can use to support a premises liability claim: (1) that defendant's own negligence created a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injury; (2) that defendant had actual knowledge of a condition which defendant itself did not cause, but defendant failed to adequately warn plaintiff of the danger she faced as an invitee; or (3) that, based upon the passage of time, defendant should have known of the dangerous condition caused by another party if defendant had acted reasonably, i.e., constructive knowledge of the condition should be imputed to defendant. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999) (citing Downs v. Choo, 656 So. 2d 84, 86 (Miss. 1995)).

In Mississippi, a plaintiff may espouse one of three theories in support of a claim of premises liability: (1) that defendant's own negligence created a dangerous condition which caused plaintiff's injury; (2) that defendant had actual knowledge of a condition which defendant itself did not cause, but defendant failed to adequately warn plaintiff of the danger she faced as an invitee; or (3) that, based upon the passage of time, defendant should have known of the dangerous condition caused by another party if defendant had acted reasonably, i.e., constructive knowledge of the condition should be imputed to defendant. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 980 (Miss. 1999) (citing Downs v. Choo, 656 So. 2d 84, 86 (Miss. 1995)).

To prevail under this theory, "no proof of the operator's knowledge of the condition is necessary." K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So. 2d 975, 981 (Miss. 1999). Instead, Hudson must show the traditional elements of a negligence claim, including: duty; breach of duty; proximate causation; and an injury. See Lovett v. Bradford, 676 So. 2d 893, 896 (Miss.

Admissibility of witness testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Pounders, 970 So.2d 141, 145 (¶ 13) (Miss.2007); K–Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (¶ 21) (Miss.1999). “For a case to be reversed on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the defendant must show that it resulted in harm and prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant.”